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Foreword 
 
In December 2008, the Executive Board requested the Office of Evaluation to conduct a corporate-
level evaluation of IFAD’s capacity to promote pro-poor innovation. The two main objectives of the 
evaluation were to assess the Fund’s performance in promoting innovations that can be replicated 
and scaled up, and to generate findings and recommendations for enhancing future activities in this 
area.  
 
The evaluation found that, since the mid-1990s, concerted efforts had been made to incorporate 
innovation into the Fund’s key policy and strategy documents. This is demonstrated by the inclusion 
of innovation, learning and scaling up as one of the six principles of engagement in the IFAD 
Strategic Framework for 2007-2010, and by the fact that, of the five organizations covered by the 
evaluation’s benchmarking study, IFAD was the only one to have a definition and stand-alone 
strategy for innovation. Nonetheless, the evaluation found that insufficient resources and attention 
had been allocated for translating policy and strategy pronouncements into concrete action.  
 
As far as results on the ground are concerned, the performance of IFAD-funded projects in promoting 
innovation has improved over time. This should not, however, give rise to complacency as almost 50 
per cent of all projects evaluated in 2008 revealed only moderately satisfactory results in terms of 
innovation; very few were satisfactory; and even fewer were highly satisfactory. 
 
Scaling up is particularly weak in IFAD-funded operations. With IFAD’s relatively limited resources, 
scaling up is of paramount importance if the organization is to make a greater impact on rural 
poverty. While the evaluation found examples of successfully scaled up innovations, these were 
largely the result of individual initiatives and commitment rather than a systematic approach. Indeed, 
it was found that far too much is left to the initiative and entrepreneurial skills of individual IFAD 
country programme managers, who frequently act without clear incentives and/or accountability.  
 
The evaluation found that IFAD’s organizational capabilities and culture to promote innovations 
have enhanced since the beginning of 2000, but the improvements have been small and from a very 
low base. Among other things, there is a need for further development of human resource skills and 
competencies, for strengthening knowledge management systems, promoting a more open 
environment to foster creativity and for setting clear, focused directions for promoting innovation and 
scaling up. In this regard, IFAD’s recent appointment of a Chief Development Strategist as the focal 
point for knowledge and innovation may be seen as a move in the right direction. 
 
Perhaps the evaluation’s most important finding is that IFAD’s past efforts to promote innovation 
have been too broad-based. That is, rather than pursuing innovation in a focused manner, building on 
its comparative advantage, track record and specialization, the Fund has followed a “let a thousand 
flowers bloom” approach. One reason is that the Fund’s innovation strategy does not require it to 
channel resources to selected strategic areas, or to chart the way to become an innovative 
organization. If IFAD is to move forward, therefore, it should define selected “big bets” in areas of 
the agriculture and rural sector that have a proven need for innovative solutions and where the 
organization has (or can develop) a comparative advantage in promoting pro-poor innovations that 
might be scaled up. The evaluation also recommended that IFAD should be ready to promote 
country/project-level innovations that respond to challenges specific to the context. 
 
The evaluation includes IFAD Management’s response to the main findings of the report as well as an 
indication of its commitment to implementing the recommendations contained therein. 
 
 
 
Luciano Lavizzari 
Director, Office of Evaluation 
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IFAD’s Capacity to Promote Innovation and Scaling Up 
 
Corporate-level Evaluation 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 
1. Background. At its Ninety-fifth Session in December 2008, the Executive Board requested the 
Office of Evaluation (IEO) to undertake a corporate-level evaluation of IFAD’s capacity to promote 
pro-poor innovation. The main objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance of the 
Fund in promoting innovations that can be scaled up; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations 
for enhancing future IFAD activities in this area. The evaluation and IFAD Management’s response 
thereto were discussed by the Evaluation Committee and the Executive Board at their respective 
sessions in April 2010.  
 
2. Main findings. The evaluation found that, since the mid-1990s, concerted efforts had been 
made to incorporate innovation into the Fund’s key policy and strategy documents. This is 
demonstrated by the inclusion of innovation, learning and scaling up as one of the six principles of 
engagement in the IFAD Strategic Framework for 2007-2010, and by the fact that, of the five 
organizations covered by the evaluation’s benchmarking study, IFAD was the only one to have a 
definition and stand-alone strategy for innovation. Nonetheless, the evaluation found that insufficient 
resources and attention had been allocated for the purpose of translating policy and strategy 
pronouncements into concrete action. For instance, some recommendations generated by the first 
corporate-level evaluation on innovation, undertaken in 2000/2001, were never implemented, others 
only partially.  
 
3. As far as results on the ground are concerned, the performance of IFAD-funded projects in 
promoting innovation has improved over time. This should not, however, give rise to complacency as 
almost 50 per cent of all projects evaluated in 2008 revealed only moderately satisfactory results in 
terms of innovation; very few were satisfactory; and even fewer were highly satisfactory. Two 
qualifications should be borne in mind when interpreting positive results: (i) evaluations have paid 
more attention to assessing the innovations introduced and piloted during project/programme 
execution, and much less to verifying whether successful innovations had been scaled up – which 
would have been essential to ensure they had a greater impact on rural poverty; and (ii) IEO’s 
selection of projects for evaluation in any one year is largely done on a non-random basis, which may 
lead to a bias towards evaluating better-performing IFAD-funded interventions.  
 
4. The evaluation revealed that the Fund has paid relatively more attention to (and found more 
success in) innovative solutions in social engineering and institutional arrangements (e.g. promoting 
participatory approaches to planning and resource allocation) rather than in agriculture. Although 
IFAD has provided a fair amount of grant resources for agricultural research to develop innovative, 
low-cost agricultural technologies that can lead to better productivity and incomes, the results of such 
research have not easily found their way into its investment projects. The relatively higher proportion 
of social engineering and institutional innovations may be attributed to the fact that, in the 1990s and 
the first part of the new millennium, IFAD generally focused more on social capital formation and 
empowerment than on agricultural activities or identifying economic opportunities for poor rural 
people. This gives rise to concern, first of all because of the number of poor people who are also food-
insecure, and because of the Fund’s mandate to enhance agricultural productivity and incomes 
through on-farm activities. 
 
5. Scaling up is particularly weak in IFAD-funded operations. With IFAD’s relatively limited 
resources, scaling up is of paramount importance. While the evaluation found examples of 
successfully scaled up innovations, these were largely the result of individual initiatives and 
commitment rather than of a systematic approach. Indeed, it was found that far too much is left to the 
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initiative and entrepreneurial skills of individual IFAD country programme managers, who frequently 
act without clear incentives and/or accountability.  
 
6. There are two other reasons why IFAD’s performance in scaling up has been inadequate. First, 
as a general rule, little attention has been given to knowledge management, partnership-building, 
policy dialogue, etc., partly because IFAD has concentrated on designing investment 
projects/programmes (and, more recently, on direct supervision and implementation support) instead 
of allocating time, space and resources to non-lending activities. Second, in the past, the Fund’s 
operating model (which did not allow it to perform supervision directly or to provide implementation 
support) and lack of a country presence constrained its ability to promote, replicate and scale up 
innovations. In any event, it is fair to state that, having recognized the importance of scaling up, IFAD 
is now making due efforts in that regard, including a scaling-up initiative in collaboration with the 
Brookings Institution. Moreover, the strengthening of the Fund’s country presence, better quality 
assurance and quality enhancement systems, direct supervision and implementation support, and 
greater focus on non-lending activities are expected to collectively contribute to better results, not 
only in scaling up but also in identifying and piloting innovations. 
 
7. As mentioned above, lesson learning and knowledge management are essential for documenting 
and sharing successful innovations with a broader audience. While it is recognized that IFAD 
introduced a dedicated knowledge management strategy in 2007 and that some useful initiatives have 
been made to share experiences over the last two years, knowledge management may be further 
strengthened to support innovations within IFAD-supported country programmes/projects. The recent 
decision to integrate stand-alone knowledge management and innovation strategies is a step in the 
right direction, given that the two processes are mutually reinforcing and essential for innovation 
management.  
 
8. In tandem with loans, grants can play a useful role in selected phases of the innovation journey. 
IFAD has invested a fair amount of grant resources in developing pro-poor innovative solutions in 
agriculture and related areas. Nevertheless, although IFAD’s grant programme could play a strategic 
role in supporting the innovation agenda, evaluation experience confirms that the links between grants 
and investment projects have not been adequately defined in country strategic opportunities 
programmes (COSOPs) and thus have been mostly weak in operations. It is to be noted, however, that 
IFAD’s revised Grant Policy, approved in December 2009, emphasizes the strategic role of grants in 
innovation and, for the first time, also provides an opportunity to involve the private sector in research 
and pilot innovations for replication and scaling up through investment projects. 
 
9. Perhaps the evaluation’s most important finding is that IFAD’s past efforts to promote 
innovation have been too broad-based. That is, rather than pursuing innovation in a focused manner, 
building on its comparative advantage, track record and specialization, the Fund has followed a “let a 
thousand flowers bloom” approach. One reason is that the Fund’s innovation strategy does not require 
it to channel resources to selected strategic areas, or to chart the way to become an innovative 
organization. 
 
10. The evaluation found that while IFAD’s organizational capacity and culture to promote 
innovation have both improved since 2000, results have been rather poor and in any event start from a 
very low base. Among other things, there is a need for further development of human resource skills 
and competencies, for strengthening knowledge management systems, promoting a more open 
environment to foster creativity and for setting clear, focused directions for promoting innovation and 
scaling up. In this regard, IFAD’s recent appointment of a Chief Development Strategist as the focal 
point for knowledge and innovation is a move in the right direction. 
 
11. In continuation to the above, the evaluation notes that a number of organizational capabilities 
are required to support the innovation journey: systematic learning, structure and processes, culture, 
competencies (including staff skills and incentives), decision-making, and leadership and direction – 
capabilities that the 2000/2001 evaluation considered to be weak. The present evaluation found that 
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the third, and probably the most important objective of the Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation 
(IMI) – changing the organizational culture and practices to support innovation – has not, by and 
large, been met. The evaluation pointed out that, overall, IFAD’s organizational capacity for 
innovation remains weak and has changed only marginally since the beginning of the decade. In other 
words, the Fund’s strong strategic commitment to, and pronouncements on, innovation have not been 
adequately converted into action to become part of IFAD’s corporate culture. 
 
12. According to a staff survey conducted in 2009, despite having moved up five places IFAD still 
falls within the lowest quartile of the 43 organizations surveyed. More generally, the survey also 
showed that while staff considers IFAD to be relatively good at searching out or scouting for 
innovations, it is somewhat weak in prioritizing their promotion and scaling up. The survey also noted 
that while a number of key operational processes (e.g. quality enhancement and assurance) have been 
strengthened, the required human resource skills/incentives have not been put in place to promote 
innovation. Training opportunities are limited and it is not easy to obtain additional resources for 
advancing promising innovations. It was found that managers do not deal promptly with blockages 
that may hamper change (e.g. identifying additional resources for scaling up), and that IFAD’s 
knowledge and information systems do not perform well with regard to deciding on innovations for 
scaling up. The Fund is also slow in taking new ideas through the system and, importantly, is not 
sufficiently open to ideas from a wide diversity of sources, including poor rural people. All these and 
other factors constrain the development of IFAD into a more effective, innovative organization. 
 
13. Generally speaking, there is a disconnect between IFAD’s strategic pronouncements and its 
(still) weak institutional capacity to promote pro-poor innovation on the ground. Undeniably, 
however, progress has been achieved and a number of initiatives have been taken (such as that on 
scaling up). But if IFAD is to become a more effective, agile and innovation-driven development 
organization in the twenty-first century and, even more importantly, if it aspires to becoming a leader 
in promoting pro-poor innovation, it will need to make a quantum leap, particularly in terms of 
organizational culture change and capabilities, and follow its “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach 
within a few strategic areas. However, the evaluation recognized that IFAD should also remain open 
to promoting country-/project-level innovations that respond to perceived challenges related to the 
agriculture and rural development of specific country circumstances. It should also focus more 
attention on the process of scaling up than it has in the past. Clearly, this will not be possible without 
sufficient allocations of resources. 
 
14. Recommendations. The following recommendations aim to improve IFAD’s capacity to move 
from its strong strategic commitments and pronouncements towards a more systematic approach, 
thereby enabling it to achieve better results on the ground in promoting pro-poor innovations for 
subsequent scaling up. 
 
15. Define an innovation agenda for IFAD. As the Fund has followed a “let a thousand flowers 
bloom” approach to promoting innovation in the past, the evaluation recommended that an IFAD-
wide innovation agenda, consisting of a few selected themes or domains, be developed at the 
corporate level. The themes or domains selected – “big bets” – should be in areas of the agriculture 
and rural sector where there is a proven need for innovative solutions and where the organization has 
(or can develop) a comparative advantage in promoting pro-poor innovations that can be scaled up. 
The selected “big bets” would be part of the Fund’s innovation agenda, conceived as a corporate 
rolling programme over a period of, say, three years, and including specific objectives, activities, 
timelines, budgets, management and oversight arrangements, and monitoring and reporting 
requirements. The agenda would be approved by the President of the Fund, who would communicate 
it to IFAD staff and the Executive Board, with a commitment to provide annual reports on its 
implementation. However, the evaluation recognizes that the Fund also needs to remain open to 
promoting innovations at the country/project level that respond to perceived challenges related to the 
agriculture and rural development of specific country circumstances. 
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16. The evaluation recommended that more attention be paid to developing innovative solutions in 
agriculture technologies and related areas aimed at the economic empowerment of poor rural people. 
Examples of domains that IFAD might consider as “big bets” include health and weather insurance 
for poor rural people; rural finance products for dispersed populations; research on high-yielding crop 
varieties both in rainfed areas and for poor small-scale farmers; carbon projects; market access and 
value chain development (e.g. risk mitigation for the transition from subsistence to commercial 
farming); land titling (to include rural women); valorization of out-migration, and so on. 
 
17. Treat scaling up as mission-critical. It is essential that concrete approaches and strategies for 
scaling up be articulated by the time of COSOP formulation and project design. The role and 
contribution in this regard of IFAD’s direct supervision and implementation support, and of its 
country presence, should be clearly defined. IFAD should set corporate targets for scaling up and 
monitor and report on them annually. In this regard, it is also important to underline the accountability 
framework for scaling up, which would ensure that this critical phase in IFAD’s innovation journey is 
given due attention and resources. Adequate resources and space need to be allocated to non-lending 
activities, which are essential for scaling up. Staff competencies should be further developed to ensure 
success in this area. Greater effort is needed in terms of exchanging experiences and lessons on 
innovation and scaling up within and across the five geographical regions in which IFAD works, both 
in the regions and among operational staff at headquarters.  IFAD’s policy dialogue and partnership-
building agenda at the country level should be also driven by the objective of scaling up, and thus 
should focus on a few topics that are part of the Fund’s innovation agenda in the country concerned.  
 
18. The evaluation found that the concepts of innovation and scaling up were lumped together as a 
unique block in IFAD and that the measurement and reporting systems, including IEO evaluations, do 
not always distinguish between them. It is recommended that, in future, innovation be assessed and 
reported on as a separate process from scaling up. However, given the intrinsic relationship and 
dynamic between the two concepts, assessing the achievements of IFAD’s efforts in the entire 
innovation journey from scouting, to piloting, documenting and scaling up will be also essential. 
 
19. Strengthen organizational capabilities and culture. The Fund will need to develop practical 
innovation management skills. Management of innovation is different from implementing proven 
approaches inasmuch as it requires entrepreneurship, a capacity to cope with greater uncertainties, 
adaptation, a range of skills and the ability to make difficult choices on emerging evidence. Thus 
IFAD should develop an innovation-specific competency model for individuals and teams, drawing 
on current best practice. Such a model would provide the basis for a comprehensive skills 
enhancement programme and development of relevant tools, processes and monitoring systems. 
Innovation management skills should be developed as personal, team and networked competencies 
and adopted both by the staff of IFAD and by its partners. 
 
20. Staff recruitment should explicitly include innovation as a necessary characteristic. Incentive 
systems should be introduced that reward staff for promoting innovation and fostering the 
learning/sharing of good practices and experiences in innovation, i.e. the annual staff performance 
evaluation system should consider innovation in the assessment process. The evaluation found that 
there had been some improvement in operational processes in past years, but recommended that a 
study be undertaken to establish whether further adjustments were required in areas such as policy 
formulation, COSOP development, project design, supervision, evaluation systems (including 
monitoring and evaluation), non-lending activities, etc., to ensure that innovation is fully built into 
key phases of the country strategy and project life cycle. 
 
21. All the recommendations generated by the present evaluation, including that of improving 
organizational capabilities and culture, will have a bearing on the Fund’s administrative budget. If 
IFAD’s overall innovation and scaling up efforts are to give the desired results in future, a detailed 
analysis will be first required to determine the financial implications involved and to ensure that 
adequate resources are allocated in a timely manner. 
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22. The Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation. The evaluation recommended that funds left 
unused from the IMI should be used for initiating implementation of the three main recommendations 
contained in the evaluation, in particular, for changing the organizational culture and practices to 
support innovation, i.e. the IMI objective that has not been satisfactorily achieved. The evaluation also 
recommended that the IMI be extended and a future work programme developed, which could be 
funded either through IFAD’s administrative budget or from supplementary funds mobilized for that 
purpose. 
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IFAD’s Capacity to Promote Innovation and Scaling Up 
 
Corporate-level Evaluation 
 
 
Management Response1 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
1. IFAD Management sees innovation as a critical element in improving IFAD’s operations and 
development effectiveness, and as a consequence in enhancing the impact of the Fund on the lives of 
rural poor people. Management therefore welcomes the corporate-level evaluation of IFAD’s capacity 
to promote innovation and scaling up. 
 
2. This evaluation was conducted in line with the decision taken by the Executive Board when 
approving the IFAD Innovation Strategy and the Board decision in December 2008 requesting a 
second corporate-level evaluation of IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations, including the 
assessment of the performance of the Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation (IMI). This document, 
which is submitted along with the executive summary of the evaluation report for the review of the 
Board, records the views of IFAD Management on the substantive findings and recommendations. 
 
II.  Findings 
 
3. IFAD Management broadly concurs with the findings of this corporate evaluation, in particular 
the following conclusions:  
 
(a) IFAD’s performance in terms of innovation has improved and 100 per cent of the projects 
evaluated in 2008 were rated as moderately satisfactory by the Office of Evaluation (IEO); 
 
(b) IFAD’s direct supervision and country presence - two important elements of IFAD’s new 
operating model – are playing critical roles in promoting innovations; 
 
(c) More recent country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) have been paying 
greater attention to innovations, knowledge management and promoting partnerships; and 
 
(d) Innovation in the areas of institutions, access to land and water, rural microenterprise and 
marketing has increased in recent years. 
 
4. IFAD Management also takes note of the finding that among the agencies benchmarked, IFAD 
alone has adopted an explicit definition of innovation, an innovation strategy, and a knowledge 
management strategy (paragraph 100). As the report notes (paragraph 94), “[t]he need to scale up 
successful innovations has long been recognized by IFAD.” 
 
5. IFAD Management also takes note of the findings emerging from the focus group that 
highlighted the need to improvise, despite a formal institutional structure that is not fully supportive; 
the lack of adequate incentives to do so; and, above all, the relatively limited opportunities for sharing 
knowledge (paragraph 60). 
 
                                                     
1
  This Management Response is based on the document EB 2010/99/R.7, presented to the Executive Board – 
Ninety-ninth Session, Rome, 21-22 April 2010. 
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6. Management is also in broad agreement with the finding that the COSOPs fall short in 
analysing the risks related to innovations and that greater innovation is needed to enhance technology 
in agricultural production. 
 
7. It also agrees that there is a need to undertake non-lending activities such as policy dialogue, 
knowledge management and partnership building; increase synergies between loans and grants to 
improve the scaling up of innovations (paragraph 95); and pay more attention to the cross-fertilization 
of experiences on innovations across divisions and departments (paragraph 113). 
 
8. Nonetheless, Management wishes the Board to take note of the significant decisions taken by 
the Fund in recent months to strengthen institutional capacity to promote innovations. These include 
the establishment of the Office of the Chief Development Strategist (CDS), with the CDS now 
designated as champion of both innovations and knowledge management. The need to integrate these 
two distinct but complementary activities is thus recognized, as is the importance of seeking synergies 
in the implementation of these two strategies. 
 
9. In terms of scaling-up innovations, as the evaluation report notes, a grant has been provided to 
the Brookings Institute aimed mainly at enhancing IFAD’s aid effectiveness through country-led 
scaling up of the results of local innovations and project-level policy gains. 
 
10. Similarly, the relocation of IFAD’s operational policy function to the Programme Management 
Department (PMD) is expected to improve policy dialogue and thereby improve scaling up. The 
Revised IFAD Policy for Grant Financing – approved by the Executive Board in December 2009 – 
also gives high priority to innovation and is expected to improve the synergy between loans and 
grants. 
 
11. While agreeing with the evaluation finding that IFAD needs to work on building institutional 
capability for innovation, changing organizational culture and allocating more resources to promoting 
innovation, IFAD Management strongly believes in introducing innovation through its principal 
instrument: its investment projects and country programmes. This approach dramatically improves the 
chances of the innovations being scaled up. 
 
12. Management agrees that the IMI has played an important role in mainstreaming innovation 
within IFAD. It also agrees that strengthening innovation in operations and increasing learning and 
sharing was more successful than promoting the required culture change. What could be considered as 
the IMI’s main result is the space it provided for individuals and teams to experiment and test new 
ideas in new contexts. Such a space is critical for innovation to take place in an institution. 
 
13. The point raised on culture change is indeed a critical one. Unfortunately, the evaluation does 
not offer an analytical framework of IFAD’s current organizational culture that would help define the 
elements of the culture that need to be changed. Nonetheless, with the designation of the CDS as 
knowledge management and innovation champion, IFAD now has a leadership and accountability 
structure that will allow it to make more systematic efforts in this direction. 
 
14. Management supports the main finding that the innovation strategy was useful in that it 
articulated a rationale and a clear definition for innovation. However, the view that the innovation 
strategy did not contain anything new is somewhat surprising. In its note to the Evaluation Committee 
assessing the proposed IFAD Innovation Strategy (EC 2007/48/W.P.5), the Office of Evaluation states 
in paragraph 2: “In addition the strategy (i) proposes an IFAD-specific definition for innovation, 
(ii) builds on lessons from IFAD’s own experiences and those of other development partners, 
(iii) recognizes the need to establish linkages with other relevant corporate processes … and 
(iv) proposes logical steps for the implementation of the strategy …”. It further states (paragraph 9) 
that “[t]he strategy includes an interesting section on risk assessment and management” and in 
paragraph 10 that “OE welcomes the explicit links that the proposed strategy makes with articulated 
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in the proposal with IFAD’s important direct supervision and implementation support activities and 
the country presence initiatives…”. 
 
15. While recognizing that the start up of the innovation strategy has been slower than expected due 
to a number of institutional changes, Management is nonetheless committed to full implementation of 
the strategy, in an integrated manner with the IFAD Strategy for Knowledge Management. 
 
III. Recommendations  
 
16. Management agrees with the thrust of the three recommendations of the evaluation report. Its 
views on these recommendations are given below.  
 
17. Define an innovation agenda for IFAD. The evaluation report recommends that IFAD adopt a 
more systematic approach in implementing the innovation strategy, in particular by defining an 
innovation agenda for IFAD. There are two dimensions to this issue: first, the need to establish an 
innovation agenda and second, the way this should be done. 
 
18. On the first dimension, Management fully supports the idea of setting a clearer innovation 
agenda. IFAD Management has, however, some concerns regarding the setting of the agenda using a 
“big bet” approach. Although the evaluation report does not see this approach as a substitute for the 
current broad-based innovation approach, care must be taken to ensure that this does not happen in 
practice. 
 
19. The current broad-based approach does not mean that it is an ad hoc approach. Rather, it 
implies a convergence of actions that create an enabling environment for innovation that needs to be 
maintained. By contrast, a strict top-down approach to encouraging innovation could have the 
unintended effect of stifling innovation at the country/project level. Currently, as recognized by the 
evaluation, some of the most innovative ideas are developed at the project level with country teams 
and country programme managers suggesting new approaches in response to perceived challenges at 
the project and country levels. 
 
20. Management views the big bet approach as complementary to the current approach in order to 
allow a focus on those areas where it is generally acknowledged that IFAD faces major challenges 
across regions, countries or in specific sectors. In such cases, IFAD would publicize these challenges 
to a large global audience, scout systematically for better solutions and provide the required 
institutional and financial support. Management recognizes, in particular, the need to use IFAD grants 
in a more strategic manner to support such approaches. Subsequently, successful solutions could be 
scaled up in IFAD’s own programmes as well as in those of its partners. 
 
21. Treat scaling up as mission-critical. As noted earlier, IFAD considers scaling up not only as a 
principle of action, but also as a true measure of innovation in that IFAD needs to create a wider 
impact on rural poverty, beyond the direct impact it would have through its own operations. In line 
with the evaluation recommendations, IFAD will strengthen its knowledge management and 
undertake policy dialogue and partnership building in order to contribute to scaling up. It finds the 
specific knowledge management initiatives referred to in paragraph 127 relevant and agrees that 
project-level monitoring and evaluation systems need improvement. 
 
22. Since IFAD Management is currently facing competing demands for resources, its ability to 
allocate more resources for non-lending activities is limited. It has, however, taken serious note of the 
recommendation of this report – as well as those of evaluations undertaken in the recent past – to 
allocate adequate financial and staff resources and space for non-lending activities. 
 
23. IFAD Management would also like to clarify that, contrary to what is noted in the evaluation 
(paragraph 128), it no longer “lumps together” innovation and scaling up. In 2006, IFAD started 
measuring its performance at project completion with respect to scaling up as distinct from 
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innovation, and regularly reports in the annual Portfolio Performance Report (e.g. 2009 report, 
paragraphs 66-71). It agrees, however, that the reviews undertaken by IEO and some other internal 
processes need to adopt a similar approach. In sum, IFAD Management agrees that scaling up must be 
prioritized and treated as mission-critical. 
 
24. Strengthen organizational capabilities and culture. Resources permitting, Management is 
committed to conducting a cultural analysis to provide a basis for bringing about the required changes 
in IFAD’s innovation objectives, capabilities, processes and organizational climate. Needless to say, 
this is not an easy task and will require time. 
 
25. Pending such a study, Management is nonetheless committed to taking steps to encourage 
greater knowledge sharing and risk taking in order to motivate staff to innovate. It is also committed 
to bringing about institutional and process changes to achieve this goal. In this regard, Management 
believes that with the establishment of the Office of the CDS and the designation of the CDS as 
knowledge management and innovation champion, IFAD will have greater capacity to strengthen 
organizational capabilities and improve the culture, as the evaluation report recommends. It should 
also be easier to identify innovative projects and programmes that require greater management and 
financial support. This will also place IFAD in a stronger position to use the remaining IMI funds and 
other facilities more strategically to support innovation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
26. Overall, Management found the evaluation report very helpful and is prepared to incorporate its 
recommendations and insights into its future work plans. To this effect, the CDS will lead a corporate 
effort to develop a framework for implementing the innovation and knowledge management strategies 
that will translate the agreements reached into concrete activities and measures. 
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IFAD’s Capacity to Promote Innovation and Scaling Up 
 
Corporate-level Evaluation 
 
Main Report 
 
 
 
I.  EVALUATION BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND PROCESSES 
 
A.  Background and Origin of the Evaluation 
 
1. Since the mid-1990s there has been increasing emphasis on innovation in the corporate-level 
processes of IFAD. The Vision statement of May 1995 recognized the significance of innovations, 
noting that IFAD would “… ensure the design and implementation of innovative, cost-effective and 
replicable programmes with sustainable impact.” The focus on innovations has become more 
prominent since 2000. During the 5th replenishment, the role of IFAD in promoting innovations was 
further developed: the final report1 noted that as an innovator IFAD had a major role in catalyzing and 
transferring resources for rural poverty reduction. One activity to enhance IFAD’s work on 
innovations, the IFAD V: Plan of Action (2000–2002) that emerged from the 5th replenishment, 
mandated the Office of Evaluation (IEO) to evaluate in 2000–2001 IFAD’s capacity as a promoter of 
replicable innovations in rural poverty reduction.  
 
2. IEO undertook this evaluation in 2000–2001 as mandated; the Understanding at Completion 
Point was produced in November 2002 and endorsed by IFAD management.2 The evaluation provided 
recommendations at the strategic, organizational and operational levels with a view to enhancing 
IFAD’s ability to promote innovations and its scaling up. In response to the recommendations of this 
first evaluation of innovation, IFAD developed the Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation (IMI)3 to 
“… enhance IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations that will have a positive impact on rural 
poverty.” The IMI was approved by the Executive Board at its 83rd session in December 2004; it was 
the first financial instrument to be developed specifically to promote innovation in IFAD country 
programmes and to develop innovative capacity at the corporate level.    
 
3. The 6th and 7th replenishment consultations in 2002 and 2005 reinforced IFAD’s need to 
“… enhance and apply its capacity to innovate.”4 They noted the importance of systematic 
documentation and sharing of successfully tested innovations in IFAD operations and underlined the 
significance of the linkages between innovation and policy dialogue, knowledge management and 
partnership building in promoting innovations. The 8th replenishment consultation in 2009 
consolidated the strategic importance of proactive innovation.  The report of the consultation on the 
8th replenishment5 stated: “… IFAD will innovate, learn, and respond with agility to the volatility and 
highly uncertain conditions affecting agricultural development, food security and rural livelihoods. It 
will scale up its investments in agricultural productivity, including in technologies and practices of 
adaptation to climate change.” The report also emphasized the importance of sharing knowledge and 
expanding partnerships to assist other development agencies in scaling up engagement in the 
agricultural sector and to increase impact at the national, regional and global level. 
                                                     
1
  Report of the Consultation to Review the Adequacy of the Resources Available to IFAD 
(GC 23/L.3/Rev.1). 
2
   EC 2002/30/W.P.3. 
3
   EB 2004/83/R.2. 
4
   GC 26/L.4 and GC 29/L.4. 
5
   See GC 32/L.5. 
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4. IFAD’s Strategic Framework6 for 2007–2010 includes innovations, learning and scaling up as 
one of its six principles of engagement. It states: “IFAD’s role is to establish partnerships for 
developing innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction at the local level, testing methodologies, 
institutional arrangements, partnerships or technologies that are new within the context in which they 
are being applied….Yet innovation without scaling up is of little value: all engagements will thus be 
expected to have internal learning arrangements, as well as mechanisms for feeding lessons to the 
higher, usually national, level.” 
 
5. To consolidate this strategic intent and, in the context of the IFAD Action Plan for Improving 
its Development Effectiveness,7 IFAD developed an Innovation Strategy8 that was approved by the 
Executive Board at its 91st session in September 2007. The Executive Board also approved in April 
2007 a Knowledge Management Strategy,9 which is also important for the promotion of innovations.  
 
6. In short, a range of corporate-level documents have been produced over the first decade of this 
century that include statements and guidance related to IFAD’s approach to innovation – strategic and 
policy documents, evaluation documents and operational guidelines. IFAD has worked to transmit its 
strategic intentions on innovation to its country programmes; there are also examples of successful 
innovation and scaling up in IFAD operations.  
 
7. The promotion of innovation, replication and scaling up is one of the core criteria assessed 
systematically by IEO in all project evaluations since 2002, in line with the IEO Evaluation Manual.10 
Country programme evaluations (CPEs) also assess IFAD’s capacity to promote replicable 
innovations. Since 2001, IEO has undertaken several corporate-level and thematic evaluations that 
focus on innovations (see paragraph 40); IEO has also organized a number of regional and 
international events relating to innovative practices and their promotion. The External Review of the 
Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (2002) and the Independent External Evaluation (IEE) of 
2004–2005 also addressed the subject. It is most important to note that IEO has since 2003 provided 
an annual overview of IFAD’s performance and insights relating to the promotion of innovation as 
part of the Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI).  
 
8. In the last few years, the importance of innovation for smallholder development and rural 
poverty reduction has come into sharper focus. Far-reaching global changes have increased the need 
to find innovative solutions to safeguard the livelihoods of the poor in agriculture. The “rules of the 
game” with regard to agriculture and rural development have been drastically changed by increasing 
globalization and the emergence of the market as a major driver of agriculture development, changing 
patterns of competition, trade rules and technological paradigms, the increasing role of the private 
sector in agriculture and the exponential growth of information and communications technology. This 
has created new conditions, not all of which are favourable to smallholder farming and the poor. The 
situation has been exacerbated by climate change, soaring food prices and the financial crisis, with 
dire impacts on food security. In short, emerging global challenges combined with changing 
opportunities and threats mean that planned innovation for poverty reduction is essential. 
 
9. In recognition of this, the Executive Board requested IEO to undertake a corporate-level 
evaluation (CLE) of IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations and its scaling up. This would also 
                                                     
6
   Approved by the Executive Board during its 89th session in December 2006 (EB 2006/89/R.2/Rev.1). 
7
   See EB 2005/86/R.2/Rev.2. 
8
   See EB 2007/91/R.3/Rev.1. 
9
   See EB 2007/90/R4. 
10
   http://intradev:8015/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf 
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include an assessment of the IMI.11 The evaluation followed the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation 
Policy. The evaluation was, like all CLEs, discussed in the Evaluation Committee and the Executive 
Board in their April 2010 sessions together with the IFAD Management Response. 
 
B.  Objectives of the Evaluation 
 
10. The two broad objectives of the evaluation were to: 
 
(i) Assess IFAD’s efforts and performance in promoting innovations that can be replicated and 
scaled up; and  
(ii) Generate a series of findings and recommendations that will feed into the implementation of 
IFAD’s innovation strategy and inform the Fund’s overall future activities in this area.  
11. Attaining these two objectives was particularly complex. Assessment had to be carried out from 
two linked but different perspectives: on the one hand it had to assess IFAD’s actual performance on 
the ground in promoting innovations in its country programmes, guided by corporate strategies and 
policies; on the other it also had to assess IFAD’s processes and instruments, which are crucial in 
creating a favourable enabling environment and capabilities for innovation, replication and scaling up. 
This two-tier task required the incorporation of an organizational change perspective and a rural 
developmental perspective in the various assessments. 
 
12. As stated in section A, IFAD’s work to promote innovations over the past decade has 
encompassed changes at the strategy, policy and country levels, the most notable of which were the 
development of the IMI in 2004 and the Innovation Strategy in 2007. It must be emphasized, 
however, that this is not a results-and-impact evaluation of the IFAD innovation strategy: because the 
strategy is currently being rolled out, a traditional results-based evaluation would not be possible at 
this early stage. The evaluation will, however, assess the relevance of the 2007 innovation strategy 
and its initial implementation, and will include a review of past performance in innovation and the 
lessons learned. 
 
C.  Methodology and Processes 
 
13. The evaluation followed the provisions of the IEO Evaluation Manual, including the application 
of internationally recognized evaluation criteria (see Appendix I) and the 6-point rating scale,12 as 
well as the principles of triangulation13. Attention has also been given to ensure an appropriate 
evidence trail in the evaluation, where the conclusions are coherently anchored in the analysis 
captured in the evaluation report, and the recommendations rooted in the main conclusions derived. 
To achieve its two objectives the evaluation had seven building blocks, which are described below. It 
was important to define these seven building blocks in order to: (i) gain an appreciation of past 
performance; (ii) understand the evolution of IFAD’s approaches to promoting innovation; 
(iii) compare IFAD’s innovation capabilities with those of other organizations; (iv) evaluate the 
relevance of the 2007 innovation strategy and its initial implementation; and (v) assess the IMI. The 
enquiry methods were a mix of document reviews, quantitative surveys, interviews and focus-group 
discussions with IFAD and partner staff at Headquarters and in-country. The seven building blocks 
were:   
                                                     
11
  At the time of its approval the Board also decided that IEO would evaluate the IMI. 
12
    6 – highly satisfactory; 5 – satisfactory; 4 – moderately satisfactory; 3 – moderately unsatisfactory; 2 – 
unsatisfactory; 1 – highly unsatisfactory. 
13
   This entails the use of three or more theories, sources or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an 
assessment. It allows evaluators to overcome the bias that comes from single informants, single methods or 
single observations and thus helps to ensure the robustness and reliability of evaluation findings. 
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• 1 – Assessment of IFAD’s strategic directions for promoting innovations. The 
assessment included a review of 28 strategic, policy and guideline documents generated by 
IFAD since 2001. The purpose was to assess the adequacy of strategic guidance on 
innovation and scaling up and its implementation over time before and after adoption of the 
2007 Innovation Strategy. The main questions addressed were: What are the features of 
innovation that have been stressed in these documents? What is the level of evidence 
revealed in the documents about a solid strategic intent? How far is the strategic intent 
aligned with the 2007 Innovation Strategy? How did the strategic intent change before and 
after adoption of the Innovation Strategy? What is the trend observed?  
• 2 – A meta-evaluation of IFAD’s past performance in promoting innovation and 
scaling up. The main purpose was to assess the performance of past IFAD-funded 
operations and understand the proximate causes. Data and analysis from IEO evaluation 
reports since 2002 were used. A sample of 30 completed projects evaluated by IEO between 
2004 and 2008 was selected and reviewed to answer the following questions: What are the 
characteristics of innovation promoted by IFAD? What are the features of innovations that 
succeeded? What are the factors contributing to successful innovations? Why do some 
innovations fail? What was the performance of IFAD in replication and scaling up? What 
are the strengths and weaknesses in IFAD’s approach? What is the association between 
innovation performance and overall project performance? The methods used in this 
assessment are reported in the relevant chapters and working papers. 
• 3 – Assessment of innovation and scaling up in IFAD’s ongoing operations. The purpose 
is to assess the extent to which IFAD is internalising its own experiences and lessons in 
promoting innovations, as well as determine the evolution of country strategies and projects 
following the adoption of the Fund’s innovation strategy. This is based on the review of a 
sample of 21 Country Strategy and Opportunities Papers (COSOPs) and 68 projects 
designed between 2004 and 2008 in the five IFAD geographic regions.  
• 4 – Assessment of progress in IFAD’s organizational capabilities to promote 
innovation. This included repeating the survey of organizational capability at Headquarters 
in the first evaluation of IFAD’s innovation capabilities in 2000–2001. The same survey was 
undertaken in 2009 with two additional sections for IMI and the Innovation Strategy. The 
purpose was to determine whether progress had been made at the organizational level to 
develop innovation as a capability in IFAD. Three methods of investigation were used: 
(i) an innovation survey, to which 39 Programme Management Department (PMD) staff 
responded, provided quantitative data; (ii) a qualitative analysis of 14 interviews and two 
focus groups with a cross-section of IFAD staff explored organizational issues in depth; and 
(iii) review of IFAD documentation to determine whether there was evidence that state-of-
the-art innovation promotion techniques were being used. 
• 5 – Evaluation of IMI. The established evaluation criteria were applied: relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and partner performance. Rating of 
performance followed the standard IEO six-point scale. The definitions of relevance, 
effectiveness and efficiency were drawn from the manual and customized to relate to the 
design of IMI. The assessment was based on four main sources of information: 
(i) documentation in IMI; (ii) a review of completed or almost completed IMI grants; 
(iii) interviews with informants associated with IMI; and (iv) the innovation capability 
survey at Headquarters (see 4 above). 
• 6 – Assessment of the relevance of the 2007 Innovation Strategy and its initial 
implementation. The relevance of the strategy was assessed from an organizational 
perspective by considering whether it was fit for purpose and made an effective contribution 
to IFAD’s work. Attention was given to the implementation of the strategy; assessment of 
its relevance and initial implementation was informed by analysis of the results of the 
innovation capabilities survey in the strategy section and a checklist of seven assessment 
criteria (see chapter VI). 
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• 7 – Benchmarking. Benchmarking was undertaken with a view to comparing IFAD’s 
innovation work with that in other organizations and identifying commonalities and 
differences to derive pointers for learning. The main selection criteria for the identification 
of comparator organizations are: (a) the relevance of innovation for the organization; (b) the 
diversity of institutional background; and (c) easy access to the organization. The following 
organizations were selected: (i) the non-governmental organization (NGO) Humanist 
Institute for Development Cooperation (Hivos); (ii) the research institution International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC); (iii) the bilateral agency Irish Aid; (iv) the United 
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); and (v) the World Bank as an 
international financial institution (IFI). The methods for benchmarking were based on a 
qualitative exploratory approach that included document research and semi-standardized 
teleconference interviews with staff, with follow-up based on a questionnaire. 
 
14. In addition to the above seven building blocks, five country visits were undertaken to Brazil, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania and Vietnam to verify the findings from the evaluation’s desk work as 
well as collect the perspective of partners at the country level related to IFAD’s performance and 
capacity to promote innovations. The selection criteria for the countries to be covered included:  
(i) only one country would be selected from each of the five geographic regions covered by IFAD 
operations; (ii) availability of recent country programme and project evaluations by IEO; and 
(iii) countries that had one or two projects manifested promising innovation approaches. The core 
issues investigated are: the factors that trigger innovations success and failures, conditions for 
effective scaling up, and the role of partnership, knowledge management and policy dialogue. A 
framework for country analysis has been developed to this effect. 
 
15. The evaluation was organized in four main phases: (i) inception, during which the methods and 
process were fine-tuned and the evaluation team contracted (see paragraph 17). This stage led to the 
production of the evaluation’s approach paper and inception report; (ii) desk work, including a review 
of documents, a staff survey aimed at assessing IFAD’s organizational capabilities to promote 
innovations, and interviews and focus-group discussions with representatives of IFAD management 
and staff. The various working papers produced in this phase are listed under the Annexes section in 
this document’s table of contents; (iii) country work, including discussion with concerned partners in 
the respective Governments and visits to IFAD-funded projects (see paragraph 14). A country 
working paper was produced following each visit; and (iv) draft final report writing, including the 
preparation of the IFAD Management Response to the evaluation. 
 
16. In line with the IFAD Evaluation Policy, a core learning partnership14 was established for the 
innovation evaluation with the aim of providing inputs and reviewing key deliverables including the 
approach paper and draft final report; its members were also responsible for sharing all information 
and documentation with others in their divisions. IEO contracted a senior independent adviser15 to 
review the evaluation deliverables and assure IFAD management and Governing Bodies as to the 
quality of the evaluation and its overall process. The senior independent adviser’s report on the 
evaluation process and the final report may be seen in Appendix II. In addition, the evaluation was 
also exposed to an internal peer review within IEO.16 The comments of the core learning partnership, 
the senior independent adviser and the IEO peer reviewers have been included in this final evaluation 
report. 
                                                     
14
   Members included the Associate Vice-President PMD, IFAD’s Chief Development Strategist, Director 
IEO, all directors of the PMD regional divisions and the operation policy & technical advisory division, the 
Director of Human Resources Division, the concerned Policy Coordinator, PMD’s Senior Portfolio Manager, 
and the IEO Senior Evaluation Officer designated as the lead evaluator for the innovations evaluation. 
15
   Mr Johannes Linn, former Vice-President at the World Bank and currently Director of the Wolfensohn 
Centre for Development, the Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 
16
   In addition to the Director IEO, two senior evaluation officers and one evaluation officer took part in the 
process. 
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17. A multidisciplinary team of consultant experts were recruited for the evaluation. More details 
on the composition of the team may be seen in the acknowledgements page after the table of contents. 
 
18. The evaluation report has eight chapters in addition to this one. Chapter II covers the analysis of 
IFAD’s strategic direction on innovation (building block 1); chapter III includes a meta-evaluation of 
past performance and the evolving role of innovation and scaling up in ongoing operations (building 
blocks 2 and 3); chapter IV provides the results of progress in IFAD’s organizational capabilities in 
promoting innovations (building block 4); chapter V contains an assessment of IMI (building block 
5); chapter VI contains the assessment of IFAD’s 2007 Innovation Strategy including its relevance 
and initial implementation (building block 6); chapter VII reports on the opportunities and challenges 
related to scaling up, drawing from various building blocks; chapter VIII contains the results of the 
benchmarking study (building block 7); and chapter IX contains the conclusions and 
recommendations. The results of the country visits are used to support the analyses in the report.  
 
Key points 
 
 Since the mid-1990s there has been increasing emphasis on innovation in IFAD. This is evident through 
various replenishment consultations and IFAD policies and strategies such as the 2004 IMI and the 2007 
Innovation Strategy.  
 The evaluation has two main objectives: to assess IFAD’s efforts and performance in promoting 
innovations that can be replicated and scaled up, and to generate findings and recommendations to 
inform IFAD’s overall future activities in this area.  
 The evaluation has seven building blocks. Document reviews, quantitative surveys and interviews with 
IFAD and partner staff at Headquarters and in-country were undertaken. Triangulation of findings was 
applied as a guiding principle at all stages of enquiry.  
 The evaluation was organized in four phases: inception, desk work, country work and draft report 
writing. A core learning partnership was established to provide inputs to the evaluation and review the 
deliverables. A senior independent adviser was recruited, and the evaluation was subjected to an internal 
peer review within IEO. 
 
 
 
II.  IFAD’S STRATEGIC DIRECTION ON INNOVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
19. This chapter draws upon the analysis undertaken in building block (i), namely on IFAD’s 
strategic directions for the promotion of innovations. In particular, the evaluation: (i) assesses the 
extent of achievements made in the implementation of the recommendations captured in the 
Understanding at Completion Point (UCP)17 of the CLE on innovations undertaken in 2000-2001; 
(ii) traces the key landmarks in IFAD’s innovation promotion efforts in the past decade; and 
(iii) provides an overview of the Fund’s performance in articulating and providing strategic directions 
to staff for the promotion of innovations and their scaling up.  
 
A.  Innovations in IFAD18 
20. Box 1 captures the definition adopted by IFAD for innovation and its understanding of scaling 
up, as captured in the IFAD innovation strategy of 2007. 
 
                                                     
17
  The UCP is equivalent to the Agreement at Completion Point, which captures the main findings and 
recommendations to be adopted by IFAD and implemented in specific timeframes. 
18
   This section draws upon the IFAD Innovation Strategy of 2007. 
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Box 1. Definition of Innovation and Scaling Up 
 
What makes a product, idea or approach an innovation? 
 
To be considered innovative, it needs to be: (i) New to its context of application. The novelty 
may refer to country context, scale, domain, discipline or line of business; (ii) Useful and cost-
effective in relation to a goal. An innovation must have positive value for its users. In the case of 
IFAD, it needs to empower the rural poor to overcome poverty better and more cost-effectively 
than previous approaches; and (iii) Able to “stick” after pilot testing. An innovation is a product, 
idea or technology with the potential for wide adoption, which it demonstrates through pilot 
testing. 
Scaling up 
Scaling up means implementing – or enabling the implementation of – a practice on a greater 
scale. For IFAD, this may mean: (i) Organizational scaling up. Practices implemented in projects 
or country programmes that are integrated into broader, more complex programmes; 
(ii) Appropriation by partners. A practice or technology implemented in an IFAD programme is 
taken up and further developed on a greater scale by partners, including other donors, the private 
sector or governments; or (iii) Scaling up from practice to policy. A practice becomes the basis 
for policy programme and initiatives by governments, donor agencies and others. 
 
21. Replication is also an important concept in the promotion of innovations, but it is different from 
scaling up. Replication of an innovation may occur when a successful innovation is transported to 
another environment for piloting, but fine-tuned according to the needs of the specific circumstances 
of application. Replication does not necessarily entail scaling up. The latter is a broader concept, 
which however includes replication on a wider scale of an innovation that has been successfully 
piloted. 
 
22. In a nutshell, the innovation promotion process (or innovation journey) at IFAD includes the 
following main phases: (i) scouting for new ideas which are evaluated and with necessary adjustments 
included in the design; (ii) piloting the innovation on the ground, making any required adjustments as 
implementation unfolds; (iii) learning from experience and documenting the experience; and (iv) 
scaling up, for which policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building are essential. 
 
B.  The 2000-2001 Corporate-level Evaluation on Innovation 
23. The Evaluation of IFAD’s Capacity as a Promoter of Replicable Innovations in Cooperation 
with other Partners (IFAD, 2002) was instrumental in promoting collective reflection and learning on 
the opportunities and constraints faced by the Fund in innovations. It highlighted for the first time the 
crucial role for innovation in IFAD and triggered actions to achieve IFAD’s ambitions with regard to 
innovation. The UCP of the evaluation largely accepted the findings of the CLE report and observed: 
“While innovations have been central to IFAD’s vision, the institution still has no strategic agenda for 
innovations to guide and direct operations. That being the case, IFAD staff has diverse understandings 
of innovation, and performance in this area varies greatly. The innovation process is neither well 
understood nor firmly integrated into operations. Innovations promoted by IFAD are not 
systematically recorded and assessed nor is there a coherent mechanism to generate and disseminate 
learning from these innovations” (p. 19). 
 
24. The UCP made five major recommendations and 22 sub-recommendations. Table 1 lists the 
recommendations and sub-recommendations in the UCP and comments on the extent to which 
evidence demonstrated that they had been implemented, scored as “achieved”, “partly achieved” and 
“not achieved”. The assessment was largely based on the results of the reviews of the strategic and 
policy documents (see Appendix III), the review of recent COSOPs and project designs (see chapter 
III) and the results of the innovation capabilities survey (see chapter IV). The main recommendations 
are shown in bold text; the original wording of sub-recommendations has been summarized.
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Table 1. Recommendations of the UCP of the CLE of Innovation 2000-2001: 
Extent of Achievements 
Code Recommendation Extent of Achievements 
I Create a common understanding of 
innovations for IFAD. 
Achieved 
IFAD has a standing definition of innovation; “innovation” 
is generally understood. 
II Ascertain (IFAD’s) strategic 
commitment to innovations. 
Partly achieved 
Strategic commitment is strong but innovation priorities 
are unclear. 
II.a Embed innovation within the strategic 
framework and ensure that it is 
operationalized. 
Partly achieved 
Innovation is stated as a principle of engagement in the 
IFAD Strategic Framework but the ability to 
operationalize it is less evident. 
II.b Build innovation into COSOPs. Achieved 
 Innovation is built into recent COSOPs.  
II.c 
Allocate resources on the basis of 
innovation priorities. 
Not achieved 
Resource allocation is not being driven by a focused 
innovation agenda based on priority selection of corporate 
innovation themes.  
III Specify the stages of the innovation 
process and integrate them into 
current operations. 
Partly achieved 
Project design includes innovation initiatives but limited 
understanding of process stages. 
III.a Scout for and select innovation 
initiatives for promotion systematically. 
Partly achieved 
Scouting for ideas is still unsystematic, and pilot testing 
and selecting is under-developed. 
III.b Select partners with innovation 
competencies. 
Partly achieved 
Partners’ innovation capabilities not systematically 
assessed, though considered informally. 
III.c 
Undertake systematic risk analysis. 
Partly achieved 
Assessment of innovation risk and mitigation takes place, 
but it is unsystematic and often not rigorous. 
III.d Systematically test innovations before 
scaling up. 
Partly achieved 
Rigorous pilot testing is undertaken in relatively few cases. 
III.e Require M&E* to monitor innovation 
performance. 
Partly  achieved 
M&E does not track innovation performance 
systematically or at the required level of intensity. 
III.f 
Plan for replication and scaling up. 
Not achieved 
Systematic planning for replication and scaling up is rarely 
undertaken at an early stage. 
III.g 
Disseminate lessons learned effectively. 
Partly achieved 
Improved knowledge management systems to disseminate 
innovation lessons, but more can be achieved. 
IV Align organization processes and 
innovation promotion. 
Partly achieved 
Some organizational processes support innovation but are 
not fully internalized across IFAD. 
IV.a Prioritize innovation in assessment of 
grant and loan proposals. 
Achieved 
Innovation objectives are considered essential for all loan 
proposals. 
IV.b Synchronize IFAD instruments to 
provide a continuous innovation pipeline 
Not achieved 
IFAD does not have a continuous innovation pipeline 
based on clear corporate priorities. 
IV.c 
Reconfigure partnerships to support 
IFAD’s innovation process 
Partly achieved 
Still largely informal, but partnerships for innovations are 
gradually emerging as an important feature in IFAD’s 
operations. 
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Table 1 (continued). Recommendations of the UCP of the CLE of Innovation 2000-2001: 
                                   Extent of Achievements 
IV.d Develop marketing skills to promote 
scaling up. 
Not achieved 
IFAD does not have distinct competences in marketing 
innovations. 
IV.e 
Strengthen innovation-orientated 
knowledge management. 
Partly achieved 
Knowledge management strategy formulated; knowledge 
exchange on innovations improved internally but there are 
opportunities for capturing more widely knowledge from 
external sources. 
IV.f Establish working groups to investigate 
new instruments to promote innovation. 
Partly achieved 
Working groups have investigated new instruments, but 
few have emerged. 
IV.g 
Emphasize innovation in IEO’s work. 
Achieved 
Evaluation of innovation is mandatory in IEO’s Evaluation 
Manual, but rating is combined with scaling up. 
V Strengthen staff/managers’ 
capabilities and orienting IFAD’s 
culture for promoting innovations. 
Partly achieved 
IFAD’s culture has become more supportive, but 
competencies have not been developed systematically. 
*
 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
 
25. The analysis reveals that since the completion of the first innovation evaluation, IFAD has fully 
implemented the first recommendation contained in Table 1 above by developing a definition for 
innovation (see Box 1). With regard to the second recommendation, IFAD has successfully built 
innovation in the new COSOP guidelines of 2006, but has not specifically allocated resources for 
priority thematic or sub-sector areas where innovation could be pursued. The third recommendation 
has been partly achieved, especially given that approaches for scaling up are not usually integrated 
into design of new operations. With regard to the fourth and fifth recommendation, IFAD has 
included the promotion of innovation in grant and loan proposals and improved learning on 
innovation, but not developed sufficiently staff capabilities and competencies to support the 
innovation promotion process (for example the marketing skills of staff have not been enhanced that 
would facilitate the scaling up of successful innovations). Overall, in 2009 IFAD still lacked: (i) a 
framework for scaling up – though work is now ongoing in this area in partnership with the Brookings 
Institution; (ii) a competency model to drive the development of those involved in the design and 
delivery of the innovation dimension of IFAD’s work; and (iii) a focused innovation agenda 
prioritizing the main challenges in rural poverty reduction and allocating resources accordingly. These 
findings are tempered by the evidence from evaluation interviews, which indicates that at least some 
members of IFAD’s staff have developed their own informal but effective approaches to facilitating 
replication and scaling up, partnerships for innovation and effective management of innovation. These 
individual experiences are not shared internally in a systematic manner. 
 
C.  Other Key Landmarks in IFAD’s Innovation Promotion Efforts 
26. Independent External Evaluation and the Action Plan. A major landmark in the Fund’s 
innovation journey was the IEE,19 which was considered by the Board in its session in April 2005. 
The IEE noted that: “innovation is seen as central to the achievements of IFAD’s mandate. IFAD 
defines innovation in a broad way and while it has aspirations to be an innovator, evidence suggests 
otherwise. The IEE sample of operations clearly indicates that while there are a few highly innovative 
projects (as well as others that contain innovative elements), the vast majority of projects are not. 
Indeed on balance, there is little to distinguish the work of IFAD from that of other development 
agencies. And, more worryingly, IFAD’s contribution to the capture, learning, promotion and 
replication of innovation appears unsystematic and inadequate” (page 123). 
 
                                                     
19
   See document EB2005/84/R.2.Rev.1. 
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27. Although it is likely that the multiple small initiatives at the grass-roots level were not 
adequately reflected in the IEE, the thrust of the comments was correct if the basic assumption that all 
projects should contain innovative elements is accepted. It is true that IFAD-funded projects often do 
not include major innovation challenges, because they frequently transpose approaches developed in 
one geographical area to another, with some adaptation. Those that do undertake challenging and 
novel innovations lack a systematic and rigorous approach that would increase the success rate. 
Replication and scaling up of innovation are generally not systematic. Because all projects were 
expected to contain a substantial innovation element, there was some evidence that aspects of 
proposals were described as “innovative” to meet the requirements of the approval process rather than 
for the purpose of the systematic testing of promising new ideas. 
 
28. The findings of the IEE led to major organizational reforms and changes, under the overall 
aegis of IFAD’s Action Plan for Improving its Development Effectiveness, approved by the Board in 
December 2005. Through the Action Plan, the Fund introduced a series of new policies and strategies. 
Moreover, a new operating model was developed, inter alia, including the undertaking of direct 
supervision and implementation support as well as expansion of IFAD country presence. One specific 
measure in response to the IEE findings was the development of the innovation strategy, approved by 
the Board in September 2007. The goal of the strategy is to ensure that innovation is mainstreamed 
into IFAD processes and practice in a systematic, effective way. Its purpose is to enhance IFAD’s 
capacity to work with partners – including rural poor people and their organizations – to find and 
promote new and better ways to enable rural poor people to overcome rural poverty. An assessment of 
the innovation strategy is provided in Chapter VI of the document 
 
29.  The Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation. At the organizational level, the most 
important response to the 2000-2001 evaluation of innovation was the development of IMI (see 
chapter V for details). The operational framework for the main phase of the IMI was approved by the 
Board in December 2004, with dedicated funding of US$10 million, provided through a 
complementary contribution to the sixth replenishment by the United Kingdom. The IMI was 
conceived as a three year programme, with the overall aim of enhancing IFAD’s capacity to promote 
innovations that will have a positive impact on rural poverty. It was expected to achieve three main 
results. These were: (i) mainstreaming of innovations into IFAD operations; (ii) strengthened learning 
on innovation and sharing, and the application of such learning; and (iii) a changed organizational 
culture and practice.  
 
30. In short, IMI was designed as the main instrument for driving the organizational changes 
needed to make IFAD a source of innovation. From an organizational development perspective, this 
step had the merit that it focused the task of organizational transformation and dedicated resources to 
it; but it had the demerit that the units established to drive change could become marginalized or 
ineffectual. As IMI began its work, however, a country programme manager (CPM) noted: “... there 
was a real buzz around innovation.” The key strategy adopted by IMI was to change the behaviour of 
staff and empower them by funding initiatives – mostly initiated by IFAD staff – that otherwise would 
not or could not have been supported. Other activities at the corporate level were also planned, but 
were not implemented at the expected scale. The aim was to signal to the organization that innovation 
could be undertaken in any activity and, as a consequence, to give experience in undertaking an 
innovative project to those who won funds from IMI resources with a view to mainstreaming 
innovation and contributing to the development of innovation as a dynamic capability in IFAD. The 
IMI approach did not directly address several of the recommendations of the 2000-2001 evaluation 
UCP, for example those related to developing capabilities in replication and scaling up and 
preparation of an innovation competency model.  
 
31. Despite the early excitement, in time IMI came to be seen as an additional internal funding 
facility. By 2009 an informant expressed the view that “... the IMI is not a core part of the 
organization.” Nobody interviewed for this evaluation said that they were aware of the organizational 
change objectives of IMI. Two aspects were of particular concern: (i) the IMI emphasis on funding a 
range of initiatives that were intended to promote the “let a thousand flowers bloom” or ubiquitous 
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approach to developing innovation capability; and (ii) that opportunities were missed to transform the 
IMI grants into action-learning projects. But the existence of IMI meant that IFAD appeared to be 
moving forward in developing innovation capability, and in 2004 it was possible for IFAD’s 
leadership to consider that the right steps were being taken. 
 
32. A further impetus to innovation was provided through the Annual Report on the Results and 
Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI), produced by IEO each year since 2003. The ARRI contributed to 
inculcating a culture of measuring and reporting on aggregate performance in innovation, replication 
and scaling up of IFAD-funded projects in all regions. It also identified areas that warranted attention 
of the management and the Fund’s Governing Bodies in further enhancing performance in innovation. 
The 2007 ARRI was particularly important, as innovation (together with sustainability) were the two 
topics treated in depth as learning themes in the document. The 2007 edition of the ARRI included the 
articulation of priorities for innovation that were generated together with the representatives of IFAD 
management and staff. Section B of Chapter III will provide more details on lessons learned from the 
ARRIs. 
 
33. Finally, the revised grant policy approved by the Board in December 2009 is a further 
illustration of the Fund’s continued commitment to innovations in agriculture and rural development. 
The promotion of innovations is in fact at the centre of the goal and expected outputs of the policy. 
 
D.  The Fund’s Performance in Providing Strategic Directions for the Promotion of Innovations 
34. The evaluation also examined in detail the Fund’s key policy and strategy documents developed 
since 2000, as well as selected operational documents (e.g. guidelines for quality enhancement of 
projects) and evaluation reports. The aim of this analysis was to discern the emphasis they devote to 
the promotion of innovation, based on six key parameters embedded in the innovation strategy. These 
include: (i) pro-poor orientation of innovations; (ii) building innovation capacity; (iii) nurturing 
partnerships for innovation; (iv) adopting rigorous innovation processes including associated risk 
management practice into innovations; (v) promoting a supportive organizational environment; and 
(vi) focusing on scaling up. A scoring system for evidence of innovation features was devised: 3- 
strongly evident, 2 – partially evident, and 1 – not evident. The strategic, policy, operational guideline 
documents and selected evaluation reports were reviewed (see Appendix III) and scored to assess the 
strategic intent of the organization in terms of innovation.  
 
35. The documents reviewed based on the above criteria revealed that the Fund has indeed made 
significant pronouncements to ensure that innovation is treated with due attention. There was a 
definite increase of emphasis on innovation from around 2000 till about 2006, which coincided with 
the adoption of the 5th replenishment report by the Governing Council in February 2000, undertaking 
of the first CLE on the topic, adoption of the IMI, and the inclusion of innovation as a key principle of 
engagement20 in the 2007-10 Strategic Framework.21 
 
36. The adoption of the innovation strategy in 2007 itself was a further reflection of the importance 
of innovation, even though the strategy was mainly a vehicle for articulating and formalizing the 
approaches that IFAD had pursued to promote innovations in the past decade or so. There is clear 
evidence that, at the strategic level, IFAD’s attention was turning towards innovation well before the 
release of the 2007 Innovation Strategy (an assessment of the relevance and initial implementation of 
the innovation strategy is contained in chapter VI of the report). The 2005 IFAD Action Plan was a 
major contribution to the thrust towards innovation. More time is required to determine whether the 
trend in scores for innovation after the 2007 Innovation Strategy was maintained. 
 
                                                     
20
   Innovation, learning and scaling up is one of the six principles of engagement that the Fund would apply in 
its strategies and operations in order to achieve its overall development objectives. 
21
   Approved by the Board in its session in December 2006, see document EB 2006/89/R.2/Rev.1. 
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37. There are, however, still concerns. Some of the recommendations in the UCP of the 2000-2001 
CLE on innovations were not implemented, and areas such as systematic development of innovation 
competencies and approaches to replication and scaling up were neglected. More fundamentally, 
questions were raised about IFAD’s basic approach to the development of innovation capability, 
described as “let a thousand flowers bloom”, which moves away from focusing on particular areas of 
need towards a generalized pro-innovation stance. These and related points will be examined in 
greater detail in the following chapters. 
 
Key points 
 In response to the request of the 5th replenishment, IEO conducted the first CLE on innovations in 2000-
2001. This was a key document that analysed IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations, and opened the 
way for concerted collective reflection and debate in the house on the topic. 
 The IEE underlined that innovation was central for fulfilling IFAD’s mandate. It further stated that while 
there are a few highly innovative projects, many are not. It also highlighted that IFAD’s capacity to learn 
was inadequate.  
 The ARRI produced by IEO since 2003 was instrumental in inculcating a culture of measuring and 
reporting on aggregate performance in innovation and scaling up. 
 The IMI was developed in 2004 and the Innovation Strategy in 2007. The 2007-10 Strategic Framework 
included innovation as one of the six principles of engagement. These documents reflect the strategic 
pronouncements and importance IFAD attributed to the promotion of innovations as a means for 
reducing rural poverty.  
 
 
III.  META-EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANCE AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
INNOVATION AND SCALING UP IN ONGOING OPERATIONS 
 
38. This chapter draws upon building blocks (ii) and (iii) of the evaluation. These include assessing 
the performance of past IFAD operations in promoting innovations (using a meta-evaluation 
approach), and reviewing selected recent COSOPs and project designs (ongoing operations) with the 
aim of assessing the extent to which IFAD is internalizing its own experiences and lessons in 
promoting innovations, as well as determine the evolution of country strategies and projects following 
the adoption of the Fund’s innovation strategy. 
 
A.  Innovation in Projects Evaluated between 2002 and 2008 and the Link Between Innovation 
Ratings and Project Performance 
39. A meta-evaluation entails the aggregation of findings and results from a series of (previous) 
evaluations. The performance of past operations was facilitated by the fact that the promotion of 
innovation, replication and scaling up has been an integral evaluation criterion in IEO since 2002. It is 
also enshrined in the new IEO Evaluation Manual of 2009,22 which lists guiding questions for 
evaluators to answer in assessing and rating the performance of IFAD-funded projects in promoting 
innovations. As stated in the evaluation manual, IEO evaluations are required to assess innovation and 
scaling up in IFAD operations using the definitions adopted by IFAD in its innovation strategy of 
2007. From 2002 to 2008, a total of 96 IFAD-assisted projects in all five geographic regions have 
already been evaluated by IEO using a consistent methodology. 
 
40. Moreover, IEO has since 2001 undertaken a number of corporate-level and thematic 
evaluations that focused on innovations. In addition to the corporate-level evaluation of 2000–2001, 
IEO undertook three major thematic evaluations on the subject. These include the: (i) Agricultural 
Extension and Support for Farmer Innovation in Western and Central Africa: Assessment and Outlook 
                                                     
22
   The manual may be accessed at: www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/index.htm. 
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for IFAD (2001); (ii) Promotion of Local Knowledge and Innovations in Asia and the Pacific (2003–
2004); and (iii) Innovative Experiences of IFAD-Financed Projects in Peru (2003–2004). These are in 
addition to the External Review of the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (2002)23 and the IEE 
(2004–2005), which also made assessments of the performance of IFAD-funded operations and 
derived insights on the topic. Therefore, this section draws on the wealth of existing evaluative 
evidence as well as additional analysis undertaken and information collected specifically in the 
context of this evaluation (e.g. through the country visits).  
 
41. Past performance. Chart 1 shows the performance of projects by year since 2002 for 
innovations, replication and scaling up. It illustrates that the performance in terms of innovations has 
consistently improved over the years, with 100 per cent of projects evaluated in 2008 being 
moderately satisfactory or better. There are, however, two qualifications: (i) the relatively high results 
in 2005 may be caused by the fact that the projects evaluated by IEO in any year are largely chosen on 
a non-random basis; and (ii) the very high results in 2008 may be partly due to the fact that 
evaluations in the past devoted more attention to assessing the innovative characteristics of projects 
than analysing replication and scaling up. To redress this methodological concern, the new IEO 
Evaluation Manual now includes a set of questions that each evaluation is required to answer on both 
innovation, as well as replication and scaling up. 
 
Chart 1. Performance of IFAD-funded Projects for Innovation, by Year of Evaluation 
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42. The above analysis and the positive trends are further corroborated by the three-year moving 
averages of the entire evaluation dataset (see Chart 2). Three year moving averages allow for a more 
reliable assessment of trends in performance over time, as it contributes to overcoming biases that 
may result from the sample of project evaluations, which are not chosen on a random basis. 
                                                     
23
  This document may be accessed at www.ifad.org/gbdocs/repl/3/e/REOK-VI-3-R-2.pdf. 
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Chart 2. Performance of IFAD-funded Projects for Innovation 
(three-year moving averages) 
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43. Based on independent evaluation data, it seems plausible to conclude that IFAD has exceeded 
the target it has set for its performance for innovations. As agreed with the Board in September 2007, 
the results measurement framework for reporting on progress achieved against the IFAD Strategic 
Framework (2007–2010) required 65 per cent of projects to be moderately satisfactory or better by 
2010. Data from IFAD’s self-evaluation system also reveals that the set target has been surpassed,24 
with 71 per cent of projects closed in 2008–2009 manifesting a moderately satisfactory or better 
performance in innovations. 
 
44. In addition to the overall emphasis by the management and IFAD Governing Bodies, there are 
various reasons for the upward trend over the years and improvements in the performance of IFAD-
funded projects in terms of innovation. For example, following the advent of the IMI in 2004 
innovation began to receive more attention in the self-evaluation system, particularly in the portfolio 
performance reports produced by the management; this was one measure that encouraged CPMs to 
treat the promotion of innovations more coherently. Another development was the increasing 
recognition over time that IFAD needed to devote enhanced attention to non-lending activities (such 
as knowledge management, policy dialogue and partnership building) in addition to financing 
investment projects, given the significance these non-lending activities have for the promotion of 
innovation, and their replication and scaling up. An additional factor is that relatively deeper attention 
was devoted to exchanging experiences within IFAD through the establishment of electronic 
knowledge networks25 and there was more systematic organization of annual implementation 
workshops at the regional level and seminars and workshops at Headquarters. This was particularly 
important given that a large number of innovations are those that have been previously applied in 
other contexts.       
 
45. The country visits undertaken during this evaluation and other IEO evaluations of individual 
projects and country programmes systematically reveal that two far-reaching adjustments to IFAD’s 
operating model have been critical in promoting innovations: (i) direct supervision and 
implementation support; and (ii) country presence. Even though the direct supervision policy was not 
adopted too long ago, IFAD started to experiment with direct supervision in the second half of the 
                                                     
24
   See Chart 1 in the 2009 Report on IFAD’s Development Effectiveness (EB 209/98/R.10). 
25
    Electronic Networking for Rural Asia/Pacific (ENRAP), FIDAMERICA, FIDAFRIQUE and KARIANET.  
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1990s,26 and there are several examples of some form of country presence having been established 
before the Field Presence Pilot Programme was officially launched in 2003. These two elements of 
the operating model are fundamental because they enable IFAD to enhance its knowledge of potential 
institutions and partners, scout for innovations and identify at an early stage opportunities for 
replication and scaling up. In fact, the 2007 ARRI notes that some of the most innovative projects 
were in countries with a permanent IFAD presence – India and Peru, for example – and that direct 
supervision and implementation support allow for adjustments during implementation and more 
systematic follow-up, which is necessary when piloting innovations. Finally, there are other reasons 
related to IFAD’s own organizational capabilities (e.g. improved attention to innovation in quality 
enhancement and quality assurance) that can explain the better project performance in terms of 
innovation, which are covered in chapter IV.  
 
46. The evaluation did also find a number of limiting factors affecting the performance of IFAD-
funded projects in the promotion of innovations as may be seen from Box 2, including the fact that 
governments are not often open to borrowing for innovative projects that may fail or the need for 
better use of both loans and grants for different phases in the innovation journey. Moreover, one area 
where performance is systematically found to be inadequate is the scaling up of successfully piloted 
innovations. There were a number of examples of scaling up found during the country visits, however, 
according to the evaluation, they were often a manifestation of the initiatives, competence and 
perseverance of individuals rather than a result of an institutional approach and efforts to the topic. 
IFAD is aware of the generally weak results in scaling up, and there is evidence of increased attention 
recently by management to the issue.   
 
47. IFAD has an active grants programme for research, which has contributed to generating 
numerous innovative approaches, for example, in better land use management, pro-poor technology, 
gender mainstreaming, and livestock development, but the results of these important initiatives have 
not easily found their way into the Fund’s mainstream investment programmes. It can therefore be 
concluded that the potential of IFAD’s grants programme has not been fully exploited in the 
innovation promotion process. The implementation of the new IFAD grants policy (2009) offers an 
opportunity to redress this area of limitation in the past. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26
   Through the Direct Supervision Pilot Programme approved by the Board in 1997. 
 
Brazil: Farmer Osmar Rodriguez 
Paixao shows a visiting farmer a 
melon from his melon plantation on 
his farm in Umari, near Baturité. 
Osmar is one of the contact farmers 
selected by the project to receive 
technical assistance on his farm 
which will then serve as a model for 
other farmers.  
 
IFAD Photo by Franco Mattioli 
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Box 2. Factors Affecting Innovation and Priorities for Moving Forward (ARRI, 2007)27 
 
48. Innovation and other project results. The analysis conducted in this evaluation revealed a 
positive relationship between good performance in innovation and project results (e.g. in terms of 
effectiveness and impact). Nearly all projects that obtained a satisfactory or highly satisfactory rating 
for innovation had a similar rating for project performance28 and overall project achievement.29 But 
the same relationship is not evident between satisfactory performance in innovation and sustainability: 
in 70 per cent of the projects evaluated, sustainability was moderately unsatisfactory or worse, with 
similar performance in innovation. This is also due to the fact that numerous complementary factors 
such as post-project financing of recurrent costs and mainstreaming of institutional arrangements 
following project closure are essential for ensuring the sustainability of benefits, whereas successful 
implementation of innovations is essential for achieving effectiveness and impact, given that 
innovations are a central feature in project design. 
 
B.  Lessons Learned on Innovations from the ARRIs 
49. IEO published the first ARRI in 2003, and since then all ARRIs have included analysis of 
performance in innovation and scaling up. This first ARRI was prepared immediately after the first 
evaluation of IFAD’s capacity as a promoter of replicable innovations, and reflected its findings and 
conclusions (see Box 3).   
                                                     
27
   Identified by IFAD staff at the ARRI learning workshop in 2007. 
28
    Project performance is a composite of ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. 
29
    Overall project achievement is a composite of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, 
sustainability and innovation. 
Factors affecting innovation: 
• Innovation is a relatively new objective for IFAD. Most of the projects evaluated pre-date this. 
• Design and approval pressures do not allow sufficient time for scouting for new ideas. 
• There is a possible tension between a focus on results (which favours proven solutions) and a focus 
on innovative approaches (which increases the risk of failure). 
• The risks of innovation are perceived differently by and distributed differently among different 
stakeholders. 
• Gaps exist in competencies and capacities within IFAD and its partners. 
• Loans may not be the most appropriate financial instrument, or at least they need to be better linked 
with grants. 
 
Priorities for moving forward: 
• Clarify the definition, aspiration and measurement. 
• Create a more supportive “space” and internal culture for innovation. 
• Structure the innovation process, and train staff to support it. 
• Increase the time and capacity for innovation scouting. 
• Consider measures for marketing and sharing innovation at the country level (e.g. innovation fairs). 
• Re-examine the case for more flexible financing instruments and the focus on governments. 
• Consider how innovation could be facilitated and encouraged within project design and 
implementation. 
• Increase direct supervision, implementation support and country presence. 
• Improve knowledge management, innovation-sharing and the rotation of staff. 
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Box 3.  Features of Innovations that Worked in IFAD-Supported Projects (ARRI, 2003)* 
 
50. The 2007 ARRI included innovation as one of the two learning themes covered by the 
document; the other was sustainability. The report identified some of the essential factors affecting 
innovation, and suggested that successful innovation needed:  
 
• an explicit innovation objective;  
• a structured innovation process with clear sequential steps;  
• a genuine commitment to innovation and capacity-building for it by IFAD and its 
partners;  
• a supportive policy environment and effective local partners;  
• better analysis and treatment of risk; 
• improved knowledge management and sharing of experience and lessons learned from 
IFAD programmes and others; and  
• flexible project design, longer project time-frames, frequent adjustments during 
implementation and systematic follow-up; some of the most innovative projects were in 
countries with a permanent IFAD presence. 
 
51. A list of issues to be addressed to improve IFAD’s performance in innovation is given in the 
2007 ARRI and reported in Box 2. These issues were identified and discussed by IFAD staff in a 
learning workshop organized by IEO in preparation for the 2007 ARRI. 
 
52. All ARRIs consistently recommended for IFAD to plan and implement innovation, replication 
and scaling up as structured processes with explicit objectives and resources. They also concluded that 
results remain weak in terms of replication and scaling up in IFAD-supported projects. Recent ARRIs 
note the consistent improvement in project rating for innovations, but make the point that most of the 
projects evaluated were not designed and implemented with the specific purpose of promoting the 
replication and scaling up of successful innovations, nor were partners selected or resources and 
activities mobilized for this objective.  
 
 
 
 
Successful field innovations in IFAD-supported projects shared the following characteristics: 
• They addressed a need widely shared by the poor. 
• They built on existing or traditional knowledge technologies, practice, and cultural and social norms. 
• Farmers participated in their design and implementation. 
• Their advantages were clear to farmers, and the rewards were rapidly visible. 
• The cost of adopting them was affordable, financially and socially. 
• They were relatively simple, and less likely to arouse distrust among the rural poor. 
• They were well tested: prior testing of innovations, particularly when they are brought in from 
outside the  area, is necessary to reduce risks. 
• They were based on exchanges of farmers’ knowledge in project areas and among regions. 
• The project design approach was flexible, and frequent adjustments took place. 
• There was genuine commitment on the part of all partners during project implementation. 
• The correct policy environment facilitated them. 
• They were easily reversible if unsuccessful. 
* Based on findings of the Evaluation of IFAD’s Capacity as a Promoter of Replicable Innovations (2002) 
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C.  Methodology for Innovation Assessment in Evaluated Projects and Ongoing Portfolio 
 
53. The assessment framework. Although successive ARRIs presented a consolidated view of 
IFAD’s performance in innovation, it was imperative for this evaluation to gain further insights 
through a more detailed assessment of innovation in the projects already evaluated by IEO. As 
discussed in other parts of this evaluation, the Innovation Strategy gives substance to IFAD’s recent 
thinking on innovation and scaling up and confirms its aspiration to mainstream them into its 
operations. The assessment framework used by the evaluation was therefore guided by concepts and 
principles in the innovation strategy. It was developed in tandem with the review of recently designed 
projects (ongoing portfolio) to ensure consistency, building on the analysis undertaken for the second 
and third building blocks of the evaluation. 
 
54. The framework (see Appendix IV) is divided into two parts: the first is descriptive, providing 
information about different types of innovation, sectoral coverage and the nature of scaling up where 
relevant; the second consists of six composite criteria that reflect the main requirements for the 
promotion of successful innovation and scaling up in IFAD’s operations, as embodied in the 
innovation strategy. These are:  
 
(i) pro-poor orientation of innovation as a principle;  
(ii) building capabilities and understanding challenges requiring innovation;  
(iii) nurturing partnerships and facilitating innovation networks;  
(iv) embedding rigorous innovation processes and associated risk management into the 
management of innovation;  
(v) facilitating a more supportive organizational environment for innovation; and 
(vi) focusing on replication and scaling up of innovations.   
 
55. Each feature is broken down into 15 indicators (see Appendix IV). These were scored for each 
project to gain deeper insights into the performance of innovation in evaluated projects. As noted 
above, the same framework was applied for the assessment of innovation in the design of the ongoing 
portfolio. The purpose is to determine whether the main features of innovation are becoming more 
evident in the design of recent projects, particularly since the adoption of the Innovation Strategy. The 
scoring system for each indicator is as follows: 3 – strongly evident, 2 – partially evident, or 1 – not 
evident.     
 
56. The sample of evaluated projects. Between 2002 and 2007, IEO evaluated 85 completed 
projects: 53 stand-alone project evaluations and 32 in CPEs. A sample of 30 projects – 35 per cent of 
the total – was selected for the current study. The selection process targeted the most recent project 
evaluations, bearing in mind that the regional distribution of the sample, the relative weight of stand-
alone evaluations and the distribution of innovation ratings were as near as possible to that of the 
population of evaluated projects. The selected projects were approved between 1996 and 2000, and 
were closed between 2002 and 2008. 
 
57. The sample of the ongoing portfolio. The assessment covers 21 COSOPs and 68 ongoing 
project design documents. Sixteen of the COSOPs were approved after the innovation strategy, 
whereas five were from the period 2003-2006. The 68 projects reviewed are in 42 countries, 13 in 
each region except the Asia and Pacific Division where 16 projects were reviewed in view of the 
larger number of new project designs. This sample includes all 45 projects approved since December 
2007 following adoption of the Innovation Strategy, and a cohort of 23 ongoing projects designed 
previously. The projects were all designed between 2003 and 2008 and were ongoing at the time of 
this evaluation. For project design, the score is assigned for the extent of description and the intent of 
innovation: it does not make a judgment as to whether the approach is likely to succeed, other than 
where there are obvious weaknesses in the design. It is likely that at project completion the 
practicalities of implementation may result in a score that is different from the picture presented at the 
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design stage: it is acknowledged that the documents may not be a full reflection of the potential for 
innovation in all cases, but further insights were gained through the country visits undertaken in the 
course of the evaluation. 
 
D.  Characteristics of Innovation in IFAD Projects: the Old and the New 
58. Forms of innovation. According to the Innovation Strategy, there are three levels of intensity 
in processes of innovations: (i) first and most common in IFAD is the adoption in a new context, or on 
a new scale, of practices or technologies developed by others or in other contexts; (ii) adaptation is 
also common in IFAD, and it occurs when a practice is useful but not fully appropriate to a context, 
requiring a certain amount of redesign; and (iii) the least frequent, but most intense type of innovation 
is the creation of new practices or ideas, which occurs by virtually accidental creative acts or by new 
combinations of existing ideas.  
 
59. Majority of the projects evaluated by IEO since 2002 include adoption in a new context, or on a 
new scale, of innovative practices or technologies that have been developed by others or previously 
applied in other contexts. Of the completed projects, 97 per cent fell into this category. About half of 
these also included some form of adaptation (e.g., of the technology or institutional arrangements) to 
meet the requirements of the target group in a new context. The creation of entirely new innovations 
is rare and limited to only around 7 per cent of the projects evaluated by IEO since 2002. It is also 
useful to underline that 10 per cent of the projects evaluated were second or third phase operations, 
aimed at consolidating earlier investments in innovative practices. 
 
60. Increasing emphasis on creation of new innovations. The picture emerging in the ongoing 
portfolio is somewhat different: 81 per cent of innovations are adoptions of known practice in new 
contexts, but the proportion of designed adaptations increased to 76 per cent. Two other important 
developments in the new design are: (i) the significant increase in the percentage of new innovations 
to 43 per cent of the reviewed designs; these either promoted a new combination of known practices 
or created new innovations such as smart cards and mobile telephones to promote access to markets, 
improved seeds, and soil conservation techniques; and (ii) the increased emphasis on consolidating 
innovative initiatives in follow-up phases, which increased to 26 per cent. The process of creating new 
innovations is not clearly defined in the Innovation Strategy because it is a matter of combining new 
ideas and processes with established practices. There is a need for IFAD to be clearer on this because 
the need for testing and levels of risk are much higher with new innovations.  
 
61. Types of innovations: the declining role of innovation in agricultural technology and 
increased role of policy and partnership. With regard to the types of innovations, it is important to 
first underline that an IFAD-funded project may include innovative approaches in more than one sub-
sector or thematic area. Therefore, in closed and ongoing projects there were considerable overlaps 
among the different types of innovation: for example, new technologies were often introduced 
through innovative institutional approaches, and new forms of partnership were often accompanied by 
policy innovations. The meta-evaluation undertaken found that the most common type of evaluations 
in past operations are institutional (83 per cent), technological (50 per cent), empowerment of rural 
women (33 per cent), partnership (17 per cent) and policy (13 per cent). However, the new project 
design showed a different pattern where institutional innovations are still dominant (81 per cent), 
followed by innovations in partnerships (60 per cent), policy (44 per cent), technology (29 per cent) 
and gender (21 per cent). The first three types of innovation are consistent with IFAD’s current 
strategic thrusts towards institutional and partnership development and policy dialogue. The decreased 
share of technological innovations for agricultural production is a concern in view of the persistent 
food insecurity situation in low-income countries, climate change and the continuous degradation of 
natural resources.  
 
62. Change in the sectoral coverage of innovations. The meta-evaluation indicates that 
innovations cover the sectors of agricultural production and related technologies and services (60 per 
cent of the projects evaluated), rural financial services (53 per cent), natural resource management 
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(NRM) practices (37 per cent), small-scale and medium-scale enterprise (SME) production and 
marketing (23 per cent) and access to land and water (13 per cent). As mentioned above, projects may 
include innovative practices in several sub-sectors, and that is why the percentages may add up to 
more than 100. The emphasis changed in the ongoing portfolio, with a significant drop in the share of 
agricultural production and related technology and services, including product marketing, to 35 per 
cent – half of its share in the evaluated projects; rural financial services maintained its share; access to 
land and water and SME development and marketing increased their shares. This is consistent with 
IFAD’s focus on rural finance as a mechanism for poverty reduction; it also relates to the large 
number of projects that included innovations in institutional enhancement, many of which involved 
rural financial institutions. SME development and marketing was a consistent theme in project 
designs, but the designs are now becoming more sophisticated, with emphasis on value-chain 
analysis, information and technology.  
 
E.  Where does IFAD Innovate Best? Characteristics of Innovations that Succeeded 
63. Successful innovative projects do not invest in a single innovative activity but often include a 
set of complementary new approaches and processes covering different areas. Successful innovations 
were concentrated in the rural financial services, followed by SMEs, in line with the shift in IFAD 
emphasis over the last 15 years. Innovations in agricultural technology did not have a high success 
rate: of the technological innovations attempted, 40 per cent were rated successful by the evaluations. 
IFAD’s comparative advantage in innovation is therefore not closely related to its traditional domain 
of agricultural production, technology and related services. Innovations that succeeded were mostly in 
the adoption category, but with a greater degree of adaptation. All projects that invested in phase II or 
phase III to consolidate innovations performed moderately satisfactorily or better in terms of 
innovation, which supports the conclusion that innovations require time to mature. Successful 
innovations strongly emphasized institutional innovations, with emphasis on organizations of 
communities, and innovations in supporting gender equality. Of the ten projects in the closed project 
sample that attempted to innovate in terms of gender equality, nine were rated successful by the 
evaluations. This is no doubt a result of IFAD’s increasing work in the last decade to promote gender 
in its project design and implementation.  
 
64. Progress on desired features of innovation: the six composite criteria. The evaluated 
projects demonstrate only partial fulfilment of these criteria (see Table 2). IFAD-supported 
innovations are strongly pro-poor, and their implementation is generally associated with capacity-
building. Two thirds of the projects reviewed demonstrated strong evidence of emphasis on poverty; 
the remaining third had partial evidence. Capacity-building around innovative practices and 
appreciating the challenges were generally evident in 87 per cent of the projects reviewed, and 
strongly evident in 27 per cent. Support for partnerships and networks for innovation were evident in 
only half of IFAD projects, and strongly evident in less than a quarter. None of the reviewed projects 
demonstrated strong evidence of methodical adherence to the rigorous innovation process called for in 
the Innovation Strategy, but half showed evidence of following some of the stages; similarly, none 
showed strong evidence of facilitating a more supportive environment for innovations. Evidence of 
IFAD’s work and achievements in replication and scaling up was the weakest of all the criteria. 
Strong evidence of systematic drive, explicit strategy and achievements in this area existed in only 
11 per cent of the sample; there was partial evidence in 20 per cent, but in more than two thirds of the 
sample no evidence existed to this effect. 
 
65. Considerable progress was observed in the design of the ongoing projects in terms of the 
composite criteria. Scores were higher than in the closed projects for all criteria except the pro-poor 
orientation of innovation (see Table 2). Significant progress was made, particularly in following 
rigorous innovation processes and creating a supporting environment and in replication and scaling 
up. IFAD’s strategic emphasis on innovation and scaling up seems to have trickled down to project 
design, but the aggregate scores stood between “strongly evident” and “partly evident”; they were 
particularly low for replication and scaling up (see Chart 3 and Table 2).   
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Chart 3.  Project Design Scores for Innovation Over 2003-2008 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Evidence of Innovations Promotion in Evaluated Projects and New Design 
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F.  IFAD’s Evolving Approach to Innovation 
66. Innovation is now a key principle of IFAD. As mentioned earlier, corporate policies, 
strategies and guidelines have internalized innovation as a key operating principle of IFAD. There is 
unambiguous understanding that IFAD now requires a strong element of innovation in programme 
activities and project designs. This has been reflected to a considerable extent in COSOPs and in the 
design of the ongoing portfolio. Programme design work in IFAD is clearly changing in response to 
the strategic and policy focus on innovation. The pattern of improvement over the last six years points 
to a gradual shift towards an approach that facilitates innovation rather than a radical change.  
Emphasis on Innovation at IFAD’s Country Strategy Level 
67. The trends in IFAD’s country-level approach to innovation have been identified through an 
assessment of a sample of 21 COSOPs, using a framework similar to the one described above. The 
sample covered two periods rather than a sequence of years: the two time periods were: (i) September 
2007 (the approval of Innovation Strategy)–2008: all 16 COSOPs approved; and (ii) 2003–2006: five 
COSOPs in five countries. 
 
68. There is a clear pattern showing that the 2007 and 2008 COSOPs pay more detailed attention to 
the promotion of innovations, as compared to those formulated before that period (see Chart 4). The 
difference in evidence of innovation in new COSOPs in 2007 and 2008 compared with COSOPs 
generated in earlier periods moved from just above “partially evident” to “evident”.  
 
Chart 4.  Innovation Scores for COSOPs 
 
 
69. The scoring of COSOPs in terms of the detailed criteria for innovation also shows a systematic 
improvement between the two periods, which indicates that the COSOPs were influenced by IFAD’s 
increasing focus on innovation at the strategic level. For example, the newer COSOPs articulate more 
comprehensively the partnerships for innovations and the role of knowledge management, but older 
COSOPs fall short in analysing the risks and their potential consequences. In the earlier COSOPs, 
there was a variable approach to innovation; in contrast, recent COSOPs have a more uniform 
approach that clearly articulates a strategic thrust to innovation. In the 2002 COSOP for Moldova, for 
example, the only reference to innovation is in the title of a section called “Main Opportunities for 
Project Interventions and Innovation”. The report provides four paragraphs related to the main project 
initiatives but does not specifically mention areas of possible innovation. But the 2007 Moldova 
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COSOP shows a substantial shift towards a country-level approach to innovation and has a separate 
section entitled “Opportunities for Innovation” that articulates a clear approach to innovation. The 
evaluation also found that the Guidelines for COSOPs approved in December 2006 contributed 
considerably towards greater emphasis on innovation in new COSOPs. 
 
Strength of IFAD’s approach to innovations at project level 
 
70. The detailed study of the scores for the 15 innovation indicators (see Appendix IV) suggests 
that IFAD has four strengths as a promoter of innovations: (i) the pro-poor orientation of innovations; 
(ii) capacity-building for innovation; (iii) building on lessons learned in country programmes, with 
experimentation and adaptation to the new context; and (iv) building partnerships for innovations, an 
evolving strength in IFAD that is emphasized in new designs. These factors were also important 
ingredients in successful innovation. 
 
71. The pro-poor orientation of innovations. The evaluations reviewed contained clear evidence 
of close adherence to IFAD’s definition of innovation, IFAD’s support in addressing the priorities of 
the poor, recognition of pro-poor opportunities for innovations, and empowering poor people’s 
organizations at the local level through innovations. Among the projects that were rated “satisfactory” 
for innovation, 85 per cent had clear evidence of pro-poor orientation. Of those that were not 
satisfactory, 76 per cent did not focus on the poor. All projects with successful innovations contained 
evidence that the poor had participated in the processes. Participation was not only an element that 
facilitated the success of innovation: in projects in Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, India, 
the Philippines, the United Republic of Tanzania and Viet Nam, the fact that IFAD adopted 
participatory approaches was itself an innovation and was confirmed in the country visits. The poverty 
orientation of innovation was also apparent in the new design, but the score was slightly lower (see 
Table 2). In particular, the participation of the poor in the innovation process itself was less evident in 
the new design.  
 
72. Although the strength of the poverty criterion for innovation is undisputable, project documents 
can interpret almost any initiative as “innovative” in some way at some level and provide justification 
because the definition of innovation in IFAD is very broad. IFAD projects promote a range of 
products and processes as “innovative” at some scale, but the absence of objective measures of the 
degree of innovation masks the value of the term. There appears to be a lack of clarity as to what can 
be considered innovative and what can be considered best practice applied in a new situation.  
Innovation is seen as a desirable attribute of IFAD’s comparative advantage, but the range of 
activities described as innovative, as well as the uncertainty of what “newness” really is, may 
undermine the operational value of innovation in IFAD. 
 
73. Capacity-building around innovative activities. This was recognized as an important 
requirement to promote innovations in the evaluated projects reviewed and the new design, with 
evidence in around 85 per cent of cases in both groups; it was also a key element in successful 
promotion of new practices and approaches in closed IFAD projects. Three quarters of all projects 
with successful innovations showed clear evidence of supporting capacity-building; in particular, the 
projects reviewed frequently showed that project management capacity at the country level was 
crucial to promoting successful innovations: this was evident in all country visits, especially Brazil 
and Morocco. Many lost opportunities for innovations were associated with poor management and 
lack of skills and knowledge among project staff, particularly in relation to the requirements of the 
innovation processes as in Belize and Mongolia; the Nigeria country study clearly illustrates such lost 
opportunities. The approach followed in most cases of successful innovation was to transfer resources 
and decision-making powers to the users of the innovation and provide skills training and capacity-
building for staff of the government and non-government institutions involved and for institutions 
such as water users’ associations and savings-and-credit cooperatives. Emphasis on capacity-building 
in new project design increased over time, but capacity-building was largely understood as training in 
technical skills for the innovative activities rather than targeted enhancement of understanding of the 
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ways in which innovation processes work and can be supported, and of the incentives required to 
promote them. 
 
74. Learning, experimentation and adaptation. One of the strengths in IFAD’s approach to 
innovation is building on lessons learned and adopting or adapting them in new contexts: this 
approach capitalizes on previous investments in a country by building new projects on the knowledge 
generated in previous projects. There are many examples of building on lessons learned and adopting 
and adapting innovation in the new context. This is also evident in the multiple-phase projects. The 
attraction of applying lessons learned in a new context is that it builds on known elements and so 
minimizes risk. More than 50 per cent of closed projects showed evidence of internalization of lessons 
learned; the figure was 90 per cent for the new design.  
 
75. Of the evaluated projects, 60 per cent had evidence of experimentation or trialling; adaptation 
of innovations improved to 80 per cent in the new project design. All innovations in Albania, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and the Philippines with strong evidence of 
testing and adaptation were rated satisfactory in terms of innovation performance; 70 per cent of 
successful innovations had evidence of learning and adaptation. For technological innovations in 
particular, success was associated with testing, adaptation and validation of new technologies carried 
out jointly by farmers and technicians at the farm level along with the application of participatory 
research and learning practices. 
 
76. Building partnerships for innovations: an evolving strength in the new design. Building 
partnerships and networks to promote pro-poor innovations was an important factor for success in 
innovation, particularly in terms of identification of intervention needs, testing, experimentation and 
transfer of innovative solutions. Partners’ commitment and capacities were essential for proper 
design, implementation and monitoring of innovations, but insufficient attention was devoted to 
building innovation partnerships and networks in closed projects. Evidence of partnership building for 
innovation was found in half of the reviewed projects. Twenty-three per cent of projects showing 
strong evidence of partnership performed satisfactorily in terms of innovation. Partnerships that 
succeeded in promoting pro-poor innovations were broader and multi-disciplinary: they included 
government and non-government institutions, civil society organizations, international and regional 
research institutions, pro-poor organizations and private-sector entities working in the rural sector. 
Partnership with centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
was particularly valuable in promoting agricultural innovations in technology and natural resource 
management. Involving them during project implementation for testing and adaptation paid dividends 
in terms of innovation success, for example in Pakistan and the Philippines. In a number of cases, 
innovative partnerships proved essential to drive innovation performance, for example in Belize and 
Pakistan. In several cases, lost partnership opportunities proved detrimental for innovation, as in 
Ghana and Nigeria.  
 
77. The situation changed markedly in the new design, which demonstrates better appreciation of 
the role of partnership and its importance for success in innovation. Almost 90 per cent of the 
reviewed project designs showed evidence of planned partnerships and networking. There was 
evidence of a link between recognition of the crucial importance of robust alliances among partners 
with an interest in developing an innovative approach, and innovative overall project design. The link 
was less clear for innovative elements in a project. Discussion of partnership development in some 
projects was weak and did not detail ways in which partnerships could be developed to support the 
innovation process. Project designs with the highest rating for innovation usually had specific 
partnerships for promoting innovation: the design for the Decentralized Programme for Rural Poverty 
Reduction in Viet Nam, for example, includes a technical innovation advisory group of stakeholders 
to review designs for on-farm trials and to supervise them. 
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Areas Needing Improvement in IFAD’s Approach to Innovations and Scaling Up   
78. The reviews of evaluated projects and the new design suggest that there are six areas needing 
attention if IFAD is to become a leader in innovation for rural poverty reduction. They are largely 
related to embedding rigorous innovation processes in project design and implementation: (i) greater 
involvement of the poor as partners; (ii) scouting for innovative solutions to challenges; 
(iii) identifying risks in innovation and ways to mitigate them; (iv) using grant funding for the testing 
of innovative solutions and linking it with lending-based activities; (v) orienting M&E and knowledge 
management systems to promote innovations; and (vi) developing a systematic approach for scaling 
up successful innovations. 
 
79. Rigorous innovation processes. IFAD does not perform well in embedding rigorous 
innovation processes in project design and implementation, despite the strategic intention to do so (see 
Chart 5). There is recognition that there should be a comprehensive process, but embodiment of this 
understanding in operations is at best only partially evident. The idea of innovation has increasingly 
become part of IFAD’s project processes, but without the necessary rigour to support a reasoned, 
monitored and managed innovation process. The understanding that innovation requires a structured 
process is evident in most project designs, but evidence of its application is not yet clear. Only 27 per 
cent of the project design sample clearly stated how the innovation process would occur in line with 
the criteria. Basic elements such as scouting for new solutions to identified challenges and setting 
clear objectives and indicators at the outset were largely absent. Identification of innovation risks and 
their management were not evident in the closed projects, and only marginally more so in the new 
design. Not all the projects showed definite evidence of the cost-effectiveness of innovations in 
relation to other alternatives, though this aspect was improved in the new design. 
 
Chart 5.  Innovation Processes in Project Design (percentage of clearly evident scores)  
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80. Greater involvement of the rural poor in the innovation process. Despite the strong pro-
poor orientation of innovations in IFAD-supported interventions, the focus on the poor was less 
evident in the actual process. Only 27 per cent of project designs explicitly mentioned the inclusion of 
poor people in the innovation process itself; the figure for completed projects was 37 per cent. The 
trend declined between 2005 and 2008 (see Chart 6), which means that the approach to innovation is 
currently more top-down than bottom-up. The innovations are designed to benefit the poor, but fewer 
than 30 per cent of projects directly involve poor people in the innovation process itself. This is 
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consistent with the increased focus on policy-related innovations observed earlier, where project 
interventions are mainly at the government level or at levels that are distant from the rural poor even 
though the outcomes are intended to benefit the poor. 
 
81. Project design reviews demonstrate a change in IFAD’s approach to innovation. More emphasis 
is now given to the strategic level of innovation with partner organizations. The focus on innovation is 
still pro-poor, there is a move towards improving the facilitating environment for poverty reduction 
and the innovations that support it: for example the move towards increased emphasis on policy and 
institutional development, SME, market linkages, supply-chain management and links to export 
markets are further removed from the traditional integrated area-based approach to rural poverty 
reduction. It is also at variance with the original IFAD pronouncement that innovation should 
“... address the needs widely shared by the poor and involving farmers in the design and 
implementation of innovations ...” (ARRI, 2003) and should aim at “... identifying, stimulating and 
building on local innovations that emerge from the rural poor, themselves, through a process of 
mutual learning and lesson-sharing with other stakeholders ...” (IFAD Action Plan V, 2000–2002). 
 
82. These new approaches require IFAD-supported projects to liaise more with senior decision-
makers in governments and with the larger private-sector partners, who are usually not located in or 
familiar with the project area. But although the aim of innovations is to benefit poor communities in 
the target areas, the innovations themselves may hence be partially or fully separate from the direct 
impact of a project on the target group. There is sound justification for IFAD to innovate in these 
policy and institutional areas – but it is important that the link with poverty reduction and the 
priorities of the rural poor in downstream activities be clearly articulated to ensure that target groups 
enjoy the full benefits of any innovation. Some newer project designs such as the Mauritius Marine 
and Agricultural Resources Support Programme attempted to ensure this: they should be monitored 
during implementation to provide insights and lessons. 
 
Chart 6.  Participation of the Poor in Innovation Processes 2003–2008 (project design) 
 
83. Scouting for innovative solutions to identified challenges. Scouting is the systematic search 
for potential new approaches, practices and technologies to address identified challenges. IFAD-
funded projects are particularly weak with regard to this step: only three projects in Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso and Morocco – 10 per cent of the evaluated projects reviewed – had evidence of 
scouting for innovative solutions; all three produced successful innovations, and two of them were 
linked to grants funding for scouting. Of the 30 projects reviewed, 27 showed no such evidence.  
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gives to building innovation from lessons learned in its country programmes and the fact that the 
dominant pattern of innovation is adoption or adaptation of existing innovations in new contexts, 
which substantially reduces the need for serious scouting for new innovative solutions. Fifty-six per 
cent of innovations in project designs were clearly based on lessons from previous projects. The 
design process for most projects rarely included a search for new innovations to integrate into project 
design. If IFAD wishes to pursue its strategic intent to promote innovation, more attention must be 
given to scouting and instruments should be developed for it. 
 
85. Identification and mitigation of risk in innovation. Innovations are by definition risky: there 
is no guarantee of success, and there will almost certainly be failures before successful solutions can 
be identified, tested and applied. Identification of risks in innovation and formulation and 
implementation of mitigation measures were not strong aspects of the completed projects. Clear 
evidence of these elements was found in only 10 per cent of the projects – those in Bangladesh, 
Morocco and Rwanda, all of which were rated satisfactory in innovation performance. Failure to 
identify risk led to the failure of the innovation in Mongolia, Ethiopia and The Gambia. There was 
some improvement in the new design, but even so two thirds of projects did not adequately identify 
risks. Many of those that identified risks did not propose mitigation measures. One design that 
effectively addressed risk management was the Bangladesh National Agricultural Technology 
Programme, which explicitly identifies the risks of innovative market mechanisms. To ensure that 
small and marginal farmers are not exposed to unsustainable risks, potential participants will be risk-
profiled: farmers will self-select through participation in interest groups on the basis of their judgment 
of risk exposure to provide the flexibility needed for vertical integration of different segments of the 
poor in the supply chain. 
 
86. One of the reasons for the modest performance in this area is that the importance of risk factors 
in innovations is not sufficiently emphasized at the COSOP or policy level; there are no guidelines on 
addressing risk operationally. This lack of risk assessment and mitigation initiatives may result in 
negative impact on target groups. There is a requirement for project designs to comment on risks 
during internal design review, but the risks mentioned are generally related to external factors such as 
natural disasters or internal factors related to project management such as government commitment 
and receipt of counterpart funding. The risks of an innovative approach are rarely referred to, and 
even when they are the reference tends to be indirect. 
 
87. Use of grant financing for promoting innovations. Grant financing is essential in the early 
stages of innovations for scouting and pilot testing where the risk element is high and loans are not the 
right instruments. Evidence relating to innovation grant financing was limited in the evaluated 
projects: only six projects in Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Pakistan – 20 per 
cent – had clear evidence of linkages to technical assistance grants and grant funding to promote the 
earlier stages of innovations; all except one were rated by the evaluation as satisfactory in terms of 
innovation. Investing in earlier phase of testing for innovation has therefore a positive influence on 
the performance of the projects in terms of innovations.  The grants were assigned to partners such as 
national research institutions, CGIAR centres, private-sector entities, governments and NGOs. The 
availability of grants from IFAD resources to finance innovation is essentially an IFAD policy issue, 
but evidence from the review suggests that other factors may also limit the availability of funds for 
grant financing for innovation and weaken linkages with loan-funded projects. For example: (i) a 
government may be hesitant to allow experimentation in projects financed by loans; (ii) national funds 
for pilot testing of innovations are limited; (iii) those benefiting from innovation grants may not have 
links to potential partners for scaling up; and (iv) most of IFAD’s country-level partners are planners 
and implementers rather than innovators, and their roles understandably take precedence over 
innovation. 
 
88. The new design exhibited the same features. Over time, the idea for innovation emerged mainly 
through the learning process of previous projects, and occasionally from partners. Grant-financed 
research and other pilot activities can be an important precursor to project design, but only 22 per cent 
of project designs mentioned prior grant funding. There was little mention of IMI grants as an input to 
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project design; only a few projects cited grant funding from other sources such as the pilot projects of 
NGOs or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This implies that there is not a strong 
connection between grant activities and subsequent design, which obviously limits the scope of 
innovations.  
 
89. The often short project design time and the projects financed by time-bound loans further 
complicate the establishment of links between grant-financed and loan-financed activities. Innovation 
takes time, but there is little differentiation in project design documents as to the expected timeframe 
for innovative processes. IFAD core documents imply that innovations must be time-bound according 
to the length of project implementation, yet this review found that: (i) for the innovation with the most 
widespread impact, pre-design grant-based explorations were crucial; and (ii) continuing project 
phases to develop different learning and implementation stages for innovation processes were a major 
feature.   
 
90. Monitoring and evaluation to promote innovations. Evidence of adequate M&E systems to 
follow up and assess the results of the innovations was partial in the closed projects and the new 
design. This is a reflection of the recognized weakness in M&E systems in development projects: only 
7 per cent of the evaluated projects had strong evidence of an M&E system geared to innovation 
needs; the new design showed improved intentions, but 50 per cent of the projects reviewed did not 
adequately incorporate this aspect. The M&E system was effective in the closed projects when 
training and capacity-building for M&E staff were provided in the early stages of implementation. In 
some of these projects, the M&E system was used to provide feedback on the innovations and include 
additional practices that had not been part of the design such as participatory monitoring by 
beneficiary associations and other innovation stakeholders, as in Bangladesh and Brazil. When this 
was the case, adaptation was made easier and innovations had better chances of success.  
 
91. A related concern is the lack of evidence that clear goals and indicators had been developed for 
the proposed innovation processes. The nature of innovation implies that its consequences cannot be 
clearly defined at the outset: the potential may be clear, but major modifications are required more 
often than not. For this reason, the evolution of the process needs to be tracked with a view to 
understanding the potential outcomes of an innovation. Tracking helps the innovators to understand 
results, make decisions as to next steps and generate learning that will help in replication and scaling 
up. Only 11 project designs – 16 per cent of the sample – defined a specific goal for testing 
innovations or stated how success would be measured. Few project designs included any reference to 
innovation in the monitoring framework. In most projects, innovation processes were embedded in 
project management or technical processes: although integration with project implementation is 
positive, lack of clear innovation objectives and monitoring processes may constrain the potential of 
innovative processes. 
 
92. Limited evidence was found of appropriate innovation documentation and dissemination. Very 
few projects developed a systematic approach to documentation, analysis and dissemination of lessons 
learned during project implementation. In some, dissemination of lessons occurred informally through 
NGOs, cooperatives, government staff and local authorities and by word of mouth among 
beneficiaries, as in Brazil and Morocco. Evaluations reported that too little information was available 
on the achievements of innovation, replication and policy dialogue. Potential benefits were probably 
lost because of insufficient attention by governments and IFAD to sharing information or 
documenting and disseminating good practices. Some projects with technological innovations that 
could have easily been disseminated missed opportunities to share information on results, thereby 
losing benefits that could have accrued through wider adoption and replication. In other projects, good 
documentation on the results of research and demonstrations were produced, but this did not translate 
into clear messages for extension (IFAD, 2007a and 2008c). The new design improved on this aspect, 
but even so 40 per cent of the reviewed projects did not have an effective system for documenting 
lessons learned from innovations. It appears that greater attention has recently been given to 
systemizing successful innovative experiences through IFAD networks such as FIDAMERICA, 
FIDAFRIQUE and KARIANET and knowledge-sharing events.   
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93. Scaling up successful innovations. The final test of an innovation is whether it is replicated 
elsewhere and/or scaled up by a government, donors, partners or the poor themselves. This explains 
the use of the term “replicable innovation” in early strategic and policy documents rather than just 
“innovation”. Scaling up successful innovations is one of the weakest aspects of IFAD’s promotion of 
innovation: only 13 per cent of the projects reviewed showed clear evidence of scaling up; none 
promoted strategic partnerships for the purpose of scaling up successful innovations. Supervision and 
implementation support had marginal roles in promoting replication and scaling up. But this was 
before 2007, when IFAD started direct supervision of projects: currently, more attention is devoted to 
promoting innovation and to scaling up. There were attempts to disseminate innovations at the 
country level, but it was mainly done in an unsystematic manner. Most of the projects reviewed were 
not designed and implemented with the purpose of promoting replication and scaling up of successful 
innovations, nor were partners selected or resources and activities mobilized for this objective. Those 
that succeeded in scaling up did so by appropriating the innovative practices of major partners such as 
IFIs or governments. 
 
94. As mentioned above, recent project designs devoted more attention to scaling up (see Chart 7), 
but even so there is less evidence than might be desired (see Table 2). Fewer than a quarter of the 
projects reviewed articulated a process for scaling up; a slightly higher percentage intended to 
cultivate strategic partnerships for scaling up; only a fifth indicated in their design that IFAD technical 
capabilities and resources would be applied to support scaling up. 
 
Chart 7.  Replication and Scaling Up in Project Design Documents 2003-2008 
 
 
95. There appeared to be  a tendency referred to as “replication and scaling up” as a composite 
concept during 2002–2006, but under the influence of the 2005 IFAD Action Plan there has been less 
discussion in recent strategic and project documents on replication and greater focus on scaling up. 
This is reflected in the scores for replication and scaling up in project design in Chart 7. There was a 
spike in attention to scaling up rather than replication in design documents between 2006 and 2008, 
following the reverse trend in the preceding period. 
 
96. As mentioned in paragraph 21, replication gives an indication of the robustness of an 
innovation in different contexts and with different users. It can be seen as an interim step in the 
scaling up process, and it provides insights into enabling factors for scaling up such as whether 
replication occurs naturally or whether particular forms of training and promotion are required. The 
many adoptions or adaptations of innovations or best practices in different contexts in IFAD-
supported interventions are no doubt a manifestation of a replication experience, but so far they have 
not been recognized as such in IFAD. More assessment of causal links between the replication and 
scaling up processes is needed to enable IFAD to be clearer about the requirements for the processes 
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in project design and implementation and in terms of potential links. Further discussion on scaling up 
can be found in Chapter VII. 
 
Key points 
 The performance of IFAD-funded projects in promoting innovations has steadily improved overtime: this 
is corroborated by the three-year moving averages of all projects evaluated by IEO since 2002. However, 
performance in scaling up has not been good. 
 There was clear evidence of increasing alignment of recent COSOPs with the strategic intention to 
promote innovations. The evaluation found that the Guidelines for COSOPs approved in December 2006 
contributed considerably towards greater emphasis on innovation in new COSOPs. 
 Majority of the projects in the past were strong in adopting innovative practices in a new context. The 
same applies to the ongoing operations, although there is a wider degree of adaptation and the creation of 
new innovations has also increased. 
 There is a reduction of innovations in agriculture technology, as compared to the past. Institutional 
innovations are most prominent in IFAD-funded projects, followed by innovations in partnerships, 
policy, technology and gender. 
 Innovations in rural finance and rural micro-enterprise development were on the whole successful, 
whereas less than half of the concerned projects were moderately satisfactory or better in promoting 
agriculture technology innovations. 
 The review of evaluated projects and new project designs showed that IFAD had four prominent 
strengths and six areas needing attention in promoting innovations. 
 
 
 
 
IV. PROGRESS IN IFAD’S ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN 
PROMOTING INNOVATION 
97. The assessment in this chapter relates to building block (iv), which is to evaluate the progress in 
the Fund’s organizational capabilities to promote innovations. In particular, the evaluation included 
repeating an organizational capability survey, which was also conducted in the first evaluation of 
innovation in 2000-2001. The same survey was undertaken in the 2009 innovation evaluation, with 
two additional sections, one on the IMI and one on the IFAD innovation strategy. 
 
98. The purpose of the survey was to assess whether progress has been made at the organizational 
level to develop an environment that allows innovations to be promoted and scaled up within IFAD. 
Three methods of investigation were used: (i) an innovation survey which provided quantitative data; 
(ii) a qualitative analysis of 14 bilateral interviews and 2 focus groups with a cross section of IFAD’s 
staff which explored organizational issues in depth; and (iii) a review of IFAD’s documentation to 
assess whether there was evidence that state-of-the-art innovation promotion techniques were being 
used in the organization. 
 
A.  The Innovation Survey 
 
99. The aim of the survey was to answer the broad question “Does the way that we function help or 
hinder innovation?” The survey used for this evaluation compare IFAD with a reference model 
derived from an analysis of the common features of 106 innovative organizations, including some 
non-profit30 organizations. 
 
100. As mentioned above, this survey has been completed twice by IFAD. It is therefore possible to 
discern the areas in which progress has been made. The model, developed by the Centre for Research 
in Innovation Management at the University of Brighton in the UK, has three levels of enquiry: the 
                                                     
30
   No comparable research-based innovation survey exclusively for non-profit organizations is available. 
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highest consists of six domains; the intermediate level has 18 components and the third level includes 
56 elements that provide the richest picture of the shared characteristics of innovative organizations 
because they disaggregate the broader constructs. The research that underpinned the model showed 
that if one or more of the components or elements were weakly developed, it prevented the realization 
of the full potential of the organization.  
 
101. The six domains are as follows: 
 
Direction or Leadership examines (i) the extent to which senior leaders promote innovation, 
(ii) whether innovation is a key element in strategic plans and (iii) the willingness of 
management to revise the organization’s business model and move away from old ways of 
doing things. 
Competency examines (i) the degree to which the organization employs and encourages 
creative individuals, (ii) the extent to which new initiatives are adequately resourced and 
(iii) the capacity to execute innovation initiatives. 
Culture examines (i) the degree to which able people are empowered, (ii) whether there is an 
expectation that innovation will be “part of the job” and (iii) whether there is general support 
across the organization for new ventures. 
Learning examines (i) the extent to which the organization facilitates outward-looking 
learning, (ii) whether outside sources of innovation are tapped and (iii) whether multiple 
perspectives on problems, opportunities and solutions are sought. 
Structure and process examines (i) the extent to which the organization is agile, (ii) the 
degree to which support is provided for those who champion new ideas and (iii) whether there 
are effective disciplines for managing multiple innovation initiatives. 
Decision-making examines (i) the extent to which the organization has adopted progressive 
change philosophies that align innovative initiatives, (ii) whether decision-making is rapid 
and bold but prudent, and (iii) whether commitment by managers to support innovation 
initiatives is sustained over time. 
 
102. Because the domains and components are interdependent, the model can be understood most 
easily as a wheel diagram. The six domains may be seen at the centre of the wheel, whereas the 
eighteen components are visible towards the outer circular border of the wheel. 
 
 
 
Nigeria: Girls sell cassava 
flour at roadside market  
 
IFAD Photo by Piero Tartagni 
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Figure 1. Model for Assessing Organizational Innovations Capabilities 
 
 
 
This model is the copyright of Barnes & Conti Inc & D L Francis PhD and used herein with permission. 
 
103. This model was used to devise the innovation survey. The 2001 and 2009 surveys were 
completed only by PMD staff as the front line of the organization. Thirty-nine staff and consultants 
responded to the survey in 2009, as compared to 40 in 2001. The samples were broadly comparable, 
as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Innovation Survey Sample 
Level 2001 number 2001 % 2009 number 2009 % 
Senior manager 1 2.5 1 2.6 
D1 or D2 4 10.0 1 2.6 
P1 to P3 9 22.5 8 20.5 
P4 to P5 26 65.0 25 64.1 
Long-term Headquarters consultants 0 0.0 4 10.3 
 
104. It is important to note that the sample of respondents who completed the survey is not 
statistically representative of the whole of IFAD, but only PMD. Results must be interpreted 
accordingly. Two new sections were added to the survey to investigate the perceptions of IMI and the 
innovation strategy; these were analysed separately and are reported in chapters V and VI.  
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B.  Findings of the Survey 
 
105. Respondents’ answers to the standard 56 questions31 in the innovation survey, which 
correspond to the model’s 56 elements, were analysed by aggregating them into the relevant 
components and then aggregating more into the six domains. The differences between the 2001 and 
2009 scores were calculated for the domains and the components and are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Results of IFAD Organizational Innovations Capabilities Survey (2001–2009) 
Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.41
Difference 
2001 - 9
-0.46
Difference 
2001 - 9
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Difference 
2001 - 9
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Difference 
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Difference 
2001 - 9
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2001 - 9
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2001 - 9
+0.50
Difference 
2001 - 9
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Difference 
2001 - 9
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Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.45
Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.50
Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.52
Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.68
Difference 
2001 - 9
+0.44
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2001 - 9
+0.33
+0.51
+0.76
+0.55
+0.58
+0.57
+0.10
 
This model is the copyright of Barnes & Conti Inc & D L Francis PhD and used herein with permission. 
 
106. The results show that every domain received higher scores in 2009 than in 2001. The greatest 
improvement was in competency, which suggests that IFAD has increased its ability to “make 
innovation happen”. The lowest improvement was in decision-making, among other issues, implying 
that decisions are not always taken about launching a new idea or initiative after careful consideration 
or managers do not proactively deal with blockages that constrain changes. When the data are 
considered at the component level, the picture becomes clearer: the 2009 scores are higher for 17 of 
the 18 components when compared with the 2001 scores; it is only for “managers sustain momentum” 
that the difference is negative – but this may be the result of improvements elsewhere, which suggests 
that the intervention of senior managers is needed less often to drive initiatives forward.  
 
107.  Table 4 shows the detailed scores for each of the eighteen components.  
                                                     
31
   Each question could be answered on a six point scale where 1 means agree to a little or no extent, 2 means 
agree to a slight extent, 3 means agree to a moderate extent, 4 means agree to a great extent, 5 means agree to a 
very great extent, and 6 means agree totally. 
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Table 4.  Scores for the Eighteen Components to Assess IFAD’s  
Organizational Capabilities to Promote Innovations 
Component 2001 2009 High/low 
Leaders drive innovation 2.4 2.81  
Strategy incorporates innovation 2.04 2.73 L 
Dysfunctional assets are destroyed 2.78 2.93  
Talented people are employed 2.48 3.07 H 
Needed resources can be obtained 2.32 2.86  
Ideas are implemented efficiently 2.03 3.17 H 
Able people are empowered 2.65 3.29 H 
Everyone is expected to contribute 2.24 2.73 L 
Innovation initiatives are supported 2.41 2.91  
Learning feeds idea development 2.05 2.77 L 
Multiple perspectives are sought 2.44 3.01 H 
Fruitful external linkages are created 2.78 3.22  
Structures are adaptive 2.32 2.81  
Idea champions are supported 2.42 2.94  
Processes provide discipline 2.68 3.36 H 
Development pathways are explicit 2.59 3.03 H 
Decisive commitments are made 2.43 2.75 L 
Management sustains momentum 2.98 2.52 L 
 
108. Scores of 3 or more are high and shown with an H; those below 2.8 are low and shown with an 
L. IFAD can be seen as doing better in employing and empowering talented people, selecting 
development pathways,32 and being open to multiple perspectives. It is less strong in incorporating 
innovation into strategic plans, involving everyone in supporting innovative initiatives, using learning 
to drive innovation forward, making decisive commitments33 and sustaining momentum. 
 
109. While almost all of the differences show improvements, it is of concern that the level of all 
scores is low with no score reaching 3.5 or more on the 6 point scale, where 6 is the highest score. In 
fact, IFAD was in the lowest quartile of the 43 organizations surveyed with the same questionnaire in 
2001 and it remains in this group in 2009, though its ranking has improved by five places from the 
41st to the 36th position.34 It is of concern that the average score for the entire sample is 3.36 (i.e. 
taking the 43 organizations), but in 2009 using the same calculation, IFAD’s score was 2.91. As a 
comparison, it may be useful to underline that the top ten ranked organizations had an average score 
of 3.80 or more. According to this model, a score of 3.50 or more may be viewed as a relatively high 
scoring innovative organization. Out of the 43 organizations surveyed, 17 organizations had an 
average overall score of 3.50 or more. Organizations with weak innovation capabilities have a score 
of 3.00 or less, and there were 10 such organizations in the sample including IFAD. However, it 
would be wrong to place too much emphasis on these comparisons because the other organizations 
surveyed were not directly comparable and did not have to maintain the standards of probity required 
of an IFI.  
 
                                                     
32
   This includes studying new ideas and techniques that have been developed by others to see whether they 
should be adopted by IFAD. 
33
   This would include, for example, that IFAD’s knowledge and information management systems enable 
effective decisions to be made about which innovation should be selected for scaling up. 
34
   The overall score of each organization is calculated as average of all scores for the 56 elements in the 
survey questionnaire. 
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110. To gain a better insight into the relationship between the scores in the 2001 and 2009 surveys, 
statistical tests of significance were conducted at the level of the six domains and 18 components. 
Two of the domains showed a statistically significant improvement: “competency” and “structure and 
process”. In the competency domain: (i) a significant improvement was shown for the component 
“innovation initiatives are supported”; (ii) a less significant improvement was shown for “talented 
people are employed”; and (iii) no significant difference was shown for “needed resources can be 
obtained”. In the “structure and process” domain, no significant difference was shown for “structures 
are adaptive” and “processes provide discipline”, but a significant improvement was shown for “idea 
champions are supported”.  
 
111. Two domains showed an improvement, but not at the level required to be statistically 
significant: these were “culture” and “learning”. In the “culture” domain, a significant improvement 
was shown for the components “able people are empowered” and “innovation initiatives are 
supported”. A significant improvement was shown for “everyone is expected to contribute”. In the 
“learning” domain, a significant improvement was shown for “multiple perspectives are sought”; no 
significant difference was shown for “fruitful external linkages are created”.   
 
112. The domains that displayed no statistically significant difference between 2001 and 2009 were 
“leadership” and “decision-making”. In the “leadership” domain, however, a significant improvement 
was shown for the component “strategy incorporates innovation”. No significant difference was 
shown for “leaders drive innovation” and “dysfunctional assets are destroyed”. In the “decision-
making” domain, no significant difference was shown for the components “development pathways are 
explicit”, “decisive commitments are made” or “managers sustain momentum”. 
 
113. The pattern that emerges is one in which improvements have taken place, but from a low base. 
Most of the improvements relate to operational performance, not how leadership and decision-making 
are practiced. From an innovation perspective, IFAD has become more efficient and more open, but 
not better directed (e.g. one of the lowest scoring elements is that IFAD’s innovation strategy does not 
direct people efforts as to where new ideas are needed). This finding becomes clearer when the most 
detailed level of analysis is undertaken, that is reviewing the findings on the 56 elements of the 
reference model (see next section). 
 
C.  Changes in IFAD’s Innovation Capabilities 
 
114. One way to understand the changes from 2001 to 2009 is to move to the deepest level of 
analysis and examine which of the 56 elements scored significantly higher or lower in 2009 as 
compared with 2001. As it happens, nine of the elements in 2009 had climbed by 25 per cent or more 
in both the climber and the faller categories (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. What has changed in IFAD’s Innovation Capabilities between 2001 and 2009?  
Elements in 2009 that had climbed by 25% or 
more 
Elements in 2009 that had fallen by 25% or more 
People in IFAD have all the skills needed to 
contribute to high-performing teams. 
IFAD managers are tough in dealing with anything that 
blocks change. 
Programmes of work are well managed in IFAD – 
i.e. execution is highly effective. 
We implement the principle that many small ideas taken 
together are a good way to help IFAD to develop. 
People who drive through changes and overcome 
difficulties are highly respected in IFAD. 
IFAD’s strategic emphasis on innovation has caused me 
to change my priorities as to what is important in my 
job. 
Once agreed, new ideas are rapidly implemented 
across IFAD. 
Managers in IFAD frequently ask for ideas from more 
junior members of staff. 
Advisers from outside of IFAD are invited to 
question how we do things. 
In IFAD, people with good ideas can get the resources 
needed to implement their proposals. 
People in IFAD are clear as to how they can focus 
their efforts to help to implement the strategic 
commitment to promoting innovation. 
The voice of the rural poor is clearly heard in the 
development of new initiatives. 
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Table 5 (continued). What has changed in IFAD’s Innovation Capabilities between 2001 and 2009? 
Top management in IFAD take a direct interest in 
innovative initiatives. 
IFAD can take an idea and quickly turn it into 
something that can bring substantial benefits to the rural 
poor. 
IFAD searches for highly creative people for key 
roles in IFAD itself and in project-delivery teams. 
Managers systematically collect suggestions that could 
improve IFAD’s ability to promote new ideas for 
poverty alleviation from everyone who can contribute. 
In IFAD, people frequently get together to discuss 
new ideas. 
Decisions about launching a new idea or initiative are 
only taken after careful consideration. 
 
115. The elements that climbed in the rankings indicate that IFAD has improved in its ability to 
implement, both in the use of facilitative social processes such as teamwork and in programme and 
project planning. With regard to the latter, important progress has been made in quality enhancement 
and quality assurance processes, which have contributed to focusing management and staff attention 
on innovation.35 The self-evaluation system of IFAD also treats innovation with attention. It is also 
significant that members of the top management group take a greater direct interest in innovation, 
suggesting that top leadership involvement has increased. Several of the falling elements relate to 
management practice (that appears to have become less consultative regarding new ideas). Also, there 
are difficulties related to the availability of resources, a lack of speed in taking new ideas through the 
system and, importantly, a suggestion that IFAD is insufficiently open to ideas from a wide diversity 
of sources, including the rural poor themselves. The picture becomes clearer when the 15 highest and 
15 lowest-scoring elements are reviewed, as in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Highest and Lowest-Scoring Fifty-Six Elements to Assess  
IFAD’s Organizational Capabilities to Promote Innovation 
15 Highest-Scoring Elements Mean 2009 
Those who develop new initiatives are creative and well-motivated individuals  3.89 
We have frequent contacts with people from outside IFAD - for example, other agencies, 
pro-poor organizations, universities, consultants, etc.  3.55 
Strong co-operation between teams helps new ideas to be implemented effectively  3.47 
Individuals within IFAD or working on IFAD projects are encouraged to take initiatives 
themselves - providing they operate within guidelines  3.45 
Programmes of work are well managed in IFAD (i.e. execution is highly effective)  3.39 
A great deal of time is spent exploring how IFAD needs to change in the future  3.34 
People in IFAD share a deep understanding of the Fund's chosen pathways to help the rural 
poor achieve social and economic development 3.31 
I can talk openly to all managers in IFAD about opportunities for doing new things, no 
matter if my ideas are 'outside the box'  3.29 
Advisers from outside of IFAD are invited to question how we do things  3.29 
There is a ‘can-do’ spirit in IFAD (people feel able to get things done)  3.24 
IFAD has many talented people who are actively promoting new ideas  3.18 
People in IFAD are encouraged to be self confident (i.e. act on what they believe is the 
right thing to do)  3.17 
People who drive through changes and overcome difficulties are highly respected within 
IFAD  3.17 
                                                     
35
   For example, innovation is one criteria included in the Maturity Assessment Template for overall design of 
new COSOPs and project design – see IFAD President’s Bulletin dated 15 July 2008 on Guidelines for COSOP 
Quality Enhancement and Quality Assurance. 
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Table 6 (continued). Highest and Lowest-Scoring Fifty-Six Elements to Assess  
       IFAD’s Organizational Capabilities to Promote Innovation 
People with up-to-date knowledge and skills are valued highly in IFAD  3.16 
People in IFAD have all the skills needed to contribute to high-performing teams  3.13 
15 Lowest-Scoring Elements Mean 2009 
In IFAD, people with good ideas can get the resources needed to implement their 
proposals.  2.66 
In IFAD, members of staff are appraised and assessed with regard to whether they 
implement new ideas successfully.  2.63 
All managers inspire and encourage those working in and for IFAD to be creative.  2.63 
Recently there has been a comprehensive review of the degree to which IFAD makes best 
use of new social and science-based technologies, for example in community development, 
agricultural technologies, electronic communication methods and rural development 
approaches. 
2.61 
Managers in IFAD frequently ask for ideas from more junior members of staff.  2.57 
Effective planning takes place before changes are introduced so that new ideas can be 
implemented effectively. 2.53 
Managers systematically collect suggestions that could improve IFAD’s ability to promote 
new ideas for poverty alleviation from everyone who can contribute. 2.53 
IFAD’s Innovation Strategy directs people’s work to areas where new ideas are needed. 2.53 
IFAD implements the principle that many small ideas taken together are a good way to 
help it to develop. 2.51 
In IFAD a great deal of time is invested in developing people’s knowledge and skills so 
that everyone is fully up-to-date. 2.46 
IFAD’s knowledge and information management systems enable effective decisions to be 
made about which innovations should be selected for scaling up or replication. 2.42 
IFAD’s Innovation Strategy has caused me to change my priorities as to what is important 
in my job. 2.35 
The way that IFAD’s organizational structure has been designed helps rather than hinders 
the discovery and implementation of new ideas. 2.33 
IFAD’s managers are tough in dealing with anything that blocks change. 2.32 
When something new needs to be done, people in IFAD can have all the training they need 
to get them up to speed quickly. 2.24 
 
116. The list of 15 lowest scoring elements is revealing. It shows that two of the bottom five items 
relate to the lack of outward-looking training that could help those who champion innovation to find, 
select and implement new ideas. The second lowest item relates to the extent to which managers 
remove blockages that can hinder the progress of innovative initiatives. There are concerns about 
IFAD’s organizational structure and, interestingly, the fourth item from the bottom suggests that 
IFAD’s Innovation Strategy, published in 2007, has had little or no effect on behaviour.  
 
D.  The Innovation Journey 
 
117. As mentioned earlier, IFAD is seeking to develop innovation as a dynamic organizational 
capability. Two additional questions were included in the 2009 innovations survey to provide 
additional insight as to the extent to which this has been achieved: these relate to the Innovation 
Journey Model, a framework that was not available in 2001 at the time of the first evaluation on the 
topic. The integrated model is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Innovation Journey Model 
 
 
This model is the copyright of Barnes & Conti Inc & D L Francis PhD and used herein with permission. 
 
118. At the base of the diagram is “innovation capability” of an organization (which was measured 
by the innovation survey described above). Specialized tools and methods provide the capacity to 
manage many types of innovation journeys, each of which can be considered a discrete initiative. 
Innovation journeys are aligned with the strategic intent of the organization, indicated by the arrow on 
the left, and create new value or benefits, indicated by the arrow on the right. Successful innovation 
journeys grasp opportunities and create new value, but because it is not possible to exploit every 
opportunity an organization needs to be selective and set its own innovation agenda to harmonize 
separate innovation initiatives. 
 
119. The five phases are shown in sequence on the diagram for ease of explanation. In reality, they 
occur much less systematically, but that is the true nature of the innovation task. The five phases are: 
 
Searching (or scouting). In this phase, the organization looks for new and different ideas. 
Many ideas are created or found, and opportunities are mapped in line with the organization’s 
strategic goals. At the end of the phase, opportunities will have been defined, there will be 
many ideas and those beginning the innovation journey will be aligned, challenged and 
inspired. 
Exploring. Facilitating the systematic exploration of the upsides and downsides of new ideas is 
part of the exploring phase. Ideas and opportunities are organized, debated and analysed in 
depth. Ideas are tested to demonstrate that they are practical and to ensure as far as possible that 
potential customers want the proposed innovation. Experimentation and filtering narrow the 
field so that exploration can be directed to where it is most likely to deliver an attractive return 
on investment. 
Committing. The emphasis moves from “What could we do?” to “What should we do?” The 
focus is on what to do, what not to do and getting the right people and financial resources 
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committed to support the initiative. Defining the resources and new capabilities that will be 
required is crucial. 
Realizing. The emphasis moves to execution (piloting) – from “what” to “how”. The focus is 
on achieving goals. This requires the organization to build high-performing teams, carry out 
frequent project reviews, manage boundaries and deal with outside forces that can mislead or 
block progress. 
Optimizing (or scaling up). The emphasis is on maximizing benefits – that is, increasing the 
degree to which an idea is exploited fully, for example by scaling up. Optimization is central to 
the concept of innovation: without it, the process is not worthwhile. 
120. An important aspect of the journey is to define an innovation agenda (during the exploring and 
committing phases). An innovation agenda is essential to focus an organization’s limited resources on 
selected innovation priority areas or domains that are driven by the organization’s mandate, 
comparative advantage, specialization and track record. 
 
121. The questions related to the innovation journey in the survey have been analysed at the level of 
these five phases. The pattern of answers is shown in Chart 8. 
 
Chart 8.  Perceived Competence of IFAD in the Five Phases of the Innovation Journey 
 
 
122. The scores indicate the numbers of times that the 39 respondents’ answers indicate the relevant 
behaviours for each phase of the journey. The results reveal that staff perceive IFAD to be stronger in 
searching, exploring and realizing than committing and optimizing (scaling up). The scores for the 20 
activities that are needed for successful innovation journeys are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Scores for 20 Activities Required for a Successful Innovation Journey 
 
 
 
This model is the copyright of Barnes & Conti Inc & D L Francis PhD and used herein with permission 
 
123. It can be concluded that the lowest-scoring activities in this diagram are likely to be 
development areas for IFAD. These findings are provisional, however, in that they were based on a 
small sample of respondents. A training-needs analysis, which was outside the scope of this 
evaluation, would be needed to validate this finding. 
 
124. The five skills are major aspects of innovation management. Staff who are agents of innovation 
need to use state-of-the-art tools and processes to: (i) explore the advantages and disadvantages of 
new ideas; (ii) design experiments; (iii) provide rapid learning; (iv) build adaptable, high-performing 
teams; (v) evaluate the costs and benefits of innovative initiatives; and (vi) exploit the advantages of 
successful initiatives so that more people benefit. It is a matter of concern that input into these topics 
has not been part of IFAD’s formal learning agenda, though some individual staff found their own 
answers to the requirements.  
 
E.  Qualitative Analysis 
 
125. The qualitative data were collected by interview and focus group. Twenty-one staff took part in 
two focus group discussions and interviews on IFAD’s innovation capabilities, leading to various 
interesting findings. All but one of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The analysis used a 
computer-assisted grounded-theory method. 
 
126. The qualitative information made two substantial contributions to the evaluation: (i) it provided 
greater depth of insight into the pattern of scores from the innovation survey; and (ii) it demonstrated 
the importance of agency – how individuals act as agents of innovation by showing entrepreneurship 
and dedication. The agency level of analysis is important, because innovation is at least in part a 
social process that cannot be fully systematized: it is not just that people are important – they are vital 
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if innovation is to take place. Organizations need people in innovation-intensive roles to be proactive, 
to take initiatives, to win support and to persist despite setbacks. 
 
127. At the agency level, the analysis of data from focus groups and interviews presented the 
evaluators with a paradox: all the interviewees and the members of focus groups offered positive 
examples of innovative initiatives and expressed the view that innovation was important, indeed vital, 
to their work and for IFAD as a principle of engagement for reducing rural poverty. Indeed, two 
CPMs used the same phrase: “If we don’t innovate then we, as IFAD, have nothing to offer.” 
 
128. The qualitative data therefore presented a picture that was different from the one derived from 
the survey. It seemed that many individuals or agents, especially those who worked on designing or 
delivering projects, operated as social entrepreneurs and showed substantial dedication to making 
innovation part of their work. Detailed analysis of the data showed that IFAD had succeeded in 
conveying the message that innovation was important, expected and relevant to development 
community. However, the Fund has not succeeded in indicating what this meant in practice or how to 
go about promoting innovations and their scaling up. Those who contributed to the qualitative 
analysis filled in the gap themselves, at least in part. 
 
129. There are indications of a potential for conflict between the quest to innovate and the numerous 
additional tasks (e.g., direct supervision and implementation, policy dialogue, knowledge 
management, self-evaluation, etc) that CPMs are required to discharge. This is illustrated by the 
following comment from a CPM: “You want innovation, you want creativity, you want country 
programme management teams, you want an inclusive private sector, civil society. You want me to be 
as good with a loan agreement as a lawyer would be … you want me to do supervision, you want me 
to play the policeman, you want me to be the implementer and supporter and a creator. What do you 
really want?” Perhaps the most telling point was the use of “you” rather than “we” to refer to IFAD. 
 
130. Another informant provided evidence of other negative stereotypes, i.e. the limited opportunity 
for sharing of knowledge across CPMs as the following quotation shows: “I think all of the CPMs 
tend to work in parallel lines and do not learn from each other… There’s a very strong culture of, 
firstly, ‘it’s my country, and I know best for my country’, and secondly, ‘I’m too busy to be wasting 
my time learning’. It’s a very self-defeating culture and one that is about the importance of the CPMs, 
who are the praetorian guard of IFAD”. This is critical: if the view is held widely, it will inevitably be 
a barrier to cooperation.  
 
131. These quotations, although selective, help us to understand why IFAD’s scores on the 
Innovation Survey were consistently low. To be successful, innovation requires greater cross-
boundary cooperation than routine activities, and a willingness to take risks. Any tensions between 
those who seek to standardize and the agents of innovation will inhibit communication and 
collaboration. It is important not to over-emphasise the extent of such conflict, however, because there 
are many examples of cooperation and mutual support across “the divide”. IFAD has many intelligent 
and able professional members of staff who have come to terms with what was described as “the 
reality”; but innovation appears to occur in IFAD because committed individuals take initiatives and 
succeed with at least some of them. 
 
132. Although principles favouring innovation are clearly articulated in IFAD, there is no 
corresponding understanding as to how those who are expected to manage innovation – the agents – 
should operate. This is illustrated by the following quotation: “... there’s no sort of methodology for 
innovation, which is articulated in a paper or that we are encouraged to follow. It’s more a sort of 
theory … looking at innovation and the cycle: starting with the scoping, identification, research and 
development, validation, communication and ending with scaling up replication. We know about that 
and as CPMs we’re just told… be innovative!” 
 
133. The picture that emerged from the qualitative analysis is complex. The principal way in which 
innovation takes place in IFAD is through multiple processes of improvisation that have been 
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legitimized by policy documents such as the Fund’s Innovation Strategy. However, IFAD’s formal 
organization has not been designed to support multiple improvisations, and the lack of clear strategic 
intent means that there is a lack of alignment between initiatives. Those who have the role of 
standardizing practices have not been sufficiently active in helping IFAD staff to develop the mind-
sets and skill-sets as well as providing the required incentives. Sometimes, scholars of innovation 
studies use the analogy of a jazz band to describe the reality of innovation: if this analogy is used to 
describe IFAD, then the musical genre is explicit but the musicians improvise, with varying levels of 
skill, according to their own perception of the tune. So, there is plenty of jazz, but it is difficult to 
discern the tune being played! 
 
134. The analysis of quantitative and qualitative data provided a deep insight into IFAD’s progress 
in acquiring the capabilities needed to promote innovation. The findings of the innovation survey 
show that IFAD’s formal organization was not designed to support innovation, although progress in 
managing implementation has been beneficial. The findings of the innovation journey analysis 
identify areas of strength and weakness; parallel to this, but less obvious, there are many professionals 
– and not only those in project-oriented roles – who have taken advantage of significant degrees of 
freedom and acted as agents of innovation with passion and commitment. IFAD’s policy that 
innovation should be infused into practice whenever and wherever possible has not been supported by 
the development of relevant skills among innovation agents, and there are weaknesses in the ways in 
which innovation is managed. The situation is far from bleak, however: there is a high degree of buy-
in to the principle that innovation is important: this can be built on if an innovation-oriented 
organizational development programme is undertaken. One instrument that was intended to achieve 
this aim was the Innovation Strategy, which will be considered in detail in chapter VI. 
 
Key points 
 The 2009 survey, which is a repeat of the one done in 2001, reveals improvements in IFAD’s 
organizational capabilities to promote innovations, although from a very low base. IFAD is however still 
in the lowest quartile of 43 organizations that have undergone the same survey.  
 The survey provides evidence of IFAD’s strengths in various stages of the Innovation Journey, from 
scouting to piloting, validating and scaling up. Results indicate that staff perceive IFAD to be strong in 
searching or scouting for innovation but weak in scaling up.  
 Innovation appears to take place in practice largely through individual initiatives rather than in a systemic 
manner. There are improvements in operational processes, but the human resources skills and incentives 
are not in place to promote innovation. 
 The 2007 innovation strategy has had little effect on behaviour. 
 The survey reveals that managers are not tough in dealing with blockages that may hamper change and 
that opportunities for training are limited. IFAD’s knowledge and information systems are not strong in 
enabling effective decisions about which innovations should be selected for scaling up. 
 
V.  ASSESSMENT OF THE INITIATIVE FOR MAINSTREAMING INNOVATION IN IFAD 
 
135. Methods. The IMI evaluation (the fifth building block of the evaluation) was guided by the 
IEO evaluation manual. The assessments were made based on four main sources of information: 
(i) available documentation within IMI; (ii) a review of completed or almost completed IMI grants; 
(iii) interviews with key informants associated with IMI; and (iv) the Innovation Capability Survey of 
IFAD staff that was carried out as part of the overall evaluation (see chapter IV).  
 
136. Background. The IMI was designed in response to IFAD’s increasing strategic focus on 
innovation, particularly in response to the first innovation evaluation of 2000–2001. This evaluation 
raised concerns about the low level of systemization of innovation across IFAD operations. IMI was 
an attempt to address directly the recommendations arising from these findings. It was funded by a 
US$10 million supplementary contribution from the United Kingdom Department of International 
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Development (DFID). The funds were intended to be a contribution to a multi-donor trust fund on 
innovations, but no other donors subscribed.  
 
137. IMI design. The goal of IMI was to “... enhance IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations that 
will have a positive impact on rural poverty.” The strategic intent was to move IFAD from a tactical 
approach to innovation to a more strategic and systematic approach that mainstreamed innovation into 
IFAD operations. The IMI programme was designed to have two phases: a pilot phase, which started 
in 2003, and a main phase that was to run from 2005 to 2007. The preparatory phase was to identify 
IFAD’s most promising innovations, concepts and experiences and start to prepare them for further 
implementation or dissemination. Eight pilot activities related to developing innovation capacity in 
IFAD were initiated. The lessons learned from the pilots helped to shape the Operational Framework 
for the main phase of IMI, which was approved by the Executive Board in December 2004.    
 
138. IMI objectives. The objectives of the IMI programme were to: (i) strengthen innovation in 
IFAD operations; (ii) increase learning and the sharing of innovations; and (iii) change organizational 
culture and practices to support innovation. The design included three components corresponding to 
the expected outcomes. Building partnerships for innovation was an operating principle for 
implementing all three components. The Operational Framework proposed an extensive list of 
activities for each component and included a matrix summarizing indicative activities for each 
component.36 
 
139. Component 1. Strengthening innovation in IFAD operations. The role of IMI in this 
component was to strengthen the pipeline of innovations, generate new partnerships and tools, and 
enhance innovative learning-based design and implementation in the project cycle. This was to be 
achieved by identifying and promoting innovation for the rural poor in and through country and 
regional programmes and through policy and strategic input at the corporate level. The main 
instrument used was the Competitive Innovations Grant Scheme, which builds on the IMI pilot 
activities and provides funds for innovative ideas that contribute to the IMI objectives. Other activities 
included partnership-building with several organizations and inputs into strategic processes at the 
corporate level; these were financed by targeted budget allocations. 
 
140. Component 2. Increasing learning and the sharing of innovations. IMI was designed to 
develop a more structured and effective process of learning about innovation, involving a range of 
partners. This was central to increasing IFAD’s capacity to promote innovation for the rural poor. The 
learning was also aimed at developing IFAD’s strategic areas of innovation to generate expertise for 
promoting innovation in rural poverty reduction. Internally, IMI was tasked to provide IFAD staff 
with opportunities for field-level learning, training and dialogue on innovations. The activities 
supported in this component consisted of training courses and workshops.  
 
141. Component 3. Changing organizational culture and practices. This component aimed to test 
and evaluate strategies for organizational innovation such as finding new ways of working in IFAD 
and motivating staff to become more innovative in practice. The activities were generally not separate 
processes but supporting activities to other components such as staff training, testing new working 
arrangements and providing incentives for innovative practices.  
 
142. Programme management. IMI is managed by a small secretariat – the IMI management team 
– funded from IFAD’s regular budget and located in the then External Affairs Department (EAD) of 
IFAD. Among other activities, the management team operated the Competitive Grants Scheme with 
guidance from a screening committee chaired by the Acting Director of the Policy Division and the 
                                                     
36
   The description of proposed activities for the IMI in the main text of the Operational Framework does not 
clearly correspond to the indicative activities stated in the summary table in the Operational Framework, page 4. 
This has resulted in lack of clarity in implementation and is discussed further in relation to the relevance and 
effectiveness of the IMI. 
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Director of the Technical Advisory Division. IMI funding was designed to be available for use by 
Headquarters and field staff: this was a major distinguishing feature from the IFAD Grant Policy that 
did not allow funds to be allocated for use by IFAD itself. All IMI activities were to be linked to the 
IFAD’s loans and grants projects.   
 
143. Design changes. There were no major changes to IMI design during implementation, but there 
were changes of direction. A draft IMI implementation strategy was produced in 2006 that 
incorporated the findings of a DFID review: it proposed a change in the direction of implementation, 
focusing on: (i) scouting for innovation; (ii) creative problem solving; and (iii) communicating for 
replicating and scaling up innovation. The draft did not explain why these three aspects were 
prioritised or why other design activities had been scaled back. It was presented to the IFAD 
Programme Department Management Team in December 2006. Several revisions were requested, but 
there is no record of management approval for a final document or acceptance by senior management 
of the new emphasis. Programme implementation clearly changed in response to the draft strategy, 
because the three focus areas were given prominence in the 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports. Other 
changes in design included: (i) redundancy of several activities proposed in the Operational 
Framework, which were taken over by other IFAD programmes; and (ii) changes to the selection 
criteria and weighting for grants, which changed the basis on which grants were selected for funding. 
A logical framework was developed for IMI in 2004, but it was not finalized and has not guided 
implementation. 
 
Implementation Results 
 
144. The following paragraphs summarize the results achieved by IMI. The results are ordered by 
component on the basis of the activities recommended in the IMI Operational Framework.37 The IMI 
Competitive Grants Scheme was the main funding instrument and drew 66 per cent of funds.38 The 
scheme is placed nominally in Component 1, but grant proposals were required to state the ways in 
which the proposed grant would support all three IMI objectives. Activities financed through the 
Competitive Grant Scheme are therefore referred to in all three components.  The components are 
cross-referenced where appropriate.  
 
145. Component 1. Strengthening innovation in IFAD operations. The expected activities in this 
component were extensive.39 IMI was also tasked with a leadership role in policy dialogue and 
engagement for innovation.40 The main approach to implementation was to finance relevant activities 
through the Competitive Grants Scheme. The IMI management team implemented actions to drive 
forward partnerships, scouting and policy development related to innovation; the results are explained 
below. 
 
                                                     
37
   The range of activities in each component was viewed by the IMI management team as indicative rather 
than comprehensive. Nevertheless, the evaluation gauged progress against all the recommended actions to assist 
in overall assessment of IMI’s intended performance.  
38
   The Competitive Grants Scheme had an allocation of US$5,761,930, which was 66 per cent of the total 
allocation of US$8,708,346. The remaining 34 per cent of financing covered designated activities and the 
operation of the IMI screening committee. 
39
   Activities included: (i) building partnerships for innovation; (ii) enhancing the capacity of the “extended” 
IFAD; (iii) development of design tools for innovation; (iv) improving the implementation of innovation; 
(v) bridging the gap between design and implementation; (vi) providing back-up support for implementation of 
innovation in country programmes; and (vii) creation of a project development and innovation partnership and 
programme management unit “twinning” arrangements.  
40
   The activities envisaged were: (i) identification and analysis of policy issues related to innovation; 
(ii) support for the engagement of people’s organizations in policy dialogue; and (iii) support for the IFAD 
policy forum and other fora that would enhance IFAD’s profile as an innovator in rural poverty reduction. 
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146. IMI Competitive Grant Scheme. The scheme received 78 proposals over seven funding 
rounds, 40 of which – 51 per cent – were approved;41 39 grants were financed by IMI, but only 11 
were fully completed by the time of the evaluation in June 2009. A further nine grants expended more 
than 90 per cent of their funds. Nearly 50 per cent of IMI grants were still in progress42 at the time of 
the evaluation. The distribution of grants across IFAD departments was 18 grants for the five regional 
divisions,43 11 for the Technical Advisory Division, 3 joint regional grants and 7 grants for internal 
administrative or operational IFAD divisions.  
 
147. The selection criteria for grants initially covered: (i) the strategic fit of the grant application 
with IMI objectives, including “uniqueness”; (ii) the extent to which the grants addressed the three 
IMI objectives; and (iii) the feasibility of the budget and timeline. There were changes to the criteria 
and the weighting of different criteria over time,44 but all scoring totalled 100 points. A sample of 
grants reviewed by the steering committee showed that the quality of proposals increased from an 
average score45 of 56 per cent in the first grant rounds to 69 per cent in the 2007 rounds; it then fell to 
65 per cent in the 2008 grant round. This indicates that the quality of proposals to IMI did improve 
from the early years of the programme, but that there were still gaps in the quality of proposals in 
relation to the requirements of the IMI funding criteria. The main weaknesses identified by the 
steering committee were: (i) low levels of innovation; (ii) unrealistic objectives; and (iii) insufficient 
definition of mechanisms for mainstreaming. These weaknesses are consistent with the concerns 
raised in the first innovation evaluation in 2000-2001.  
 
148. The grants approved covered various sectors and activities. Analysis by the most common 
sectors showed that grants with a private-sector connection were most frequent: this is consistent with 
the evaluation finding mentioned earlier in the report of a shift towards private-sector interventions 
such as value-chain and market access development in IFAD’s current country programmes. 
Institutional development in IFAD was the next most frequent type of grant. Rural finance innovation 
initiatives accounted for nearly a quarter of the grants; the remaining grants covered either aspects of 
natural resource management or technological innovations. Table 7 provides a snapshot of sub-sector 
coverage of the IMI grants. 
 
Table 7.  Sub-sector Coverage of IMI Grants 
 
Private 
Sector 
Rural 
Finance Technology NRM 
 
Institutional 
 
Total 
No. of Grants 12 8 3 6 10 39 
% 31 21 8 15 25 100 
 
                                                     
41
   Seventeen per cent of the proposals were rejected because they did not fulfil all the required criteria; 10 per 
cent were rejected because they had a low score against the required criteria. The remaining 22 per cent were 
rejected because of insufficient funds allocated to a particular funding round – but several were approved in 
subsequent rounds. One approved grant was cancelled because of lack of counterpart funding. 
42
   Updated information as of September 2009 indicates that 30 grants have now been completed. 
43
   Western and Central Africa (4); Eastern and Southern Africa (5); Asia and the Pacific (1); Near East and 
North Africa (2); Latin American and the Caribbean (6). 
44
   The weighting for the feasibility of the activity increased from 10 points to 30 points. There was a decrease 
in weighting for “linkages to other organizational units within IFAD” and in contributions to changing the 
“organizational culture/practices” with regard to innovation. The aspect “innovativeness” was added as a 
criterion late in the programme; it received a 10/100 weighting. 
45
   Scoring of grants was based on the selection criteria for the screening committee. The criteria changed 
slightly during implementation, but the total score remained 100. The score average per funding round therefore 
demonstrates the extent to which grants addressed the IMI selection criteria. 
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149. Results of IMI grants. It is important to distinguish between the results of IMI grants in 
relation to stated targets in the grant proposal, set out in this paragraph, and the contribution of these 
grants to IMI objectives (the latter will be treated later in the document). At the time of this 
evaluation, 20 grants – around 50 per cent – had been completed or almost completed. The evaluation 
review of these 20 grants reveals that around 85 per cent of grants can be considered moderately 
satisfactory or better in terms of overall achievement, whereas 15 per cent were rated as moderately 
unsatisfactory.   
 
150. Partnerships for innovation. IMI grants were used to foster partnerships, for example, with 
the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Centre for Creative Leadership. The former 
led to approval of a grant of US$3 million from the IFAD Executive Board in December 2008 for 
policy development related to climate change mitigation and improved market access for the poor. 
The latter provided customized training for country programme staff and partners, but it is still in the 
preliminary stages. There are currently no tangible results from either of these partnerships. 
Preliminary partnerships with private-sector and other agencies were evident in 36 per cent of IMI 
grants: for example a private-sector entity in China was involved in risk assessment related to 
changing weather conditions46 and is likely to take up the weather insurance supported by the project. 
These are positive initiatives – but given that partnerships were considered to be a basic principle of 
IMI, results have not been as extensive as intended in the IMI design.  
 
151. Policy-level activities. The generation of the Innovation Strategy was an important activity 
related to this component; the IMI management team was instrumental in its development. The 
document emphasizes IFAD’s commitment to innovation and provides a formal outline of IFAD’s 
approach to innovation (see chapter VI for the assessment of the Innovation Strategy). The IMI 
resources were valuable in other strategic processes such as background research that contributed to 
development of the IFAD Targeting Policy (2006), the IFAD Policy on Improving Access to Land 
and Tenure Security (2008), and input to the preparations of the IFAD Rural Poverty Report. 
 
152. Scouting. Emphasis was placed on the search for innovations that could be applied directly or 
indirectly to poverty-reduction initiatives. Of the 296 documented case studies of successful 
innovation, 58 per cent related to IFAD-funded projects; these activities contribute to results in 
component 2 in terms of capturing learning and promoting IFAD innovations.  
 
153. Component 2. Learning and sharing of innovations. Before IMI, IFAD had already 
emphasized learning and sharing in relation to rural development. The activities in IMI were designed 
to systematize learning by supporting activities such as: (i) capturing learning; (ii) communicating and 
promoting IFAD-supported innovations; and (iii) developing IFAD-specific areas of innovation, with 
emphasis on the necessary conditions for implementation, replication and scaling up of innovation. 
 
154. IMI supported a range of activities aiming at learning and sharing. It supported workshops that 
gave people in and beyond IFAD an opportunity to discuss innovation initiatives freely and share their 
experiences. A number of the grants included activities that involved bringing different stakeholders 
together for learning and sharing of experiences. For example, the IMI supported IFAD’s regional 
Farmer Innovation Fair in 2004, the Rome-based workshop “What are the Innovation Challenges for 
Rural Development?” in 2005 and the Regional Innovation Workshop/Fair for West and Central 
Africa in 2008. Each of the workshops included an output that was circulated to stakeholders. Forty 
eight case studies about IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations were prepared in the pilot phase of 
the IMI.47 These are being promoted through the IFAD website and in key publications. IMI 
supported a series of “brown bag” informal seminars at which speakers described interesting 
                                                     
46
   IMI grant no. 24072. 
47
   The Pilot phase of the IMI was undertaken in 2003, which included eight pilot activities related to 
developing innovation capacity in IFAD. This was a one year pilot which led to the production of 48 case 
studies of IFAD-financed innovations. 
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innovative ideas related to rural development; those attending exchanged ideas and learning. The 
practice has now been adopted by several IFAD divisions. 
 
155. But results have been weak in relation to development of IFAD-specific areas of innovation and 
linking them to opportunities for replication and scaling up. There has been limited support for 
IFAD’s core areas of activity such as smallholder agriculture, rural micro-enterprise development and 
gender initiatives. There is some duplication between IMI-supported activities and knowledge 
management activities, for example the IMI grant “Innovative Forms of Training and Capacity-
Building in IFAD-Supported Projects and Programmes”.48 While this is valuable work, the link to IMI 
outcomes is not clearly defined. Replication and scaling up have not been sufficiently emphasized in 
the grant proposals or other activities. On the whole, IMI activities have not been well linked to IFAD 
country programmes, and limited attention was paid towards ensuring the replication and upscaling of 
the IMI grant results through IFAD operations. 
 
156. Component 3. Changing organizational culture and practices to support innovation. This 
is probably the most important IMI objective. The activities envisaged in this component were 
intended to encourage a shift in the work practices of IFAD and its staff towards a more innovative 
approach. It was expected that IMI would support training related to innovation and new work 
practices and would seek to establish a system of incentives and rewards to motivate staff to pursue 
innovative activities. The most notable activity was the Creative Problem Solving training arranged 
by the IMI management team for a total of only 66 staff attendees.49 The feedback50 from the training, 
though based on few respondents, is that it is relevant and useful but that lack of time was a major 
barrier for staff in application of the practices recommended. 
 
157.  In general, few activities were undertaken – such as field exposure and immersion for IFAD 
staff – that aimed to fulfil the third IMI objective. On the whole, the planned activities such as 
providing incentives for staff (e.g., non-financial rewards systems), testing new work arrangements 
that have proven successful in the private sector, and promoting cultural change (e.g. identifying 
innovative ideas and view points from outside IFAD) have not been implemented to the required 
extent. Some changes in organizational practices were promoted by the IMI, such as the inclusion of 
the Microfinance Information Exchange market as a tool for assessing and monitoring the viability of 
rural finance service providers, but most changes in practices have occurred mainly through the wide-
ranging reforms processes (e.g. improved quality enhancement and quality assurance) within IFAD in 
the past 3-4 years and not the IMI. It is therefore difficult to trace or attribute the results of cultural 
change directly to IMI activities.  
  
158. In the following paragraphs, the evaluation makes an assessment of the IMI as a whole, and not 
the individual grants it financed, using the standard IEO evaluation criteria. 
 
Programme Performance 
 
159. Relevance. The IMI programme was timely and relevant for IFAD. Its three objectives were 
appropriate to the needs of IFAD, as they aimed to respond to the increasing importance of innovation 
in the Fund’s policy and strategy documents. The IMI addressed the need to mainstream innovation 
processes and allocate specific resources to innovation initiatives. On the whole, the design of the 
programme was largely relevant. For example, it allowed IFAD to invest funds in its own 
                                                     
48
   Grant no. 24086, which aims to compile a compendium of best practices with partners such as the United 
Nations Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization and the Network for Policy Research Review and 
Advice on Education and Training. 
49
   Approximately 10 per cent of IFAD staff. 
50
   Feedback was assessed by an internal IMI survey that incorporated electronic and face-to-face feedback 
from participants. There were 16 respondents out of the 66 participants, two of whom were IMI staff. It is not 
clear whether there were duplicate respondents in the two forms of data. 
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development, which would not be possible through resources from the IFAD’s grant policy. The 
design of a discrete, externally funded programme, situated within the main hierarchy of the 
organization and focused exclusively on promoting innovations, offered good opportunities for 
organizational change.  
 
160. But there were some weaknesses in the design that prevented IMI from being of further 
relevance to the organization: (i) it aimed to undertake a large list of activities which were not 
prioritized; (ii) some  of the activities, such as developing incentives for staff, were clearly beyond the 
scope of IMI to address, and no specific suggestions were included in the IMI Framework on how 
these activities could realistically be achieved; and (iii) the IMI Operational Framework only noted a 
requirement for annual reporting: it did not propose a rigorous regime of developing specific 
programme targets in relation to results or of regular M&E. These contributed to diffuse 
implementation and disjointed results. The draft implementation strategy was an attempt to redress 
this design weakness, but the rationale for the three new focus areas was not clear and led to a 
blurring of the focus on a number of other aspects that could have moved IFAD further in terms of 
innovation capabilities.51 This was a lost opportunity for IFAD. In addition to the aforementioned, the 
evaluation raises the question whether it was appropriate to locate the IMI management team in the 
then EAD, and whether this could have limited the relationships between IMI activities and IFAD’s 
loan and grant funded operations.  
 
161. Other evidence of the relevance of IMI is the distribution of the competitive grants by sector, 
which clearly reflects the recent sub-sectoral structure of IFAD’s operations: as such it is an indication 
of its relevance to IFAD’s current portfolio.52 The grants for institutional development – 25 per cent 
of the total – were less relevant, however: some, such as the Learning and Sharing Day, aimed to 
build IFAD’s capacity for innovation; others were so integral to IFAD’s core operations that it is 
surprising that the costs were not paid out of IFAD’s regular budgets: examples include buying risk-
assessment software under grant no. 24090, security training for IFAD women staff under grant no. 
24087, and support for the Rural Poverty Portal. Overall, in spite of some design limitations, the 
IMI’s relevance is rated as satisfactory (5).  
 
162. Effectiveness. On the whole, IMI was moderately effective in achieving its objectives. The 
preparatory phase was well-structured and resulted in clearly documented pilot activities. But 
implementation of the Operational Framework for the main phase was less effective. As mentioned 
earlier, the Operational Framework outlined a broad approach that did not clearly define what IMI 
should focus on to achieve its objectives.53 No systematic attempts at prioritization were undertaken 
during implementation. This reduced the ability of IMI to achieve its objectives fully. Some progress 
was achieved in each programme objective, but there were gaps in performance that prevented IMI 
from reaching its full potential. The first two objectives of the IMI of mainstreaming innovations and 
strengthening learning on innovation were achieved to a fair degree, but the third objective of 
promoting changes in organizational culture and practices to support innovations has largely not been 
met.   
 
                                                     
51
   EB 2004/83/R.2, paragraph 17. 
52
   The high demand for grants supporting private-sector development (31 per cent) reflects IFAD’s current 
interest and relative inexperience in this area of activity. The grants acted as a form of research and development 
within IFAD for activities related to value-chain development and market access. The grants related to rural 
finance – 21 per cent – are relevant to a known priority area of IFAD and aimed at building the capability of 
IFAD and partners in this area. Surprisingly few grants related to technology aimed at supporting innovation in 
the agriculture or enterprise sectors. The NRM grants – 15 per cent – were mainly related to effects of climate 
change, which is a focus of global innovation efforts and thus relevant to IFAD’s operations. 
53
   For example, the term “mainstream” is not defined in the Operational Framework but is defined in 
implementation of the IMI grant selection criteria and was considered synonymous with “replication and scaling 
up”. See IMI Screening Committee Selection Criteria Scoring Formats 2005–2008. 
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163. The competitive grant scheme is the most important IMI initiative. The competitive grants were 
intended to contribute to IMI’s three objectives, but there was no process in IMI to link the 
consolidated results for individual grants – the main IMI instrument – to the objectives. Evidence 
from the review of the 20 completed and almost completed grants indicates that the grants were 
moderately effective. Positive results from the review of these grants in relation to IMI objectives 
include: (i) enhanced partnerships for innovation – 36 per cent; (ii) increased innovation capacity– 
10 per cent; and (iii) identification and analysis of policy issues related to innovation – 15 per cent. 
But the results of the remaining 39 per cent of grants did not have a clear link to the IMI objectives. 
The grant selection process was formal, well documented and transparent. 
 
164. IMI grant financing supported the IFAD policy forum and other fora that increased the profile 
of innovation in IFAD. But there was little evidence of any substantial progress in bridging the gap 
between design and implementation of loans for innovations, mainstreaming them into operations, 
developing design tools, developing IFAD-specific areas for innovation or policy dialogue. Building 
on phase I, IMI helped to identify many different forms of innovation, which were given a high 
profile in IFAD; but their contribution to country programmes has so far been limited. IMI also 
contributed to the development of the Innovation Strategy, which is a corporate acknowledgement of 
the importance of innovation. Other IMI-supported initiatives are either insufficiently innovative or 
have not achieved the expected level of results. 
 
165. IMI contributed to learning and sharing of innovation lessons in IFAD through workshops, fora 
and publications, the documentation from which was useful to the participants and in some cases was 
promoted across IFAD. The Innovation Strategy was a means of synthesizing lessons learned through 
IMI, but internalization of learning in IFAD’s operations was not evident. It is expected that the final 
report on IMI will analyse the learning generated through IMI in greater depth. The lack of an internal 
programme-monitoring system hampered the collection of baseline data on innovation initiatives and 
associated learning. Best practice in innovation management demonstrates how good monitoring 
systems act as a valuable source of learning, but IMI did not harness the strategic learning potential in 
its activities by establishing a monitoring system that would have improved the learning loop for 
innovation initiatives in IFAD.  
 
166. The Operational Framework suggested that IMI would “... develop a model for the routine 
management of learning on innovation from loan and grant projects”. This was not done, and it 
appears that IMI still needs to finance and implement the “... in-depth analysis of the elements that 
constitute a successful innovation and documentation of this knowledge ...” to “... place IFAD in a 
better position to communicate with external partners in promoting innovations.”54 The Operational 
Framework also proposed an institutionalized process of analysis and synthesis related to the 
innovation process and a more structured approach for involving consultants and network partners in 
learning and sharing lessons on innovation. It is not evident that these learning and sharing objectives 
were achieved. 
 
167. Assessing progress towards change in organizational culture and practices is inherently 
difficult. But the perception of IMI among IFAD staff is a good proxy for achievement in this regard.  
The IMI grants scheme became the main profile of IMI in IFAD, resulting in the perception of IMI55 
as more of an additional internal funding facility. There was low awareness of the third objective of 
IMI. The fact that IMI had available resources for internal IFAD use was its main attraction, because 
the current grants system does not allow it. The staff response to IMI-sponsored training in innovation 
problem solving was mentioned earlier in this chapter, but no new work arrangements to promote 
innovation resulted from IMI. The extent to which practices in innovation have changed seem to be a 
result of some influence from IMI, but there were large influences other than IMI, mainly internal 
                                                     
54
   Operational Framework, paragraph 25. 
55
   No corporate-level respondents to the evaluation were aware of the organizational change objectives for 
IMI.  They were very much aware of the grant funding.  
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IFAD reform processes such as the new guidelines for COSOPs and project designs as well as 
portfolio review process. As also mentioned previously, neither IMI nor other mechanisms in IFAD 
succeeded in creating an appropriate incentive framework for IFAD staff to promote innovation and 
scaling up. 
 
168.  The long list of activities expected was obviously beyond the capacity of IMI to deliver in a 
comprehensive and effective way,56 but no indicators for prioritization were provided. The draft IMI 
implementation strategy was a commendable attempt to redress the diffuse nature of activities in the 
Operational Framework, but the rationale for selection of the three focus areas was not clear. 
 
169. At the strategic level, there was some lack of coherence between the implementation strategy 
and the Operational Framework. The implementation strategy emphasized only a few activities at the 
expense of other activities that might have promoted the three IMI objectives by taking a more 
strategic and systematic approach to innovation, for example by: (i) developing strategic areas for 
innovation in IFAD that would receive priority; (ii) developing tools such as risk analysis and M&E 
systems for innovation; and (iii) improving learning as to the conditions necessary for 
implementation, replication and scaling up of innovations. The omission of these activities, and 
possibly others, was a lost opportunity for IMI to contribute to its effectiveness. As mentioned, IMI’s 
effectiveness has been assigned a rating of moderately satisfactory. 
 
170. Efficiency. Assessment of the efficiency of IMI requires analysis of the application of 
resources in activities with a view to achieving the objectives. Measurement of efficiency assesses not 
only the level of financial performance but also whether other resources available to IMI such as 
overhead costs and time were used in the most efficient way. The most recent financial statement for 
IMI for the period ending 31 December 2008 is shown in Table 8. The main phase of the IMI was 
originally designed as a three-year intervention (i.e. to be completed by end of 2007), but by the end 
of 2008 the schedule had already been exceeded by one year and only 77 per cent of the available 
funds had been allocated, and 55 per cent of available funds had been disbursed. 
 
171. Of the 39 grants that were financed, only 11 had spent 100 per cent of their allocated budget by 
June 2009. The competitive nature of the grants scheme means that budgets must fall within the 
designated grant limit of US$200,000. There is some doubt as to the efficiency of a competitive grants 
scheme with a maximum designated grant limit. In 20 per cent of applications, the IMI screening 
committee noted deficiencies with budgets such as insufficient detail or requests for the maximum 
amount without sufficient justification. The US$200,000 limit seems to be an arbitrary amount that is 
more about organizational equity than the efficiency of supporting a particular innovation. Some 
applications were clearly part of a longer and more strategic innovation process that needed more 
resources than were available within the competitive limit. An allocation approach with more flexible 
funding based on the relevance and feasibility of the proposed initiative would be a more efficient use 
of funds. Alternatively, a strategic approach to financing innovations focusing on few themes highly 
relevant to IFAD could have been more efficient.  
 
172. There was a reliance on the competitive grants to deliver the programme outputs: but several 
grants were considered to be borderline activities for core funding57 and the level of innovation 
supported by the IMI grants is questionable. The selection criteria for grants placed a maximum 
weighting of 10 per cent for the level of innovation of a proposal, which meant that feasible proposals 
with little uniqueness could be approved for funding. There were no clear strategic themes to guide 
the grant scheme, and the programme investments were spread across a range of disparate activities 
with no specific thrust. This meant that the bulk of resources invested to achieve the core objectives of 
                                                     
56   Overall, the initiatives of IMI were only able to achieve satisfactorily seven of the 28 actions of the 
Operational Framework, and partially achieve 7 more; 12 actions were only marginally or not developed; 2 were 
absorbed into the Knowledge Management Strategy. 
57
   Risk Assessment Software (grant 24090) and the Rural Poverty Portal (grant 24054). 
  
 51 
IMI did not reach their potential. At the time of evaluation, few grants complied with the requirement 
for a final report detailing the physical and financial performance of the grant, and many grants were 
running substantially behind schedule; 23 grants – 60 per cent – were allowed an extension. The 
average time between original completion date and the completion date is 502 days. 
 
173. The efficiency of the competitive grants is also assessed in relation to the time that elapsed 
between announcing a bid and approval of a grant. An average of 82 days between submission of 
proposals to the allocation of funds would appear to be long. The intervals increased because of the 
difficulties in having the quorum for screening meetings, and the travel schedules of senior managers 
resulted in delays in signing approval memoranda. Even so, once the grants had been approved the 
funds were allocated in an average 20 days, considerably shorter than the time taken to approve 
regular IFAD grants.  
 
Table 8. IMI Financial Performance as of 31 December 2008 
 US$ % 
Total funds received from DFID58 11,262,065 100 
Total funds allocated  8,708,346 77 
Total disbursements 6,201,876 55 
Balance funds available  2,553,719 23 
Details of allocated funds 
 
 
Preparatory phase 837,223 10 
Competitive bidding 5,761,930 66 
Partnership development 527,133 6 
Learning and sharing 815,000 9 
Cultural and organizational change 731,900 8 
Screening costs 15,210 0 
Rapid Funding Facility 19,950 0 
Total allocated funds 8,708,346 100 
 
174. The scheduling of IMI was not clearly defined. As mentioned above, the main phase was 
expected to run for three years from 2005–2007. The maximum timeframe allowed for grants was 24 
months, so it would be expected that all grants would be completed by December 2009. But in view 
of the relatively slow disbursement of funds, a further round of grant proposals was accepted in April 
2008; grants should now be completed by April 2010. This is consistent with the completion date for 
the DFID financing, but it is unlikely that all allocated funds will be absorbed by the end of the 
programme. Implementation is therefore rated as moderately inefficient. 
 
175. According to the available information, the total overhead costs of IMI, excluding any 
corporate charges, over four years to the end of 2008 were US$1,064,348. The ratio between 
administrative and programme expenditure is 1:5 (20 per cent) relative to funds expended to date, 
which is on the higher side. If IMI funds are fully expended, the ratio is likely to improve; if no major 
administrative costs are incurred and all funds received are expended, the ratio of administration costs 
to programme expenditure may reach 1:10.58. 
 
176. None of the US$40,000 allocated in the IMI budget to monitoring ongoing grants had been 
spent by the end of December 2008. The main reason for this stated by IMI management was that the 
IMI grants are to be “owned”, and therefore they should be monitored by the divisions that implement 
                                                     
58
   At the time of IMI approval, DFID committed to providing US$10 million in supplementary funds in 
pounds sterling equivalent: this explains the difference in Table 8 in the total funds received from DFID.  
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them. Nevertheless, IMI management frequently had difficulty in obtaining progress reports, which 
affected follow-up on progress made and constrained the efficiency of IMI. No firm basis was found 
to assess the efficiency of the IMI-financed training in IFAD: IMI’s contribution to the cost of 
training was US$286,900 but the cost-efficiency of these activities was not tracked. Overall, the 
efficiency of IMI was judged as moderately unsatisfactory. 
 
177. Impact of IMI. The likelihood of achieving the planned impact of the IMI programme is 
primarily the extent of: (i) innovation mainstreamed in IFAD operations; (ii) improvement in the 
quality of innovation initiatives; and (iii) replication and scaling up achieved with IMI support. There 
is evidence of an improvement in the performance of IFAD operations in terms of innovation: for 
example the percentage of IFAD-supported projects rating satisfactory for innovation rose from 
63 per cent of the portfolio in 2002 to 100 per cent in 2008. The ongoing portfolio review (see chapter 
III) found that the overall innovation score for project designs between 2003 and 2008 increased. The 
IMI contribution to this improvement in performance cannot, however, be definitively traced. 
 
178. There were other impacts attributable to IMI. Improved rural finance practices were good: 
investments by IMI led to continued and increased investment in improving micro-finance standards 
worldwide; several grants explored innovations in climate change and weather risk. The results are 
still tentative, but they demonstrate innovations in relatively new areas of interest for agriculture and 
rural development. IMI contributed to the development of a range of guides for improved agriculture 
and rural development such as the Practitioner’s Guide for Institutional Analysis. Although the 
outputs of these grants were achieved, the pathways for their promotion and use in IFAD operations 
are not well defined.   
 
179. The bulk of grants – 82 per cent – describe general outputs of enhancing learning and 
strengthening networks rather than identify specific innovations that can be transferred to IFAD 
operations for future funding; only 18 per cent of grants had a clear link between the IMI grants and 
projects in the IFAD portfolio. At this stage, the impact of IMI on innovation in IFAD country 
programmes and project portfolios is not easy to discern – but the strategic and policy input of IMI 
has influenced corporate and strategic processes, and so it is likely to have an eventual impact on field 
operations. All the grants show potential for enhancing IFAD’s approach to innovation, which is 
expected to generate an impact on operations over time. 
 
180. The innovation capability survey59 conducted as part of this evaluation showed that respondents 
were divided into three broadly equal groups: 40 per cent did not agree or agreed only slightly with 
the positive statements about IMI; a third agreed moderately and a third agreed greatly with the 
statements. This balance shifted slightly to the negative end of the scale on the contribution of IMI to 
supporting the organizational culture and practices of IFAD and institutionalizing a system of 
incentives and rewards to motivate staff to support innovation. The most positive end of the scale was 
for training activities and selection of pilot projects. 
 
181. The ultimate measure of impact will be the extent to which successful innovations are 
replicated and scaled up. The completed and almost completed grants review shows that 20 per cent 
of grants were not intended to be replicated; 35 per cent of grants were not clear about how they 
would be replicated or scaled up, and 55 per cent may be replicated in IFAD in some way. The extent 
of replication or scaling up is diverse, however.60 In conclusion, the evaluation judges the impact of 
the IMI to be moderately satisfactory. 
                                                     
59
   Respondents were asked to score on a five-point scale the extent to which they agreed with statements 
about the achievement of IMI’s main outcomes (see Table 9). 
60
   For instance, the innovative work of the Micro-finance Information Exchange Inc has the potential to 
improve micro-finance standards globally. There is evidence that the tool is leading to increased accountability 
in micro-finance institutions. The Practitioners Guide for Institutional Analysis of Rural Development 
Programmes has been circulated and presented at several fora, but there is no firm evidence that the practices 
have been replicated. 
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Table 9. IFAD Staff Perceptions of the IMI Programme 
 
 
182. Sustainability. Implementation of IMI initiatives is still ongoing. Therefore, the actual 
sustainability of results cannot be assessed fully. Nevertheless, an assessment of the likelihood of 
sustainability of the benefits from the IMI was attempted by assessing the sustainability of the 
completed and almost completed grants. Of the 20 grants assessed, four (20 per cent) were not 
intended to be sustained because they were one-off activities such as workshops; of the remaining 16 
grants, nine (56 per cent) showed indications that the initiatives were likely to be continued as part of 
IFAD’s operations. It should be noted that several of the grants included processes that were core 
activities of IFAD rather than new innovations, such as the Rural Poverty Portal. Nonetheless, these 
initiatives are likely to be continued in IFAD and act as a continuing resource for supporting 
innovation. This is a positive result that underlines the importance of some of the grants as an 
instrument to increase innovation in IFAD operations. 
 
183. On the other hand, there are many activities that did not achieve the projected results. In 
particular, the systematization of innovation in relation to IFAD operations and the envisaged cultural 
change have not occurred. The lack of strategic performance in this regard compromises the long-term 
impact of IMI and sustained impact of the investments. IMI is therefore rated moderately 
unsatisfactory for sustainability given the available information to date.   
 
184. Performance of partnerships. The partnership for IMI was largely between IFAD and DFID.  
The support from DFID was timely and relevant in view of the strategic direction of IFAD at that 
time. IMI benefited from an annual review by DFID in 2006. Initially, DFID had been expected to 
conduct reviews annually, but this did not occur. Payments to IMI were made regularly and in line 
with IFAD requests. There was no documented expectation that DFID would play a more active role 
within IMI. The performance of DFID can therefore be considered satisfactory.  
 
  
Question/ percentage of respondents A little or 
no extent 
A slight 
extent 
A moderate 
extent 
A great 
extent 
A very 
great 
extent 
Q60 
N=37 
IMI has greatly strengthened learning 
about innovation.  2.7 32.4 27.0 21.6 16.2 
Q61 
N=38 
IMI has assisted the application of 
innovation in IFAD country 
programmes. 
2.6 36.8 34.2 13.2 13.2 
Q62 
N=38 
The organizational culture and practices 
of IFAD have become more supportive 
of innovation because of the 
contribution that has been made by IMI. 
13.2 28.9 34.2 15.8 7.9 
Q63 
N=37 
IMI has helped to institutionalize an 
appropriate system of incentives and 
rewards to motivate staff to support 
innovation. 
21.6 32.4 21.6 8.1 16.2 
Q64 
N=38 
Training activities and discussion events 
sponsored by IMI have helped to 
introduce new ideas and approaches to 
IFAD and the exchange of learning. 
7.9 28.9 31.6 26.3 5.3 
Q65 
N=33 
The IMI-approved grants financed 
innovative pilot projects that are being 
scaled up in IFAD country programmes 
and/or by others. 
12.1 30.3 33.3 18.2 6.1 
Q66 
N=36 
The process of selecting pilot projects 
for IMI financing is efficient and 
objective. 
13.9 25.0 27.8 25.0 8.3 
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185. The performance of IFAD is more complex to determine. The identification of IMI as a 
potential instrument for increasing innovation in IFAD responded to its strategic needs at the time. 
Early development of IMI showed creativity and good understanding of what was required. 
Implementation performance was varied, with satisfactory performance in some aspects and moderate 
results in others. The main issues were the absence of mechanisms in IMI to link activities more 
clearly to IFAD’s broader programmes and lack of a result-based framework for monitoring and 
internal work programming; the follow-up and synthesis of grant reporting was insufficient. This led 
to prioritization of activities in terms of usefulness and importance, but the process sidelined other 
strategic initiatives that could have achieved the anticipated operational shift towards a more 
mainstreamed approach to innovation in IFAD. But the expectations of IMI were high: it could be 
argued that at the corporate level IFAD provided insufficient institutional support for the programme. 
The IMI management team attempted to balance strategic and operational priorities with limited 
resources: this did not always result in satisfactory performance, but it generated positive results and 
momentum towards innovation in IFAD. As mentioned before, the location of the management team 
in the then EAD was not appropriate and may have constrained the linkages between IMI and IFAD’s 
overall development activities. The overall performance of IFAD is therefore rated moderately 
satisfactory.  
 
Overall IMI achievement 
 
186. The evaluation of the IMI programme presents a mixed picture in terms of results, performance 
and impact. A number of important IMI achievements contributed to progress towards each of the 
three objectives. The evaluation ratings for IMI are summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Evaluation Ratings for the IMI 
Evaluation criteria Rating Evaluation criteria Rating 
Relevance 5 Impact 4 
Effectiveness 4 Sustainability 3 
Efficiency 3 Performance of partners 
  
DFID 5 
  IFAD 4 
Overall achievement: 4 
 
187. IMI has contributed to improvement in innovation performance. The evaluation shows that 
the emphasis on innovation across IFAD projects increased, but there was no direct link to show the 
extent of the contribution made by IMI made in this regard. Nevertheless, IMI was active at the 
corporate and operational levels across a range of activities. The IMI grant scheme stimulated a 
number of proposals for funding that were relevant to IMI objectives: in general these grants 
increased the diversity of innovation in IFAD and promoted innovations across the organization. It is 
likely that most of these initiatives would not or could not otherwise have been supported by IFAD 
because they were internal capacity-building initiatives that are not eligible under the current IFAD 
grant programme. A quarter of the grants were specifically designed to increase and mainstream 
innovation in IFAD. In general, the grants achieved positive results.   
 
188. IMI’s design potential was not fully achieved. IMI was designed as the main instrument for 
driving through the organizational changes needed to make IFAD a source of innovation. From an 
organizational development perspective, IMI focused attention on the need for organizational change 
and dedicated resources to it. The key instrument for change adopted by IMI – the grants scheme – 
can be considered successful. But the grants contributed to a level of fragmentation and a lost 
opportunity for a more systematic approach to organizational change.    
 
189. The strategic intent of IMI was diluted. At the commencement of IMI, there was excitement 
about the opportunity that the resources presented. The momentum developed through the preparatory 
phase of IMI promised to act as a driver of significant organizational change. The increased emphasis 
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on the grant scheme and on isolated activities from the IMI Operational Framework increased the 
level of performance in visible ways across IFAD – but it also made the strategic thrust of IMI less 
effective in terms of wider organizational change. The results of the grants were scattered in different 
sectors, activities and locations, but IMI did not sufficiently connect them. The grants scheme became 
the main profile of IMI in IFAD. Strategic opportunities were missed, so corporate attention was not 
focused on the mainstreaming of innovation: instead, IMI was misinterpreted as an additional internal 
funding facility, and so it did not become the envisaged agent for change in IFAD.  
 
190. There were internal barriers to culture change. The most difficult objective was cultural 
change in IFAD to support innovation. IMI resources provided an opportunity for IFAD to change its 
culture and approach to innovation. IMI did support training initiatives, but the impact was limited. 
Staff involved in IMI-supported activities showed a willingness to change their practices, but the 
current organizational arrangements and products did not leave sufficient scope for change to occur. 
The theory of innovation was accepted and knowledge increased, but the application of knowledge 
was poor: the reasons given were lack of time, lack of relevance to current challenges and the low 
priority given to innovative processes. This signals that there is still significant work to be done in 
IFAD to develop an environment that enables innovation. 
 
191. The approach to innovation was not sufficiently systematic. Before IMI was started, the 
Executive Board expressed concern that innovations promoted by IFAD were not systematically 
recorded or assessed. The pilot phase of IMI established rigorous processes for recording, monitoring 
and reviewing the initial grants, but unfortunately the same level of rigour was not applied in the main 
phase: this is partly the result of a concern that the documentation process in the pilot was too 
cumbersome, which may have prevented applications. But the documentation of the main grants 
scheme was not complete or systematically analysed, nor was it systematically linked to country 
programmes or project pipeline processes. There are various measures for generating and promoting 
learning from these innovations, but they were not institutionalized to the extent envisaged in the 
original Operational Framework. 
 
Key points 
 The IMI was a useful and timely initiative aimed at improving IFAD’s capacity to promote innovations. 
 Overall, good results have been achieved related to the first two objectives (strengthening innovations in 
IFAD operations and increasing learning and sharing on innovations), but the third and perhaps the most 
important objective (changing organizational culture and practices) has largely not been met.  
 IMI was appreciated more for the funding opportunities it offered, rather than a strategic instrument for 
introducing systemic enhancements for promoting pro-poor innovations. The linkages between IMI grant 
activities and IFAD’s programme of work was weak. 
 The institutional positioning of the IMI management team in the then EAD, was inappropriate and 
constrained linkages between IMI activities and IFAD’s programme of work. 
 The IMI suffered by limited institutional support, lack of a result-based framework for monitoring and 
inadequate follow-up on grant reporting and synthesis of results.   
 
VI.  IFAD’S INNOVATION STRATEGY: RELEVANCE AND INITIAL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
192. The assessment of the 2007 IFAD innovation strategy is one of the building blocks of this 
evaluation. The evaluation focused on assessing the relevance of the strategy and its initial 
implementation. Given the short time span between the approval of the strategy and the undertaking 
of this evaluation, it was not possible to conduct a results-based assessment of the strategy. In fact, 
IEO had requested the IFAD Management in 2007 to defer the development of the innovation 
strategy, so that it could be informed by this evaluation. However, the Management was unable to 
take up this suggestion. 
 
  
 56 
 
A.  The Innovation Strategy 
  
193. The Innovation Strategy, which was one of the deliverables of IFAD’s Action Plan to 
Improving its Development Effectiveness (2005), was approved by the Board in September 2007. For 
the first time, innovation was seen as sufficiently important and sufficiently distinctive to warrant its 
own strategy. The strategy outlined the challenges confronting the rural poor, and stated that the 
approaches currently used for the alleviation of rural poverty could not meet the full extent of the 
needs.  Hence, innovation would be essential and was to become a key element in “the new 
development architecture”.  
 
194. The strategy described in the document focused on the development of innovation as a dynamic 
organizational capability in IFAD. It was not explicit as to goals, but stated: “... the Innovation 
Strategy does not set new objectives for staff, but rather defines what is needed to create an 
innovation-friendly environment and to support staff in achieving the expected results” (page 4).  The 
IFAD Strategic Framework for 2007–2010, however, is more explicit about deliverables: “... all 
elements of IFAD’s country programmes will be expected to be innovative. Yet innovation without 
scaling up is of little value”. The strategy recognized that developing innovation as a dynamic 
organizational competence was more than a policy decision: it would require a focused programme of 
organizational development. This was made clear in the statement “IFAD will… modify its internal 
systems and processes as necessary. It will develop its operational strategies, its business systems and 
its human resource profile in order to focus on, achieve and measure development results.” 
 
195. For the first time, the document captures IFAD’s definition for innovation (see Box 1). The 
purpose of the strategy itself is stated clearly: “The goal of the strategy is to ensure that innovation is 
mainstreamed into IFAD processes and practice in a systematic, effective way...” that “... involves 
ensuring constant attention to this issue, so that it systematically permeates both IFAD’s core systems 
and processes and its country programmes and projects”. In order to achieve mainstreaming, four 
clusters of activities were outlined: (i) building IFAD’s innovative capabilities; (ii) nurturing 
partnerships and innovation networks; (iii) embedding rigorous innovation processes into IFAD’s core 
business practices; and (iv) facilitating a more supportive organizational environment for innovation. 
In addition, 21 initiatives were presented, one of which is an innovation prototyping process that is 
described as “the main tool”: it is a six-stage process for new product development providing the main 
route for testing and improving innovative initiatives and preparing them for scaling up. 
 
196. Implementation of the strategy was described as needing to involve the whole organization: the 
strategy recommended that “... the President of IFAD designate a member of his senior management 
team to have overall responsibility for championing, monitoring and overseeing implementation of the 
innovation strategy.” The strategy suggested that IMI be reconstituted into an Innovation Services 
Group (ISG) with 11 responsibilities that would give ISG a key role in implementation. It also 
suggested that the ISG would establish an innovation network to support the clarification and 
definition of challenges faced by rural poor people in new ways, thus leading to the identification of 
truly innovative solution. With regard to results, the strategy stated that the number of “... projects 
rated 4 or better for innovation, learning and/or scaling-up (will be) the results measure.” The strategy 
document concludes with a risk assessment, discussion of funding issues and appendixes that show 
the breadth of IFAD’s role in facilitating innovation. 
 
B.  Effective Strategies 
 
197. From an organizational perspective, it is necessary to consider whether IFAD’s innovation 
strategy was fit for purpose and took the organization forward. To do this, IFAD’s Innovation 
Strategy has to be compared and contrasted with a reference model of strategic effectiveness (Francis, 
1992). Strategies fall into two broad categories: (i) objective-driven: those that drive the organization 
towards achieving specific targets; for example “IFAD will raise 20 per cent of its funds from new 
sources by 2012”; and (ii) competency-driven: those that require the embedding of specific 
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competencies to enable the organization to perform certain complex tasks effectively; for example 
“IFAD will be able to scale up proven new ideas for the alleviation of rural poverty faster than other 
agencies”. 
 
198. All strategies are commitment decisions in that they open some doors but close others. 
Objective and competency-driven strategies are not mutually exclusive: organizations need both. 
Strategies enable organizations to be aligned with a clear direction so that the components of an 
organization such as its structure, systems, skills, style, staff and shared values can be designed and 
developed to support the strategy. Strategies are statements of identity and aspiration: they state “what 
we will be” and “what we won’t be” in the future. This helps people who work in the organization to 
re-orientate their behaviour to support the strategic intent. 
 
199. Competency-driven strategies such as embedding a dynamic competency of innovation into 
IFAD are required; indeed, they are the most frequently used, because it is not always possible to set 
specific goals in advance. For example an agency specializing in disaster relief cannot know what it 
will be called on to do in a particular emergency, but it can develop a competency of rapid need 
assessment because it knows that this will be required whatever emergencies occur. 
 
200. On the basis of established organizational models, an effective competency-driven strategy will 
have the following seven attributes (Allard, 2004). It will: 
 
i. state why the competency is required; 
ii. provide realistic scenarios of how the competency will be deployed in practice; 
iii. state a competency development level ambition, for example in scaling up innovations; 
different competencies are required to introduce a major innovation to millions from those 
needed to gain a few more adopters of a minor improvement; 
iv. clarify who is responsible for the development and maintenance of the competency; 
v. provide an assessment of the current level of competence so that the gap between the current 
and the required state is understood; 
vi. state how the strategic commitment to develop the competency will affect other aspects of 
organization; and 
vii. build an assessment of the organization’s performance in mastering and deploying the 
competence into corporate results-based management. 
 
C.  Assessment of IFAD’s Innovation Strategy 
201. Influence of the Innovation Strategy So far, just over two years after the strategy was 
published, its influence has been slight and indistinguishable from contemporary strategic documents 
and guidelines. IFAD was stressing innovation as a strategic thrust well before publication of the 
Innovation Strategy: this was demonstrated in the strategic and policy review summarized in  
chapter II. A steady increasing trend was seen for most aspects of innovation before and after 
publication of the Innovation Strategy. Hardly any factors were introduced in the Innovation Strategy 
that had not been promoted by previous documents. The effect of the Innovation Strategy itself cannot 
be clearly discerned in the content of country programmes because so many strategies, policies and 
guidelines stressed most aspects of innovation. There was a steady trend of improvement in 
performance related to innovation from 2003, but it cannot be determined whether this trend would 
have continued regardless of the release of the Innovation Strategy. This implies that the Innovation 
Strategy was primarily a mechanism to consolidate and articulate IFAD’s existing approach to 
innovation, which no doubt contributed to an increased focus on innovation at the corporate and 
country strategy levels.  
 
202. Assessment based on the effective competency-driven strategy model. A seven-point 
checklist based on the above mentioned criteria provides a structured way to assess whether IFAD’s 
innovation strategy was fit for purpose and took the organization forward. 
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Table 11. Assessment of the IFAD Innovation Strategy 
 Criteria Comments on IFAD’s Innovation Strategy 
1 State why the competency is required. 
Achieved. There are clear statements as to how 
innovation will be essential for future poverty 
alleviation. 
2 Provide realistic scenarios of how the 
competency will be deployed in practice. 
Partly achieved. Covered by examples provided in 
the appendix to the Innovation Strategy but not 
synthesized to provide clear pathways. 
3 State a competency development level 
ambition. 
Not achieved. In particular the issue of scaling up is 
not addressed. 
4 Clarify who is responsible for competency development. 
Partly achieved. Stated but not deployed: no 
member of senior management has taken the role of 
champion. 
5 Provide an assessment of current level of 
competence. 
Partially achieved. Touched on in examples 
provided in the appendix to the Innovation Strategy 
but not analysed comprehensively. 
6 
State how the strategic commitment to develop 
the competency will affect other components of 
the organization: structure, systems, skills, 
style, staff and shared values. 
Not achieved. Implementation modalities were not 
elaborated and there has been no programme of work 
to implement the strategy. 
7 
Build an assessment of the performance of the 
organization in mastering and deploying the 
competence into the corporate management 
information system. 
Partially achieved. The sole success criterion for 
innovation provided in the report related to the 
numbers of projects scoring 4 or above on relevant 
indices – which is insufficient. 
 
203. From this assessment it is clear that several aspects of the strategy are under-developed.  
However, the strategy has to be credited for containing a clear statement of the importance of 
innovation to IFAD that sent a message to members of staff and other stakeholders. Aside from this 
statement, the evaluation found that the strategy was more a confirmation of IFAD’s approach to 
innovations, and hardly included any new factors necessary for ensuring success in promoting 
innovations. 
 
204. Findings from the Innovation Capabilities Survey: IFAD Staff Perceptions. The findings of 
the 2009 innovation survey provide information as to how members of staff perceived the Innovation 
Strategy and the extent to which they believe it influenced IFAD. The influence was measured by five 
questions in the survey using a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest). The scores for respondents who 
answered the questions related to IFAD’s Innovation Strategy are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12.  IFAD Staff Perceptions of the Innovation Strategy 
  
Question Mean 
Q. 67 
IFAD’s Innovation Strategy is leading to enhanced institutional capacity to work 
with partners and to find and promote new and better ways to enable the rural 
poor to overcome poverty. 
2.73 
Q. 68 IFAD’s Innovation Strategy is helping to build the institution's ability to 
recognize and understand the challenges that require innovative solutions. 2.76 
Q. 69 IFAD’s Innovation Strategy has improved the innovative content and the quality 
of COSOPs and poverty reduction projects. 2.69 
Q. 70 Under IFAD’s Innovation Strategy, country-level partnerships to support innovation and innovation networks have multiplied. 2.62 
Q. 71 The planning and implementing of the scaling up of innovations has received greater attention in IFAD’s country programmes under the Innovation Strategy. 3.00 
 
205. The scores show that the Innovation Strategy had only a low to modest influence on behaviour. 
The highest scoring area, Q. 71, relates to the degree of attention that the scaling up of innovation 
received in the country programmes as a result of the Innovation Strategy. The lowest scoring 
question, Q. 70, asked whether country-level partnerships to support innovation and innovation 
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networks had multiplied as a result of the Innovation Strategy. Another low-scoring question, Q. 69, 
asked whether the Innovation Strategy had improved the innovative content and the quality of 
COSOPs and poverty reduction projects. 
 
Chart 9.  IFAD Staff Perceptions of the Innovation Strategy: Distribution of Scores 
 
 
206. These results indicate that IFAD’s Innovation Strategy has not influenced the way staff 
behaviour to any significant extent. More than three quarters of IFAD staff rated the influence of the 
strategy as moderate or less (see Chart 9). It is reasonable to conclude that the Innovation Strategy has 
not had a marked impact on IFAD’s approach to focusing, delivering or managing innovation. 
Evidence from interviews suggests that the activities surrounding the launch of IMI three years earlier 
had a greater impact.  
 
207. These comments relate to the influence of the Innovation Strategy so far, not to its intent. As 
mentioned above, the strategy further legitimized the importance of innovation in IFAD. Perhaps 
more important, the document signalled to donors the depth of IFAD’s commitment to adopting 
innovation as a guiding principle and raised their expectations as to how it would operate in the 
future. The expectations of governments considering undertaking projects with IFAD may also have 
been shaped by the existence of an explicit Innovation Strategy, though the evaluators were unable to 
find anyone who had read it during the country evaluation visits. 
 
208. Of particular concern is the absence of a sub-strategy that would facilitate scaling up. This topic 
is discussed in depth in chapter VII and will only be mentioned briefly here. Although there is an 
outline in the Innovation Strategy of a six-stage process for new product development, the 
organizational development requirements were not identified. As clarified previously, there was no 
evidence that IFAD has improved in this important area. At least some of the difficulties in 
implementing the strategy were consequences of the lack of clarity of some of its aspects and the fact 
that it did not develop thinking about innovation in IFAD. The Innovation Strategy as articulated in 
the document consolidated IFAD’s existing approach rather than extended it.  
 
209. It is clear that there was a steadily increasing thread promoting the importance of innovation 
through policy, strategy and operational documents in IFAD before the Innovation Strategy was 
prepared. The strategy document itself acknowledges that it “does not set new objectives”, but it did 
indicate that a range of initiatives should be undertaken. These have not been developed in a 
systematic way so far: no innovation-orientated organizational development programme was created, 
which prevented the strategy from having its expected results. The reasons for the modest influence of 
the Innovation Strategy are explained below: they extend beyond issues related to the lack of 
implementation efforts so far.  
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D.  Reasons for Low Influence 
 
210. The Innovation Strategy is a confirmation of IFAD’s approach rather than a path-finding 
document. Accordingly, the strategy lacked attraction power in the sense it did not excite members of 
staff and partners. Documentary analysis found that the major proposals in the strategy had almost all 
been suggested previously. The Innovation Strategy was not innovative! 
 
211. The stated definition of “innovation” is open to multiple interpretations. An enormous variety 
of initiatives have been described as “innovative” in IFAD documentation. Lack of clarity about the 
core concept hindered the development of an integrated organizational approach to the management 
of innovation. Accordingly, there is a lack of tools, processes and skills that would help to upgrade 
innovation as a results-orientated process. 
 
212. There is an over-emphasis on ideas. Innovation is not about creativity alone: innovation is about 
exploiting the benefits that flow from new ideas. Hence, many of the challenges in delivering 
innovation relate to an ability to execute. This aspect of innovation is not developed in the strategy.  
 
213. By adopting exclusively a “let a thousand flowers bloom” model to promote innovation, 
IFAD’s organizational development was directed only towards the specific organizational 
competences relevant to this limited model. These competencies were ill suited to rapid progress on a 
selected few “innovation big bets” that may have greater potential to achieve IFAD’s desired goals for 
innovation. 
 
214. The strategy did not help IFAD to develop formal mechanisms for selecting high-potential 
opportunities that needed to be isolated and given special attention. IFAD did not have a high-level 
innovation agenda in the form of a list of themes where innovation was most needed. It is known that 
major innovations require intensive and focused effort – and special development pathways – but 
there were no mechanisms proposed for developing these or for achieving a “great leap forward” in 
IFAD’s ability to increase significantly the numbers of poor people who could benefit from new 
ideas. 
 
215. The strategy did not chart a way forward to a comprehensive and understandable plan as to how 
IFAD would acquire the capabilities that it lacked. There was no assessment of priorities for 
competency development. No procedures for measuring the existing level of required competences 
were suggested. No targets were given. The issue of incentives was not addressed. 
 
216. Even though the first innovations evaluation in 2000-2001 clearly noted that IFAD’s 
capabilities in scaling up were weak, there were no proposals as to how the specialized capabilities 
required should be developed. This was also reiterated by IEO in its written comments on the strategy 
to the Board when the Innovation Strategy was considered for approval in September 2007. 
 
217. It is essential to underline that according to the evaluation, IFAD’s main raison d’être for 
focusing on innovations is to ensure their scaling up to achieve a wider impact on rural poverty. This 
notion was also enshrined in the 6th consultation report, which stated that “the Fund and its partners 
should continue to facilitate, more proactively, the promotion and dissemination of innovations in 
rural poverty reduction that are identified by various sources, including the poor themselves, and 
enable them to be replicated and/or scaled up by other IFAD projects and larger partners”. Therefore, 
the fact that scaling up was not adequately addressed is considered a significant shortcoming of the 
strategy 
 
218. The six-step innovation-prototyping process described in the strategy suggested that 
innovations could go through a development process similar to that used in an engineering 
environment leading to products that could be scaled up. In part, this ran contrary to IFAD’s 
commitment to a development model that emphasized context-specific adaptable and integrated 
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interventions. There is some ambiguity as to the fit between IFAD’s focus on scaling up – that it be 
based on achieving benefits from standardization – and IFAD’s broader development model, which 
emphasises participatorily developed and highly localized solutions. This a major future challenge 
facing IFAD.  
 
219. The strategy noted the importance of knowledge management for ensuring success in the 
promotion of innovation and their scaling up. Various promising initiatives in knowledge 
management have been undertaken in the past 2 years,61 even though project-level monitoring and 
evaluation systems which are essential for IFAD’s knowledge management activities remain broadly 
weak. Knowledge management was actively championed since 2008, but the same cannot be said 
about innovation. Moreover, the reality is that the two processes (innovation and knowledge 
management) – which are mutually reinforcing – have not been sufficiently linked to each other in the 
past. In this regard, the recent decision of the Senior Management to integrate IFAD’s stand alone 
knowledge management and innovation strategies into one process, and to ensure their effective 
implementation by April 2010 is an appropriate and timely step forward. 
 
220. The role to be played by IMI or subsequently by ISG in the implementation of the Innovation 
Strategy were clearly stated but unachievable with the resources available. An internal change team 
(the proposed ISG, which was not established) alone could not develop and embed a range of 
competences in an organization driven by line management. In fact, the evaluation believes that the 
responsibilities intended for the ISG were ambitious, especially given that the promotion of 
innovation in a cross-organizational function cannot be left to one group to facilitate. The innovation 
network could also not be formed given that the ISG was never constituted. The evaluation found that 
it would be essential for line management to own the implementation of the strategy. The “let a 
thousand flowers bloom” model of innovation advocated in the strategy and promoted earlier by IMI 
was an incomplete model for IFAD because it failed to focus innovative energies and resources where 
they were most likely to lead to breakthroughs. The strategy did not help IFAD to develop 
mechanisms for selecting high potential opportunities that need to be isolated and given special 
attention. It is possible that the role for ISG suggested by the strategy could prove to be a distraction, 
because it would absorb IFAD’s energies in numerous initiatives to implement the “let a thousand 
flowers bloom” approach and divert it from taking “big bets” on a few initiatives with high potential 
to make a major contribution to the alleviation of rural poverty.  
 
221. As stated in the Innovation Strategy and mentioned above, commitment by senior management 
would be required to drive implementation forward. A member of the senior management team (the 
then Assistant President of EAD, was assigned to be the champion for the implementation of the 
strategy, but the responsibilities were not discharged effectively. The evaluation questions whether it 
was appropriate to designate the Assistant President of EAD as the innovations champion, given the 
mandate of that department and corresponding functions of the Assistant President. The evaluation 
notes the recent decision of the designation of IFAD’s Chief Development Strategist as champion for 
Knowledge Management and Innovations, who is in a better administrative position to fulfil the 
requirements. Among other issues, he has the important role of supporting line management and staff 
(especially in PMD) and fostering a culture towards ensuring that knowledge and innovation 
processes are adequately embedded across the organization. The latter is essential to ensure success in 
the promotion of innovations and their scaling up. 
 
                                                     
61
   For example, IFAD established a knowledge management core team under the leadership of the then Vice 
President in 2008; a knowledge management communities of practice was also set up the same year. IFAD 
organized a knowledge management launch initiative in 2008 to raise awareness about the importance of 
knowledge management, to create space for dialogue and learning from each other, and to stimulate horizontal 
collaboration across divisions and departments. A knowledge fair on community driven development to share 
experiences from Africa was organized in 2009. These are some of the initiatives that illustrate the efforts made 
by IFAD to systematize knowledge management activities within the Fund. 
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222. In general, therefore, the evaluation concludes that the relevance of the innovation strategy has 
been moderately satisfactory, and that it did not have a significant impact in steering the Fund towards 
becoming a more agile organization in promoting innovations. Also, the strategy was not adequately 
implemented, with limited support from the senior management at the time. 
 
Key points 
 The Innovation Strategy was useful as it articulated why innovation is important, why IFAD needs 
innovation and provided a definition for innovation. 
 The strategy did not however contain anything new, and did not pay sufficient attention to scaling up and 
the linkages between innovation and knowledge management processes. The current decision to integrate 
IFAD’s stand alone knowledge management and innovation strategies into one process is a move in the 
right direction. 
 The strategy promotes a broad based approach to innovation, rather than encouraging a focus on selected 
areas of IFAD’s comparative advantage, specialization and track record. It also did not articulate how the 
strategy would affect other levers of the organization. 
 The implementation of the strategy has been inadequate and did not benefit from the necessary senior 
management commitment. 
 The evaluation notes the recent designation of IFAD’s Chief Development Strategist as the new 
Knowledge Management and Innovations champion, who is in a better administrative position to fulfil 
the requirements. Among other issues, he has the important role of supporting line management and staff 
(especially in PMD) and fostering a culture towards ensuring that knowledge and innovation processes 
are adequately embedded across the organization. 
 
VII. SCALING UP SUCCESSFUL INNOVATIONS: THE FUTURE CHALLENGE 
 
A.  Scaling Up in Design and Implementation 
 
223. The most successful innovations are those that deliver the greatest benefits to the greatest 
number at an affordable cost. From IFAD’s perspective, this means making a substantial impact on 
rural poverty for the masses. IFAD’s aim, therefore, is to facilitate the widespread adoption of 
innovations that offer real advantages. This is a challenging task in itself. The spread of micro-finance 
provides a case study of how ideas are developed and diffused. Four factors are important for 
diffusion: (i) the new idea must deliver benefits that were previously unavailable; (ii) it must be 
transferable; (iii) it must be adopted actively; and (iv) it must continue to adapt or evolve. In this case 
the method of micro-finance was in part spread intentionally facilitated by advocacy, organization, 
frequent experimentation, political support and adaptation to local conditions.  
 
224. As recognized in various parts of the report and corporate strategic documents, the need to scale 
up successful innovations has long been recognized by IFAD. It is also a key dimension of the 
optimization phase of the innovation journey. The Innovation Strategy states that “... effective scaling-
up is a key measure of successful innovation”. The Strategic Framework for 2007–2010 asserts that 
“... innovation without scaling up is of little value”. The emphasis on scaling up is evident with a 
systematic increase in strategic documents since 2003. But this was not fully reflected in country 
programmes. Almost all the evaluated projects had no clear design objectives or strategy for scaling 
up, nor were resources and capacity-building directed to this purpose. There was limited evidence of 
the supportive role of supervision by cooperating institutions in replication and scaling up before the 
recent surge in direct supervision. Systematic work to disseminate innovations in-country to scale 
them up were not common, nor were those aimed at the cultivation of strategic partnerships for 
scaling up. 
 
225. The evaluations reviewed attributed the limited success of scaling up to: (i) inadequate attention 
to non-lending activities such as policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building; 
(ii) poor synergies between grants and loan-funded projects; (iii) limited IFAD country presence, and 
only recent engagement in direct supervision and implementation support; and (iv) inadequate 
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capacity, and funding constraints within governments, in particular weak monitoring and evaluation 
systems at both the project and country levels. Monitoring and evaluation systems are essential for 
documenting experiences and learning successfully piloted innovations, which is a key step in the 
scaling up process. Moreover, the absence of a systematic IFAD approach to involve large IFIs and 
the private sector was often reported as another important limitation. Few projects provided clear 
evidence of having processes and mechanisms in place and resources allocated for this purpose as 
well as evident indication of actual scaling up of some of IFAD’s successful innovations.  
 
226. Of the new design documents, 60 per cent express scaling up as a hope for the future and do not 
include a specific strategy for the purpose. For example, there is no evidence of partnerships or 
resources committed for scaling up initiatives. Only 20 per cent of the project designs reviewed 
showed a systematic intention to scale up through assessment and the selection of partners. Provisions 
for scaling up were not evident in the remaining 20 per cent of the new project design documents 
reviewed.  
 
227. Nevertheless there were cases where scaling up took place in country programmes, for example 
linking self-help groups to formal financial institutions in India through the Tamil Nadu Women’s 
Development Project, which was scaled up by the Government of Tamil Nadu and later by the World 
Bank. Some of the innovations promoted by IFAD were developed on a greater scale by other donors, 
or were orienting public policies and government initiatives (e.g. IFAD’s innovative approaches to 
promoting participatory small-scale irrigation contributed to the development of the national irrigation 
policy in Tanzania).  
 
228. However, the evaluation did not find any structured process in place for ensuring scaling up. 
The latter is mostly unplanned and happens due to a combination of favourable factors during project 
implementation relating to the visibility of project success, positive partnerships and a favourable 
policy and institutional environment. This was observed from the meta evaluation as well as in the 
country visits undertaken. For example, the Dom Helder Project in Brazil, which introduced 
innovations in irrigation, livestock raising, participatory development planning and gender 
empowerment, made a major outreach effort and became a reference and an example for other 
projects and interventions in the North-East of Brazil.  
 
229. The Agricultural Development Project in Georgia promoted an innovative land registration 
model through the development of efficient land registration and titling services. The scaling up of 
this model took place through the successful partnership with the World Bank and the European 
Union; the fact is that IFAD took advantage of the World Bank’s strong influence in terms of policy 
dialogue and the European Union’s experience and technical expertise in land surveys and mapping.   
 
230. The Rural Micro-Enterprise Development Programme in Colombia introduced an innovative 
strategy for poverty reduction through rural micro-enterprises; it was the only operation of the Latin 
America and the Caribbean Division devoted exclusively to these. The Government adopted the 
strategy as a major thrust in its national policies for rural development, particularly those in the sub-
sectors of rural finance and rural micro-enterprises, and the intervention was identified as a flagship 
programme by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
231. In some cases, IFAD did the scaling up itself in its own programmes with the support of strong 
institutional partnerships and through long-term programme commitment. In Nigeria, the IFAD 
supported Cassava Multiplication Programme followed by the Root and Tuber Expansion Programme 
forged a strong research/extension link whereby the outputs of research by the International Institute 
of Tropical Agriculture and the Nigerian national research system into the productivity improvement 
and pest and disease resistance of new cassava cultivars were quickly put into the field, multiplied and 
made available to farmers. This was a notable example of synergy between IFAD and its national and 
international partners and of their joint long-term commitment to a specific theme. The effectiveness 
and impact of scaling up the availability of improved planting material was exemplary, not only in 
Nigeria but for other countries in West Africa.  
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232. An important conclusion from the country visit to Tanzania was that despite the successful 
innovation in rural finance introduced by the IFAD-supported Rural Financial Services Programme in 
the project area, scaling up – which was not planned in the design – did not take place. National and 
local governments and the private sector supported scaling up, but the inherent costs, the time taken 
for the development of each micro-finance institution and the need for a mature regulatory framework 
were prohibitive constraints at that stage. Scaling up seems, therefore, to have been contingent on 
follow-up support by IFAD or other donors.  
 
233. In Viet Nam, the designs of none of the two projects visited had expectations or a formal 
strategy for scaling up. In the Decentralized Programme for Rural Poverty Reduction in the two 
northern provinces, some small local innovations were being replicated spontaneously by farmers; but 
the lack of engagement by the provincial government was a barrier to scaling up beyond the targeted 
communes, and the management structure of the project was not conducive to promoting replication 
and scaling up because of its isolation from mainstream government processes. Similarly, the more 
recent Development of Business for Poverty Reduction Programme had no clear pathway for scaling 
up activities, even though potential for scaling up was much higher. Ownership of this project at the 
provincial level was strong; the involvement of provincial staff and the way project processes were 
embedded in government processes suggest that scaling up of successful activities at the provincial 
level will be ensured in and beyond the project period.  
 
234. The evidence, therefore, shows that scaling up is a neglected issue in project design, 
implementation and evaluation. This is partly because it is impossible to predict before a lengthy 
project starts which new ideas could be scaled up. More important are the findings that in most cases 
processes and resources were not assigned to prepare innovations for scaling up and that the 
capabilities for managing scaling up were not routinely built into projects and promoted during 
implementation. 
 
B.  Reasons for Modest Achievements in Scaling Up 
 
235. The steps required to prepare innovations for scaling-up were mentioned in IFAD’s Innovation 
Strategy, which also described a six-step prototyping process: (i) clarifying challenges and 
recognizing situations in which new ideas might serve; (ii) identifying potential solutions and 
resources; (iii) identifying solutions to pilot; (iv) testing potential solutions; (v) assessing the 
effectiveness of  prototypes; and (vi) developing a repertoire of innovative ideas in development that 
can be applied to other challenges. It should be borne in mind, however, that the final step is not a 
plan for scaling-up: it contributes to a repertoire of ideas that can be applied elsewhere. Nowhere in 
IFAD’s documentation can a comprehensive description be found of the processes, monitoring 
instruments and indicators needed to manage scaling-up. 
 
236. The ability to maximize benefits from innovations through scaling up is a sub-set of the 
dynamic competence in innovation that IFAD is seeking to develop but so far it is apparent that 
scaling up is an IFAD ambition without a plan to develop the relevant approaches and capabilities: 
• At the strategic level IFAD stressed the crucial importance of scaling-up, but so far no 
realistic scenarios have been provided as to how the competency will be deployed in 
practice.  
• There are no metrics available that indicate what success in scaling up would mean for 
IFAD. 
• Promoting scaling up are responsibilities of CPMs and country teams, but no specialist 
resources are available to facilitate the process. 
• No systematic assessment of the scaling up competency in IFAD has taken place and there is 
no requirement to develop it. 
• There is no plan to develop IFAD to make it able to scale up innovations effectively. 
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• Although there are no corporate metrics for assessing IFAD’s capability in scaling up, it is 
considered in IEO evaluation methodology but is not separately rated. 
 
237. The lack of a programme to develop relevant capabilities for scaling up was identified in the 
2000–2001 evaluation of innovation as a key issue, but little has been done since then to develop the 
required capabilities. Of particular importance is the lack of specific budget allocations for scaling up. 
Major increases in scale require more than plans: they require product simplification and 
standardization, quality control, organizational changes, new partners and specialized resources. 
Without specific funding and resources, systematic scaling up is difficult or impossible. 
 
C.  Requirements for Scaling Up 
 
238. The evaluation concludes that innovation for IFAD will be of limited value without scaling up, 
and the government, the private sector and co-financiers (especially the international financial 
institutions) are essential partners in this process. 
 
239. There has recently been a surge of international interest in approaches to increasing the scaling 
up of successful interventions for sustainable socio-economic development. There is widespread 
recognition that large-scale adoption of new ideas is complex and demanding, but also that it is central 
to the positive and sustainable impact of development aid. A well defined approach to scaling up has 
begun to emerge that clarifies the capabilities and processes required to improve the chances of 
success. Prominent in this is the recent work of Hartmann and Linn (2008) at the Wolfensohn Centre 
for Development on scaling up through development aid, based on a review of the literature and 
practice of scaling up development interventions: it provides a useful basis for preparing for scaling 
up innovation, and it sets out ways to address a number of the shortcomings referred to earlier in 
IFAD’s current approach to scaling up. It can be summarized as follows:  
• What should be scaled up? Should a project, programme or policy be scaled up? And if so, 
how far and for how long? Lack of economies of scale, quality/scale trade-offs and 
institutional constraints might limit the scaling up.  
• How to scale up. Scaling up takes time, often as much as 10–15 years. The long time 
horizon means that scaling up needs to be perceived as a systemic process, not a short-term 
interest. Experience with successful scaling up programmes shows the importance of long-
term commitment by institutions, donors and individuals. 
• Vision for scaling up. This should be developed while the first phase of a programme or 
pilot is being put in place. Pilots should be designed in such a way that they can be scaled up 
if successful. 
• Drivers. Scaling up is a dynamic process that needs people and systems to develop it. Ideas 
and innovations that stimulate and meet peoples’ needs and demands are essential for any 
process of social change, and for scaling up in particular. The process needs leadership and a 
champion. 
• Space to grow. Fiscal and financial space are needed to support the inevitably higher 
expenditures; political space is required to mobilize supportive constituencies and neutralize 
opposition; policy space is needed to ensure that potential policy obstacles are identified and 
removed; institutional space is required with institutions willing or able to create and operate 
the larger programme with adequate human resources, skills, managerial processes and 
incentives to overcome bureaucratic inertia; cultural space is needed to ensure that 
programmes in one community also fit culturally in others; partnership space that allows 
external and internal partners to support a programme with various resources is a 
requirement; and learning space is needed in which M&E feedback ensures that programmes 
are adjusted as they grow on the basis of lessons learned. 
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240. Overall, activities related to scaling-up are being undertaken in IFAD on a piecemeal basis, 
though sometimes with substantial success. Scaling up is resource-intensive, but mechanisms for 
funding such activities are weakly developed. Insufficient time is allocated to scaling up, and those 
who could be agents promoting it such as CPMs are expected to concentrate on the development of 
new and innovative projects and cannot not invest adequate time for promoting scaling up or other 
forms of diffusion. IFAD’s incentive structure does not reward success in scaling up. The selection of 
proven ideas that are candidates for scaling-up is handled at the operational level. IFAD does not have 
a portfolio of ideas worthy of scaling up for widespread adoption, and such ideas are not managed 
separately. Since 2009, IFAD has been collaborating with the Wolfensohn Center for Development at 
the Brookings Institution for a review of the Fund’s approach to scaling up successful innovations in 
support of rural poverty reduction.  This is a good example of the Fund’s commitment to develop the 
required processes, resources and competencies for scaling up. 
 
 
Key points 
 Innovation without scaling up is of limited value for IFAD 
 Even though the need to scale up innovations has long been recognized by IFAD, it is not adequately 
built into country programmes. 
 While there are some examples of successful scaling up, the resources allocated for the purposes are 
insufficient and staff skills are not adequate for the purpose. Up scaling has largely occurred in an 
informal and unsystematic manner largely due to individual initiatives. 
 Partnership with governments, the private sector and co-financiers (especially the international financial 
institutions) is of paramount importance for scaling up.  
 
VIII.  BENCHMARKING INNOVATIONS: IFAD AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
 
241. The analysis in this chapter draws upon building block (vii), which entailed the undertaking of 
a benchmarking study. The aim of the study was to position IFAD in the spectrum of comparator 
agencies to gauge similarities, differences and common challenges and to derive pointers for potential 
learning. The main selection criteria for identifying comparator organizations were: (i) relevance of 
innovation for the organization; (ii) diversity of institutional background: the selected sample should 
include United Nations agencies, IFIs, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs; and (iii) easy access to the 
organization. Of a group of ten organizations initially considered, the following were included in the 
benchmarking study: 
 
• Hivos – NGO; 
• IDRC – research institution; 
• Irish Aid – bilateral agency; 
• UNIFEM – United Nations organization; and 
• The World Bank – IFI. 
 
242. The organizations vary in size: the World Bank is the largest, followed by IDRC, UNIFEM, 
Irish Aid and Hivos. The methodology for the benchmarking exercise includes reviewing literature 
from these organizations about their experience in promoting innovations as well as semi-structured 
standardized teleconference interviews with key persons in the respective agencies. The investigation 
covered the following aspects of innovation: definition, strategic orientation, innovation processes, 
partnership, implementation and risk and mitigation.   
 
243. Definition. Unlike IFAD, none of the agencies have adopted an explicit formally documented 
definition of innovation, with the partial exception of UNIFEM. There is no agreed definition of the 
term, which is understood differently in different organizations; but a fundamental aspect of 
innovation – the notion of novelty – is acknowledged by all the organizations consulted. For example 
in assessing the submissions for its Development Marketplace – a global competition that provides 
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grants for the early stages of innovative projects – the World Bank aims to ensure novelty by 
including experts from all over the world. UNIFEM has set out a working definition of its “catalytic 
role” in bringing about change, which is presented in its Strategic Plan for 2008–2011. But all the 
organizations have some reflections in their strategic documents on the prerequisites for being 
innovative, for example openness with respect to structures, the need to put ideas into action by not 
penalizing risk taking and setting the right rewards, the need for constant engagement with partners, 
the importance of shared institutional understanding, the importance of management support and the 
crucial role of specific individuals as champions of innovation. 
 
244. Strategic orientation. Unlike IFAD, none of the five organizations has developed a stand-
alone innovation strategy – but all acknowledge the importance of a strategic orientation to promote 
innovation, which is reflected in their strategic and policy documents. The mandates of IDRC and 
UNIFEM – the IDRC Act passed by the Canadian Parliament and UNIFEM’s mandate as established 
by the United Nations General Assembly – contain clear references to innovation. In Hivos, 
innovation is one of the underlying policy and working principles: “Hivos values the driving force and 
inspiration of innovation, it creates room for the new and the unknown, and takes calculated risks” 
(Hivos 2002a, p. 16). Irish Aid has a number of references to innovation and innovative approaches in 
its White Paper on Irish Aid. In UNIFEM, the influence which triggered interest in innovation came 
from an external evaluation; in the World Bank it came from pressure from member countries; in Irish 
Aid it came from the shift to a programmatic approach to aid. For the World Bank, extensive 
consultations with internal and external partners triggered the ongoing strategic reorientation with 
respect to innovation: it was argued that the World Bank needed to build on its comparative 
advantages in knowledge by capturing it in “frontier issues” in order to stay ahead. As a first response 
the World Bank set up a new separate entity in the World Bank Institute (WBI) that focused on 
innovation.  
 
245. Knowledge management. A cornerstone of innovation, knowledge management has been 
identified as “challenging” in many of the organizations consulted. Unlike IFAD, none of the 
organizations have a stand-alone knowledge management strategy; but all of them are redesigning 
their approach or have recently done so. Some systems for the exchange of information, 
documentation and knowledge are in place, but it seems that they could be utilized better. The new 
innovation entity in WBI will be responsible for external knowledge management. Identifying and 
setting up tools to scan more effectively for innovations and scaling up will be a major task of WBI in 
future. 
 
246. Innovation process. None of the organizations consulted uses a specific model or process for 
innovation. On the basis of the review of documents, however, it is evident that UNIFEM focuses 
mainly on identifying and catalyzing innovative approaches. The World Bank’s Development Market 
Place supports the first phase of an innovation process, but no more. Hivos and IDRC indicate that 
they are subscribing to a more systemic approach. All the agencies, however, stress the contextual 
nature of innovation and state that it is not possible to work with a single perspective because 
innovation is defined by its context and many different entry points, institutions and partners are 
involved. All the agencies stressed the importance of resources and appropriate financial instruments 
to promote innovation, in particular the combination of grants at the initial stages and capital market 
borrowing in later stages. 
 
247. Human resources. All the agencies recognize that human resources are the key to an 
organization’s innovative capabilities. Hivos and IDRC stress that they are employing people with an 
original mindset who can “think outside the box” and who are innovators by nature. But limited use is 
made of individual incentives specifically to promote innovations. In Hivos, outstanding or innovative 
people are mentioned in internal communications, and there is a sabbatical leave policy to promote 
learning and experimentation. IDRC has a mechanism that links salary increases to individual staff 
performance on the basis of an intricate but transparent assessment process.   
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248. Internal culture. The small size of Hivos and UNIFEM is a strong motivation to innovate, as 
in IFAD. For Hivos, IDRC and UNIFEM innovation is a central element of institutional identity that 
is reflected in their internal cultures. All three state that their staff are aware of the role of innovation 
in the institution, and that many joined because of this reputation. Although innovation is a major 
element in Hivos and IDRC, both state that innovation should not be practised for its own sake but to 
achieve better outcomes; the same idea is expressed by Irish Aid .There is agreement that flexibility in 
the form of non-bureaucratic procedures, openness and flat hierarchies is conducive to innovation.  A 
culture of open discussion characterizes these institutions: it is promoted by learning sessions, debates 
and an iterative approach to project planning and management. Hivos is also flexible in dealing with 
partners in that it does not demand logical frameworks or annual reports in specific formats. IDRC, 
Hivos and UNIFEM have institutionalized regular reviews during which staff are encouraged to share 
new approaches and experiences; UNIFEM’s “Safe Cities” project was identified during such a 
session. In short, Hivos, IDRC and UNIFEM have managed to create cultures favourable to 
innovation and have gained a reputation for being innovative without formal frameworks. None of the 
organizations denied the importance of achieving results, but some were critical of an exclusive focus 
on results. Results-based management was referred to negatively by some interviewees in that it does 
not leave room for innovation because of its exclusive focus on quantitative results. One interviewee 
commented that “a blind focus on targets does not promote innovation.” Of the organizations 
reviewed, only the Irish Aid evaluation policy refers specifically to innovation.  
 
249. Instruments. The organizations consulted use a variety of instruments at different levels to 
promote innovation. UNIFEM manages the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against 
Women, which awards in-country grants through an annual competitive process that focuses on 
supporting the implementation of national policies, legal frameworks and action plans. The World 
Bank’s Development Market is a competitive grant programme that aims to identify innovative 
projects in various fields; recipients are usually social entrepreneurs, NGOs or small emerging firms. 
In all Irish Aid’s country programmes there is a “process fund” to find out whether and how new 
ideas can work, and to document their effects. IDRC has set up synergy grants that are used to explore 
windows of opportunity or new ideas that emerge during a project. The usefulness of competitive 
support for innovative approaches seems to be limited if experiences are not followed up 
systematically and cannot be fed into an organization. UNIFEM is currently undertaking an 
evaluation of the trust fund with the aim of improving understanding its effects.  
 
250. Partnerships. As with IFAD, engaging with a diversity of partners is crucial for the 
organizations consulted in the areas of learning and scaling up. The type of partner varies, largely 
according to the organization’s background. UNIFEM’s main partners are other United Nations 
bodies, particularly UNDP, and governments. The World Bank’s main partners are governments and 
private sector entities. Other agencies have a more diversified approach to partners: Irish Aid, for 
example, has one of the largest NGO programmes among bilateral donors, and meets twice a year 
with the NGOs. New partnerships approaches are sought such as IDRC’s attempt to integrate policy-
makers into research projects. When Hivos and IDRC select new partners, their track records and 
reputations with respect to innovation are a decisive factor, and they invest a good deal of time in 
accompanying and improving their partners. IDRC has a special division to manage its partnerships, 
which are a cornerstone of its work. Hivos does not support partners for longer than ten years, and 
staff are required to bring in new partners regularly. All these measures help to maintain diversity and 
openness. 
 
251. Scaling up. There is no agreement about the definition of scaling up. It is seen as closely linked 
to innovation, sometimes overlapping with it. The organizations stressed that scaling up does not 
usually take place because it would require large resources. In Hivos and IDRC, prospects for scaling 
up depend on partnerships and the nature of the projects. In Irish Aid, which is predominantly active 
in countries with national poverty reduction strategies and sectoral approaches, scaling up is part of 
the aid effectiveness agenda. UNIFEM “... does not take responsibility for replication and ‘up-
scaling’ ...” but scaling up is done by its partners, with UNIFEM taking a catalytic role. The World 
Bank Development Market does not make systematic use of scaling up potential: it provides funding 
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“at the spark level”, leaving the anticipated incubation phase to other funders. In its country 
programmes, however, the World Bank scales up successful interventions with country partners in 
view of its large size.  
 
252. Risk and mitigation. All five organizations see themselves as risk takers and early movers. 
Hivos and IDRC state that they support risky partnerships and that a percentage of failure has to be 
expected, but failures are thoroughly assessed for learning purposes. Failure is often about not 
achieving planned results, which poses a question as to the relationship between innovation and 
results. There is broad agreement that results are important and that innovation needs to be linked to 
results. But that there are various ways to understand the term results: they should not be merely 
defined as targets, but understood broadly in the context of the chain of expected results from 
innovation. Hivos, IDRC and UNIFEM do not currently have a risk-management strategy in place, 
but they are all in the process of formulating either a strategy or a formal risk-assessment model. The 
World Bank’s Development Impact Evaluation initiative is used to reduce risks. Irish Aid identifies an 
additional perspective from its focus on programmatic approaches: providing aid in cooperation with 
others always means that others assess the same situation and that risks are shared in this context. All 
the agencies have similar conservative views on innovation, with expected success rates ranging from 
20 per cent to 35 per cent; another 30 per cent of innovations have the potential to be successful.  
 
253. On the basis of the foregoing analysis it is possible to position IFAD approximately with 
respect to the other organizations in Figure 5. The graph simply differentiates formal/explicit 
characteristics and informal/implicit elements of innovations. Table 13 shows the evaluation’s scoring 
of some of the main elements considered in benchmarking to determine the relative position of IFAD. 
As can be seen, IFAD’s relative position is quite high, particularly on the formal side. 
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Figure 5. Positioning of IFAD with Respect to Other Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13.  Possible Indicators for Formal and Informal Aspects of Innovation 
  Hivos Irish Aid IDRC IFAD UNIFEM 
World 
Bank 
Explicit definition no no no yes yes n/a 
Availability of 
innovation strategy no no no yes no 
no (in 
prep?) 
Systematic integration 
into key documents yes no yes yes yes n/a 
Fo
rm
al
 
as
pe
ct
s 
Consciously initiated 
approach to innovation no no no yes yes yes 
Element of identity yes yes yes yes yes n/a 
Innovation culture yes yes yes no yes n/a 
In
fo
rm
al
 
as
pe
ct
s Favourable procedures 
(flat hierarchy, 
decentralization etc.) 
yes yes yes no (no) n/a (no) 
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Key points 
 Compared with the other organizations in this benchmarking study, IFAD’s relative position is quite high 
though more on the formal side of innovation strategic guidance. This is substantiated by the fact that it is 
the only organization in the study that adopted an explicit definition of innovation and documented 
innovation and knowledge management strategies. 
 None of the organizations uses a specific model or process of innovation, but all stressed the contextual 
importance and multi-stakeholder nature of innovations and the importance of resources and appropriate 
financial instruments to promote it.  
 The human resources are considered key to an organization’s capabilities to promote innovations that can 
be scaled up. But limited use is made of individual incentives specifically to promote innovations. 
 Engaging with diverse partners in new ways is crucial for promoting innovations in all the organizations. 
Although scaling up is seen as closely linked to innovation, there is no agreement about its definition.  
 All organizations recognize that innovation entails risks and that failure is not uncommon. 
 A focus on quantitative results and targets may limit an organization’s capacity to promote innovations. 
 
 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A.  Conclusions 
 
254. The extent of rural poverty in developing countries is widespread, and IFAD is a relatively 
small development actor given the level of resources at its disposal in relation to the magnitude of the 
problem that needs to be addressed. The situation is further compounded by continuous new 
challenges, such as most recently those related to volatile food prices, climate change and other 
environmental concerns, and trans-national epidemics. In this context, with a mismatch between the 
magnitude of poverty and resources available to IFAD but also to the development community at 
large to address the plight of the poor, innovations offer an opportunity through which multiplier 
effects can be achieved to reduce rural poverty. To this end, IFAD is favourably positioned to 
becoming a global leader, given its long history and commitment to innovations. 
 
255. The Fund has made steady progress in the past decade towards becoming an organization 
focusing on innovations in agriculture and rural development. The centrality of promoting 
innovations, and their replication and scaling up was recognised by IFAD in its Vision statement of 
1995. It has developed dedicated strategies on innovations and knowledge management, and launched 
a specific initiative to mainstreaming innovations. Many of its key corporate documents - such as the 
Strategic Framework for 2007-10 and the final reports adopted by member states following the 5th 
and 6th replenishments – further articulate and are additional examples of the Fund’s commitment 
towards promoting innovations.  
 
256. The situation on the ground in terms of results is however more mixed. The performance of 
IFAD-funded projects has steadily improved in promoting innovations. The ARRI revealed that just 
around 60 per cent of the projects evaluated by IEO in 2002 were moderately satisfactory or better in 
terms of innovation, whereas 100 per cent of the projects evaluated in 2008 had a moderately 
satisfactory or better performance. The steady improvement is commendable. However, it is to be 
noted that close to half of the projects evaluated reveal merely moderately satisfactory results in 
innovation and scaling up is particularly weak. But the problem is not just with scaling up: the 
evaluation concludes that IFAD’s approach to the innovations journey, which includes the critical 
steps of searching (or scouting), exploring, committing, realising (piloting), and optimising (scaling 
up) is not yet systematic and effective as it should be. Far too much is left to the initiative and 
individual entreprenual skills of CPMs, who act without concrete incentives and accountability. 
 
257. There are a number of organizational capabilities that are required to support the innovation 
journey. These include the need for systematic learning, structure and processes, culture, 
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competencies including staff skills and incentives, decision-making, and leadership and direction. 
These capabilities were recognised as weak by the 2000/1 innovation evaluation. Likewise, this 
evaluation found that the third and probably the most important IMI objective on changing 
organizational culture and practices to support innovations has largely not been met. The evaluation 
therefore points out that IFAD’s organizational capabilities still remain generally weak and has only 
changed marginally since the beginning of the decade. This is in fact to say that the Fund’s strong 
strategic commitment and pronouncements towards innovation have not been adequately converted 
into action and become part of IFAD’s corporate culture.  
 
258. Based on a staff survey implemented in 2009, IFAD remains in the lowest quartile of the 43 
organizations that have been surveyed using the same questionnaire, although its rank has improved 
by five places. The survey also reveals more generally that staff perceive IFAD to be relatively strong 
at searching or scouting for innovations, but weak in prioritising innovations to promote and scale up. 
The evaluation noted that some key operational processes (e.g., quality enhancement and quality 
assurance) have been strengthened, but human resource skills and incentives are not in place to 
promote innovations. Training opportunities are limited and additional resources for pushing 
promising innovations are not easily available. The survey also found that managers are not prompt in 
dealing with blockages (e.g., in terms of identifying additional resources needed for scaling up) that 
may hamper change. IFAD’s knowledge and information systems are not strong in enabling effective 
decisions about which innovations should be selected for scaling up. Also, IFAD lacks speed in taking 
new ideas through the system and, importantly, the Fund is insufficiently open to ideas from a wide 
diversity of sources, including the rural poor themselves. All these and other factors are constraining 
IFAD from developing into a more effective innovative organization. 
 
259. The evaluation found that IFAD has followed a broad-based innovation approach (“let a 
thousand flowers bloom”). This metaphor is a reflection of both the commitment of the member states 
and the management in enshrining innovations as a key principle of engagement in IFAD-funded 
operations, but at the same time, illustrative of the fact that the innovation promotion has not been 
pursued in a focused manner.  That is, the Fund has pursued innovations in a variety of topics, rather 
than focusing on few critical areas or domains, where there is a documented need for innovative 
solutions and where the Fund has a proven capability and track record to develop pro-poor 
innovations successfully. While the evaluation agrees that the Fund needs to allow “a thousand 
flowers bloom”, especially in order to harness the creativity and energies of the rural poor and other 
partners in borrowing countries, a more systematic and co-ordinated approach that focuses on few 
innovation domains is warranted to the identification, piloting and scaling up of innovations. 
Likewise, IFAD’s innovation strategy did not require the Fund to focus its innovative energies and 
resources in selected areas, neither did it chart a way forward for IFAD to acquire the required 
capabilities (e.g., in terms of structure, systems, skills, staff, shared values) to become an innovative 
organization.  
 
260. The evaluation also concludes that the Fund is devoting relatively more attention to and found 
success in introducing innovative solutions in social engineering and institutional arrangements (e.g., 
promoting participatory approaches to planning and resource allocation) than in agriculture. Although 
IFAD has provided a fair amount of grant resources for agricultural research to develop innovative 
low-cost agriculture technology that can lead to better productivity and incomes, the results of such 
research has not found its way easily into investment projects funded by IFAD. The relatively greater 
focus on social engineering and institutional innovations may be attributed to the fact that in the 1990s 
and first part of the new millennium, on the whole, IFAD devoted more attention to social capital 
formation and empowerment, rather than to agricultural activities and identification of related 
economic opportunities for the rural poor. 
 
261. The IMI had an important role in mainstreaming innovations in IFAD. The introduction of the 
IMI was a clear illustration of the Fund’s commitment towards mainstreaming innovation. Two of the 
three IMI objectives – strengthen innovation in IFAD operations and increase learning and sharing on 
innovation – were broadly met, but not the third important objective of contributing to changing 
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organizational culture and practices in support of innovations. The staff survey conducted in the 
context of this evaluation highlight that, among other issues, the lack of time, limitations in financial 
resources, and organizational blockages (e.g., the need to prioritise the commitment of new loans, 
rather than supporting the implementation of innovative projects) constrained their ability to 
effectively contribute to fulfilling IFAD’s innovation objective. Finally, the main instrument used by 
the IMI was grant funding for small innovative projects, but their linkages (as is the case of IFAD’s 
regular grants programme) to the country programme objectives has been inadequate.  
 
262. The evaluation underlines that innovation alone cannot achieve a decisive reduction in rural 
poverty. For broader impact, it is critical that innovation at the local level becomes a lever for change 
on a larger scale. Therefore, attention to replication and in particular to upscaling is essential to ensure 
a wider impact on rural poverty, for example, in terms of the numbers of poor people that can be 
reached or the expansion of specific development activities to cover a greater geographic area. There 
are examples of innovations that have been successfully scaled up by Government and other donors, 
but the evaluation concludes that these have been possible largely due to individual initiatives and 
commitment, rather systematic processes in the way IFAD operates. This casts an important question 
mark on the ultimate usefulness of the innovations introduced in IFAD-funded operations, given that 
as recognised by IFAD’s Strategic Framework 2007-10, scaling up is essential for achieving a wider 
impact on rural poverty. A further reason is that limited attention and resources were devoted to 
replication and upscaling in COSOP formulation and project design and implementation, as compared 
to the scouting and piloting of innovations. This may also be due to the lumping at IFAD of 
innovation, replication and upscaling as a unique concept –which though inter-related and mutually 
reinforcing – are distinct aspects in the innovations journey that require dedicated resources, 
approaches and attention. Weak monitoring and evaluation systems at the project and country levels 
limit IFAD’s capacity to document and learn from successful innovations, and therefore is another 
constraint for scaling up.  
 
263. There are two further reasons that can explain why IFAD’s performance in upscaling has been 
inadequate in the past. Firstly, the attention devoted to non-lending activities (including knowledge 
management, partnership building, and policy dialogue) has been generally poor. Knowledge 
management is important, in order to capture and share the lessons and experiences from projects 
where innovations have been successfully implemented and achieved favourable outcomes. 
Partnerships with a diverse range of development actors are critical for all key phases of the 
innovation journey, including scouting, piloting and upscaling. Policy dialogue also is necessary, with 
the aim of ensuring buy-in among those development partners who potentially have the resources and 
capabilities to replicate and upscale innovations successfully experimented in IFAD-funded 
operations. In general, the evaluation notes that there was limited attention to non-lending activities in 
the past, partly because IFAD mostly concentrated its efforts in designing (and more recently in 
undertaking direct supervision and providing implementation support) investment projects and 
programmes, instead of allocating time, space and resources towards non-lending activities. Secondly, 
the Fund’s operating model in the past – which did not allow IFAD to conduct direct supervision and 
implementation support and the lack of country presence- restrained its ability in promoting 
innovations, including scaling up.  
 
264. In any case, it is fair to highlight that IFAD has in the recent past recognised the importance of 
upscaling, and due efforts are being deployed towards this end, including through an upscaling 
initiative in collaboration with the Brooking Institution. Moreover, the strengthening of country 
presence, better quality assurance and quality enhancement systems, direct supervision and 
implementation support, as well as increasing focus on non-lending activities are expected to 
collectively contribute to deeper results in scaling up, but also in terms of identifying and piloting 
innovations. 
 
265. As mentioned above, learning and knowledge management is required, among other reasons, to 
document and share with a broader audience innovations successfully tested on the ground. While it is 
to be recognised that IFAD introduced a dedicated knowledge management strategy in 2007 and some 
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useful initiatives have been made to share experiences in the past two years, knowledge management 
can be further strengthened to support innovations within IFAD-supported country programmes and 
projects. The innovation survey revealed that one specific area that has received insufficient attention 
is cross-fertilisation of experiences on innovations across divisions and departments, and learning 
from external sources has also been limited. The recent decision to integrate the stand alone 
knowledge management and innovation strategies is a step in the right direction, given that the two 
processes are mutually reinforcing and essential for innovation management. In sum, the evaluation 
concludes that in the past the Fund had not devoted the required attention to knowledge management 
and its linkages with innovations, but recent efforts and decisions are appropriate and need to be 
sustained in the future.  
 
266. On another issue, the evaluation reveals that there is inadequate amount of resources that are 
specifically allocated to the innovation promotion process, as well as the usage of existing instruments 
that are required for the purpose. Notably, few resources and efforts have been devoted specifically 
towards building IFAD’s internal innovation capabilities. The main instruments available to IFAD 
(loans and grants) have not been used in a complementary and strategic manner in support of 
innovations.    
 
267. In tandem with loans, grants can play a useful role in selected phases of IFAD’s innovation 
journey. For example, grants at times are more appropriate than loans for developing new agriculture 
technologies or for piloting new methods for gender mainstreaming in traditional societies, which can 
later be upscaled either through IFAD loan-funded activities or by other partners. Grants are important 
also because Governments at times are reluctant to take loans from IFAD for projects and 
programmes that focus on innovations, as they many not bear the desired results in the end.  
 
268. IFAD has invested a fair amount of grant resources towards developing pro-poor innovative 
solutions in agriculture and related areas. However, although IFAD’s grants programme can 
potentially play a strategic role in supporting the innovation agenda, evaluation experience underlines 
that the linkages between grants and investment projects have not been adequately defined in 
COSOPs and therefore have been mostly weak in operations. It is however noted that IFAD has 
recently (2009) introduced a new grants policy which, among other issues, emphasises the strategic 
role of grants in innovation and also provides, for the first time, an opportunity to involve the private 
sector that can undertake research and pilot innovations to be replicated and upscaled through 
investment projects.  
 
269. In general, in IFAD there is a disconnect between strategic pronouncements and the still weak 
institutional capability to promote pro-poor innovation on the ground. However, progress has been 
undeniably achieved and a number of appropriate initiatives (such as the one on scaling up) are in 
place. If IFAD is to become a more effective and agile innovation-driven development organization in 
the 21st century and, more so, if it aspires to become a leader in the promotion of pro-poor 
innovations, it would need to make a quantum jump in particular in terms of organizational culture 
change and capabilities. It will also need to use its “let a thousand flowers bloom” broad-based 
approach within few strategic innovation areas. However, the evaluation recognizes that the Fund 
needs to also remain open to promoting innovations at the country/project level that respond to 
perceived challenges related to agriculture and rural development of the specific country 
circumstances. It will also need to concentrate its attention more than in the past on the process of 
scaling up. Clearly, this would not be possible without a commensurate allocation of resources for the 
purpose. 
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B.  Recommendations 
 
270. The following recommendations aim to improve IFAD’s capabilities to move from its strong 
strategic commitments and pronouncements towards more systematic and better results on the ground 
in promoting pro-poor innovations, which can be ultimately scaled up. 
 
271. Define an innovation agenda for IFAD. The evaluation found that the Fund followed the “let a 
thousand flowers bloom” approach to promoting innovations in the past. This approach has not, on the 
whole, led to the desired results and IFAD cannot afford to continue spreading its innovation efforts 
thinly - given its relatively limited level of resources and capacities. The evaluation agrees that the 
Fund needs to allow “a thousand flowers bloom”, in order to harness the creativity and energies of the 
rural poor and other partners in borrowing countries. However, a more focused, systematic and co-
ordinated approach is warranted to the identification, piloting and scaling up of innovations.  
 
272. The evaluation therefore recommends that an IFAD-wide innovation agenda should be 
developed at corporate level that consists of few selected themes or domains. The themes or domains 
selected, Big Bets, should be in those areas of the agriculture and rural sector where there is a proven 
need for innovative solutions and where IFAD has (or can develop) a comparative advantage to 
promote successfully pro-poor innovations that can be scaled up. These Big Bets should be defined at 
headquarters through a process of consultation and implemented through COSOPs and projects to be 
funded by IFAD. The implementation of the Big Bets would be time bound and have adequate 
resource allocation. Moreover, IFAD should at the same time be open to promoting innovations at the 
country/project level which respond to challenges specific to the context.  
 
273. The definition of the Big Bets will require a decision at the highest level in the senior 
management and their continued commitment and support, including first and foremost of the IFAD 
President. A specific process will need to be developed for identifying the Big Bets. Some options for 
the process may include: 
a. Each year, the operations divisions could propose one to two priority themes/domains (for 
example, small scale irrigation or land titling for rural women). In addition, the operations 
divisions should be required to outline how they plan to pursue innovations in these 
priority themes/domains, the resources required, as well as the monitoring and learning 
measures that will be implemented to document the corresponding experiences. The 
submissions from the various divisions could be amalgamated into 2-3 Big Bets at the 
corporate level; or 
b. Alternatively, the IFAD senior management could propose the 2-3 Big Bet areas and seek 
the comments from the operations, the country offices and other partners, before taking a 
final decision on the priority areas. 
 
274. The finally agreed Big Bets would be part of the Fund’s innovation agenda, which could be 
conceived as a corporate rolling plan covering a period of three years or so. The innovation agenda 
would have specific objectives, activities, timelines, budgets, management and oversight 
arrangements as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. The innovation agenda would be 
approved by the President, who would communicate it in an appropriate manner to IFAD staff and the 
Executive Board, with commitments to report on the results on an annual basis.  
 
275. The evaluation recommends that more attention than in the past be devoted to the development 
of innovative solutions in agriculture technology and other areas that will lead to economic 
empowerment of the rural poor. Examples of Big Bets that IFAD could consider include domains 
such as health and weather insurance for the rural poor, rural finance products for dispersed 
populations, research in high yielding varieties for rain fed areas and poor small farmers, carbon 
projects, access to market and value chain development (e.g., risk mitigation for transition from 
subsistence to commercial farming), land titling (also for rural women), valorising out-migration and 
so on.  
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276. Treat scaling up as mission-critical. Scaling up is essential if IFAD is to contribute to wider 
impact on rural poverty. It is imperative that concrete approaches and strategies for scaling up be 
already articulated at the time of COSOP formulation and project design. The role and contribution of 
direct supervision and implementation support as well as country presence in support of scaling up 
should be clearly defined.  
 
277. IFAD should set corporate targets for scaling up and monitor and report upon it annually. In 
this regard, it is also important to underline the accountability framework for scaling up, which would 
ensure that this critical phase in IFAD’s innovation journey is given due attention and resources.  
 
278. Adequate resources and space need to be allocated towards non-lending activities, which are 
essential for scaling up, and staff competencies further developed to ensure success in this area.  The 
evaluation found limitations in IFAD’s knowledge management system, which is a major building 
block in IFAD’s innovation journey. Deeper efforts need to be made to exchange experiences and 
lessons on innovation and scaling up within and across the five geographic regions in which IFAD 
works, both in the regions and among operations staff at headquarters. Some specific initiatives could 
include the holding of periodic knowledge fairs at headquarters focusing on innovations by regional 
divisions; inviting project staff as guest speakers from one region to the annual project 
implementation workshops organised by another regional division; better linkages among existing 
IFAD regional electronic networks; and ensuring the country presence staff are more comprehensively 
integrated and have opportunities for sharing knowledge. At the project level, improvements in 
monitoring and evaluations systems are essential. Also, the efforts in knowledge management could 
be introduced as an indicator in annual performance evaluation process of IFAD as well as project 
staff.  
 
279. IFAD’s policy dialogue and partnership building agenda at the country level should also be 
driven by the objective of scaling up, and therefore focus on few topics that are part of the Fund’s 
innovation agenda in the concerned country.  In general, knowledge management, policy dialogue and 
partnership building are likely to require additional financial and staff time resources that will need to 
be deployed, which are essential for upscaling purposes.  
 
280. The evaluation found that the concepts of innovation and scaling up were lumped together as a 
unique block in IFAD, and that the Fund’s measurement and reporting systems, including IEO 
evaluations, do not always distinguish between them. It is therefore recommended that in the future 
innovation be assessed and reported upon as a separate process from scaling up. However, given the 
intrinsic relationship and dynamics between the two concepts, assessing the achievements of IFAD’s 
efforts in the entire innovation journey from scouting, to piloting, documenting and scaling up is also 
essential.  
 
281. Strengthen organizational capabilities and culture. The evaluation found that the Fund’s 
organizational capabilities had not sufficiently improved since 2001 in order to support the promotion 
of innovations and scaling up.  
 
282. First and foremost, the Fund needs to develop practical innovation management skills. The 
management of innovation is different from implementing proven approaches. It requires 
entrepreneurship and the capacity to cope with greater uncertainties, a need for adaptation, a range of 
skills and a requirement to make difficult choices on emerging evidence. Therefore, IFAD should 
develop an innovation-specific competency model for individuals and teams drawing on current best 
practice. This model will provide the basis for a comprehensive skills enhancement programme and 
the development of relevant tools, processes and monitoring systems. Innovation management skills 
should be developed as personal, team and networked competences and adopted by IFAD staff and its 
partners.  
 
283. Staff recruitment should explicitly include innovation as a necessary characteristic, and 
incentives systems need to be introduced that reward staff for promoting innovations and fostering 
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learning and sharing of good practices and experiences on innovations. The annual performance 
evaluation system of staff should consider innovation in the assessment process.  
 
284. Although the evaluation found that operational processes had been improved in past years, an 
assessment should be made to discern if any further adjustments are required in areas such as policy 
formulation, COSOP development, project design, supervision, evaluation systems including M&E, 
non-lending activities, etc. to ensure that innovation is fully built into key phases of the country 
strategy and project life cycle.  
 
285. All recommendations from this evaluation, including the one related to improving 
organizational capabilities and culture, will have consequences for the Fund’s administrative budget. 
A detailed analysis is required to determine the financial implications and resources allocated in a 
timely manner, if IFAD’s overall innovation and scaling up efforts are to bear the desired results on 
rural poverty in the future. 
 
286. IMI. The evaluation recommends that the unutilised funds from the IMI be used towards 
initiating the implementation of the three main recommendations contained in this evaluation, in 
particular, towards changing organizational culture and practices, which was one of the three 
objectives of the IMI and the one whose effectiveness has been unsatisfactory. It is also recommended 
that the IMI be extended and a work programme be developed for the future, which could be funded 
either through IFAD’s administrative budget or the mobilisation of supplementary funds. The IMI 
work programme should aim at the implementation of the main recommendations from the 
evaluation. 
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APPENDIX I 
Definition of Evaluation Criteria used by the Office of Evaluation 
 
Criteria Definitiona 
Project performance  
• Relevance The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are 
consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, institutional 
priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment 
of project coherence in achieving its objectives. 
• Effectiveness The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were 
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their 
relative importance. 
• Efficiency A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, 
time, etc.) are converted into results. 
Rural poverty impactb Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected 
to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, 
direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development 
interventions.  
• Household income and assets Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of 
economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets 
relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. 
• Human and social capital and 
empowerment 
Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment 
of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, 
the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, and the poor’s 
individual and collective capacity. 
• Food security and agricultural productivity Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and 
stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are 
measured in terms of yields. 
• Natural resources and the environment The focus on NRE involves assessing the extent to which a project 
contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of 
NRE. 
• Institutions and policies The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess 
changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the 
regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 
Other performance criteria  
• Sustainability The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention 
beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an 
assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be 
resilient to risks beyond the project’s life.  
• Promotion of pro-poor innovation, 
replication and scaling up 
The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: 
(i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and 
(ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to 
be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor 
organizations, the private sector and others agencies. 
Overall project achievement This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon 
the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above. 
Performance of partners  
• IFAD 
• Government  
• Cooperating institution 
• NGO/CBO* 
*community-based organization  
This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, 
execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation 
support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be 
assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner’s expected 
role and responsibility in the project life cycle.  
 a  These definitions have been taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development 
Assistance Committee Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management and from the Methodological 
Framework for Project Evaluation as agreed upon with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003. 
 b  It is important to underline that the new manual also deals with the “lack of intervention”. That is, no specific 
intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if 
positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned 
to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, 
then no rating (or the mention “not applicable”) is assigned. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Report of the Senior Independent Adviser 
Johannes F. Linn1 
 
1. It is with great appreciation that I have served as the Senior Independent Adviser for the 
Corporate-level Evaluation of IFAD’s Capacity to Promote Innovation and Scaling Up. I 
reviewed and commented on background papers and drafts of the final report and discussed 
them very productively with members of the excellent evaluation team and with the 
management of the Office of Evaluation (IEO). In parallel, I served as the team leader for an 
ongoing review of IFAD’s approach to scaling up successful interventions in support of rural 
poverty reduction. This review is being carried out by the Wolfensohn Center for Development 
at the Brookings Institution with a small grant from IFAD. 
 
A.  Overview of the Report 
 
2. This evaluation covers an essential element of IFAD’s corporate mission and strategy and will 
provide a very useful platform for IFAD’s Executive Board and Management as they develop 
the path forward for IFAD during a time of new challenges.  
 
3. The evaluation report has many strengths: 
• The report covers the main strategic initiatives of IFAD which underpin the efforts to make 
innovation and scaling up a core element – perhaps even the core element – of IFAD’s 
assistance activity in support of the rural poor. They include the “Action Plan”, the 
“Initiative for Mainstreaming Innovation (IMI)”, the “Strategic Framework 2007-1010”, the 
“Report on Consultations on the Eighth Replenishment”, and the “Innovation Strategy”.  
• The report rightly focuses not only on innovation, but also on scaling up of successful 
innovations. It recognizes scaling up as a core aspect of an innovation strategy that pursues 
innovation not an end onto itself, but a means to achieve effective solutions on a scale 
commensurate with the problem of rural poverty. An enhanced focus on scaling up is 
appropriately one of the key recommendations of the report. 
• The methodology used for the evaluation is appropriate, comprehensive and sound – a 
combination of quantitative metrics and qualitative judgments, of generating new 
information (e.g., through a staff survey), and of internal investigation and external 
benchmarking. 
• It links the current evaluation with past evaluation efforts (especially the 2002 evaluation) 
and draws effectively on the results of project and country programme evaluations, ARRIs, 
etc. 
• The conclusions are sound: The report finds that IFAD has been on a decade-long path of 
developing a clear institutional focus on innovation and delivering increasingly innovative 
interventions in support of the rural poor. But it also concludes that IFAD’s approach to “let 
a thousand flowers bloom” led to a diffuse effort; that IFAD needs to improve the way it 
harnesses its resources to deliver on its commitment to innovation; and that it has to develop 
an effective approach to assist in the scaling up of successful innovations.  
• The recommendations are also sound: institute a more sharply focused innovation approach; 
pay more attention to innovations that enhance the economic potential of the rural poor; 
deploy institutional resources in a more effectively planned, organized and managed manner; 
                                                     
1
 Johannes F. Linn is the Director of the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution in 
Washington, DC. 
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develop a systematic approach to scaling up; and separately measure the effectiveness of 
innovation and scaling up in IFAD operations. 
4. In the remainder of these comments I highlight some areas of uncertainty or tensions, which the 
report has identified, and comment on a few issues which deserve further analysis and 
evaluation as one looks towards crafting an effective institutional approach to innovation and 
scaling up in IFAD.  
5. But before proceeding I should point out that IFAD is unique among international donor 
agencies in the stress it puts on the triad “innovation, knowledge management and scaling up”. 
To my knowledge no other development assistance institution has so explicitly formulated a 
strategic vision around these three inter-related and essential aspects of effective aid. Innovation 
is needed to bring new insights, approaches and instruments to bear on developmental 
challenges; knowledge management for effective learning is needed to determine which 
solutions work, to facilitate their transfer and adaptation and to help create the capacity for 
effective implementation; and scaling up is needed to ensure that innovation and knowledge are 
actually brought to fruition on a scale that provides real solutions to real problems. IFAD 
deserves a lot of credit for this vision and a lot of support in its efforts to implement it.  
 
B.  Open Issues and Unresolved Tensions 
 
What is “innovation and scaling up” for IFAD?  
 
6. The report states in Table 1 (page 8)2 that “IFAD has a standing definition of innovation; 
’innovation’ is generally understood [in IFAD]”. However, in Box 2 (page 16) the report calls 
on IFAD to “clarify the definition, aspiration and measurement” of innovation and in various 
places the report highlights a number of issues which remain to be addressed as IFAD struggles 
with the question of what is an appropriate definition. There are three aspects to this question: 
• In various places the report reflects some scepticism about the way IFAD has defined 
innovation. For example, paragraph 72 states that “project documents can interpret almost 
any initiative as ‘innovative’ in some way at some level and provide justification because the 
definition of innovation in IFAD is very broad.” It is then not surprising that the evaluation 
also finds that in IFAD’s project documents “aspects of proposals were described as 
‘innovative’ in order to meet the requirements of the approval process” (paragraph 27). The 
tension here is between opting for a narrow definition of innovation by sharply defining 
innovation to truly new approaches, or accepting a broader definition which allows for a 
wide range of activities, including knowledge transfer, adaptation and experimentation for 
existing practices. I personally prefer the latter approach, especially if the focus remains 
principally on development results, as it properly should – that is, on the question, “Does the 
intervention work for the rural poor?” rather than on the question, “Is the intervention 
innovative?” 
• Related to the issue of definition, paragraph 72 also highlights the question of what is an 
appropriate metric of innovativeness. This is a matter of concern not only for operational 
staff and managers, but also for the evaluators. It is not clear from what is presented in the 
report what the metric of innovativeness used by IFAD’s Office of Evaluation is and how it 
is applied by the different  evaluators in the various specific project and programme 
evaluations. The fact that the report recommends a separation of performance metrics 
between innovation and scaling up is welcome. 
• Then there is the question of how to define “scaling up”. The report presents a 
characterization of “scaling up and replication” in paragraphs 21, 95 and 96 which identifies 
scaling up and replication as alternative ways to broaden the impact of interventions. I would 
prefer a definition of “scaling up” under which scaling up is the overarching concept of 
achieving broad impact, with specific modalities (replication, diffusion, adaptation, etc.) seen 
                                                     
2
 All page and paragraph references refer to the main evaluation report. 
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as particular ways to scale up. This would be consistent with the standard approach (see 
Hartmann and Linn, 2008) and also with the way the term is used in the report’s title and 
throughout much of its text, referring generally to a broad understanding of the concept of 
scaling up. 
7. There is no single right answer to these definitional, conceptual and measurement issues. But it 
is important for IFAD to be clear and explicit in its approach.  
 
Tensions in Operational Approaches  
 
8. The report notes a number of important tensions in operational approaches involving innovation 
and scaling up which are worth highlighting: 
 
• Technological versus institutional and policy innovations. The report points out that there 
is a declining trend in the share of technological innovations for agricultural production, 
while the shares of institutional and policy innovations are on the rise (paragraphs 61 and 
62). The report concludes that this is consistent with the strategic direction of IFAD, but 
registers concern about it in view of persistent challenges of food insecurity, climate change 
and natural resource degradation. In the recommendation section the report suggest a greater 
focus on enhancing the economic potential of the rural poor (paragraph 275).  
• Localized, bottom-up approaches versus top-down, externally driven approaches 
towards innovation and scaling up. The report points to a tension between IFAD’s 
traditional engagement in small projects at the local level, with innovations tailored to the 
specific needs of (and driven from within) specific communities, versus the introduction of 
external innovations, the need to standardize and simplify when scaling up in larger projects, 
and engagement with central government authorities in policy dialogue. (paragraphs 80, 81, 
and 218) The report recommends that IFAD focus its innovations in a few areas with “big 
bets” rather than, as it has so far, by “letting a thousand flowers bloom” (paragraphs 271-
275), while cautioning that “the Fund needs to also remain open to promoting innovations at 
the country/project that respond to perceived challenges related to agriculture and rural 
development of specific country circumstances" (paragraph 269). This exemplifies well the 
tension between top-down and bottom-up approaches which IFAD now needs to face very 
explicitly. 
• Mitigating risks versus accepting and learning from failure. The report suggests that 
IFAD is not doing enough to mitigate the higher risks associated with innovative projects. 
(paragraph 85)  An alternative would be to accept the higher risk and deal with it not 
principally by mitigation, but by accepting a certain percentage of failures and readiness to 
learn from them.  
• Tension between innovation and scaling up. IFAD’s strategic statements and the 
evaluation report rightly stress that the challenge is innovation with scaling up, but so far 
IFAD’s operational approach has been more one of single-minded pursuit of innovation 
rather than finding the right balance between innovation and scaling up. The report 
appropriately recommends a more balanced approach, but it is important to recognize that 
there is potential tension between innovation and scaling up in terms of how IFAD’s limited 
institutional resources are deployed. 
• These are important issues and tensions which IFAD needs to face squarely and explicitly. 
Addressing these issues and resolving the tensions through transparent choices and guidance 
to staff is the role of the Executive Board and of the Management of IFAD. Leaving them 
entirely for country programme managers to address will likely result in a haphazard, piece-
meal and non-strategic institutional approach.  
• Learning and knowledge management. The report concludes that while IFAD has made 
some progress in systematic learning and knowledge management, this remains an area 
where improvements are needed. (paragraph 265) Effective evaluation of innovations in 
terms of the impact and replicability, and systematic monitoring of pilots and learning from 
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their lessons are essential for successful scaling up (see also under “gaps” below). The report 
points to continued weaknesses in IFAD’s monitoring and evaluation practices and 
inadequate resources devoted to knowledge management more generally. One might add that 
a key problem is the way IFAD manages its operational work: much of the project 
preparation and supervision is done by contractors, CPMs are overburdened, and central 
technical capacity could be better deployed to support CPMs. Fortunately, the recent 
introduction and direct supervision and field presence provide excellent opportunities for 
improved operational learning and application on the ground. Finally, the lack of effective 
linkage between IFAD funded research and its operational work is another example of poor 
knowledge capture (see also under “gaps” below). Looking ahead, more effective integration 
of innovation, knowledge management and scaling up will be critical for IFAD’s 
development effectiveness.  
 
C.  Areas Deserving Further Analysis 
 
9. Some important issues are treated only in passing. This is understandable, given the already 
considerable depth and length of the report. However, they deserve to be noted for future 
evaluation: 
• Role of Quality Enhancement and Quality Assurance (QA/QE) processes: Although 
there are some references to QA/QE, the report makes no assessment of these important 
operational management tools. My impression is that these instruments have been important 
in focusing management’s and staff attention on innovation. However, there is little guidance 
in current operational practice and processes for operational staff which would help them in 
following a systematic approach to innovation and scaling up, as this evaluation report points 
out. The specific role of QA/QE processes in this regard deserves special attention.   
• Treatment of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): The treatment of M&E is limited in the 
evaluation report (paragraphs 90-92). Effective M&E, including thorough impact evaluation 
using control groups, is essential for learning and scaling up. A more systematic assessment 
of M&E activities and specific recommendations how M&E can be enhanced for better 
innovation and scaling up will therefore be useful. 
• Use of IFAD-funded research: The report makes various references to IFAD’s grant-
funded activities (especially paragraphs 87-88). However, there is no in-depth analysis of the 
substantial amount of research which is funded by IFAD’s grant programme, although 
difficulties in transmitting the results of research to investment programmes are noted (e.g. 
paragraph 47). My discussions with concerned managers and staff confirm that little use is 
made by operational units of the results generated by IFAD-funded research. As the report 
notes, a new IFAD grants policy is now under implementation. A thorough evaluation of 
how research funded by IFAD is absorbed internally or externally in agricultural and rural 
development programmes would be desirable, once the new grants policy has had a chance 
to gain traction. 
• Human and budget resource management: While making references to the importance of 
skills (and of training) and the need for adequate resources, the report does not provide a 
detailed assessment of the constraints to innovation emanating from these corporate policies 
and how best to overcome the constraints. A key question is how human resource 
management and budget/grant resource allocation can be structured so as to create effective 
incentives for effective innovation and scaling up. 
• Coverage of survey: The survey of Programme Management Department managers and 
staff provides a useful input into the analysis of the evaluation. The low self-assessment 
ratings are of concern, as the report notes, and they are not entirely consistent with the high 
performance ratings of projects for innovation (100 per cent moderately satisfactory or better 
in 2008). It would have been helpful to survey also partner (recipient) country 
representatives and partner institutions who work with IFAD to get their perspective on 
IFAD’s role and performance as an institution that innovates and helps scale up. 
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D.  A Final Comment: Keep it Simple! 
 
10. The report contains a very comprehensive and at times complex approach to evaluating IFAD’s 
innovation and scaling up activities. For example, the analysis of IFAD’s organizational 
capabilities in section IV involves a sophisticated model with 56 separate elements. While this 
is helpful from an analytical perspective, it is important that IFAD Management and staff are 
encouraged to keep the operational approach to innovation and scaling up procedurally as 
simple as possible. The bureaucratic tendency is to make the process more complex and 
cumbersome in reaction to critique and exhortation to do more and better.3 In my experience, 
the most important factor for successful institutional change is to change the mind set of the 
people in the institution. IFAD has been successful in changing the mind set of its operational 
staff to focus on innovation. Now the most important challenge is to do the same in regard to 
knowledge management and scaling up. Improved processes and capacity are also important, 
but not at the expense of greater bureaucratic burdens. 
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  See Simply Effective: How to Cut Through Complexity in Your Organization and Get Things Done by 
Ronald N. Ashkenas (Harvard Business Press, 2009). 
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APPENDIX III 
 
 
Tracing Innovations in Corporate-level Documents 
 
Strategy/policy documents Operational documents Evaluation reports 
2001 
5th Replenishment, February 
 
- 
- 
IFAD Strategic Framework, 2002–
2006, December 
 
 
2002 
- 
- Evaluation of IFAD’s Capacity as a 
Promoter of Replicable Innovations 
November 2002 
2003 
6th Replenishment, February   ARRI 
Grant Policy, December  
 - 
2004 
IMI, December - ARRI 
2005 
7th Replenishment, February  ARRI 
IFAD Action Plan, December   Independent External Evaluation September 
- 
 Direct Supervision Evaluation 
November 
2006 
Targeting Policy, November 
Guidelines for Project 
Completion, June 2006 ARRI 
Supervision Policy, December  
Portfolio Performance Report, 
November 2006  
 IFAD Strategic Framework 2007–
2010, December 
Guidelines for COSOPs, 
December 2006  - 
2007 
Knowledge Management Strategy, 
April 
Portfolio Performance Report, 
November 2007 
Evaluation of Field Presence Pilot 
Programme, July 
Innovation Strategy, September - ARRI 
 - 
Guidelines for project design, 
December 2007 
 - 
 - 
Guidelines for QE* of Project 
Design, December 2007  - 
2008 
 
Portfolio Performance Report, 
November 2008 ARRI 
2009 
8th Replenishment, January 
IFAD grants policy, December 
 
 
 - 
*
 Quality enhancement (QE).
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
Assessment Criteria and Key Questions 
 
A.  WHAT DID THE INNOVATION AND SCALING UP COVER?  
Adoption/transfer of an existing innovation in new context 
Adaptation of existing innovation 
Creation of new innovation 
Form of innovation 
Continuing investment (project phase) 
 
Policy 
Technological 
Institutional 
Organization of communities 
Partnership 
Type of innovation 
Gender empowerment 
 
Access to land and water 
Natural resource management 
Rural financial services 
Access to markets  
Information and technology for agricultural production  
Sectoral coverage of 
innovation 
Information and technology for SME production and marketing 
 
Organizational scaling up – integration into broader more complex programmes 
Appropriation by partners – further development on a greater scale by other 
donors, private sector or government Scaling up of innovation 
From practice to policy – innovation becomes the basis for policy programmes and 
initiatives by government, donor agencies and others. 
 
Affordable to the poor, financially and socially 
Culturally appropriate 
Advantages clear to project participants  
Features of innovation 
Results rapidly visible 
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1
  The definition of innovation in the Innovation Strategy is: “... a process that adds value or solves a problem 
in new ways, and to qualify as an innovation, a product, idea or approach needs to be new to its context, useful 
and cost-effective in relation to a goal and able to stick after pilot testing” (p. 4). For IFAD, the most important 
innovations are those that “... change the way smallholders and other rural poor people invest, produce and 
market their products; manage their assets; get organized, communicate and interact with their partners; and 
influence policies and institutions” (p. 7). 
B.  EVALUATION CRITERIA/KEY QUESTIONS – for rating  
I. Pro-poor orientation of the 
innovation 
1. Did the programme promote innovation that is consistent with 
IFAD’s definition? 1 
2. Did the innovation address a need or priority widely felt by the 
poor? 
3. Did the innovation empower the rural poor to overcome poverty 
better and more cost-effectively? 
II. Building capabilities and 
understanding of challenges 
requiring innovation 
4. Did the programme implementation incorporate capacity building 
for innovation (skills training, motivation for innovation, etc) 
5. Did the programme implementation incorporate previous lessons 
on innovation  
III. Nurturing partnerships and 
facilitating innovation networks 
6. Has programme implementation built partnerships and networks 
for innovation   
IV. Embedding rigorous 
innovation processes and 
associated risk management 
into the management practices 
of innovation 
7. Did the programme follow an integrated process of innovation 
including: 
♦ Scouting 
♦ Participation of the poor  
♦ Developing alternatives with clear goals and indicators 
♦ Experimentation/pilot testing/ adaptation 
♦ Monitoring/evaluation/ validating 
♦ Identification of risks 
♦ Risks mitigation measures 
♦ Documenting lessons learned (KM) 
♦ Did the innovation link to pilot grant-funded activities?   
V. Facilitating a more 
supportive environment for 
innovation 
8. Has the programme adequately provided & devoted good attention 
to: 
♦ Flexibility to allow for adaptation of innovations 
♦  Inclusion of multi-disciplinary stakeholders in guiding the innovation 
process 
♦ Autonomy for decision-makers regarding innovations 
♦ Simple reporting requirements 
♦ Budget (grants & loans) allocation to support innovation  
VI. Replication and scaling up 
9. Has replication of innovations occurred? 
10. Has upscaling of innovation occurred? 
11. Have IFAD’s supervision and implementation support facilitated 
the replication of innovation?  
12. Have IFAD’s supervision and implementation support facilitated 
the replication of innovation?  
13. Has there been cultivation of strategic partnerships for upscaling 
of innovation.  
14. Have there been efforts to disseminate innovations in the country? 
15. Was co-financing used for scaling up? 
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APPENDIX V 
 
 
Evidence of Variability across Innovation Composite Criteria in 
Evaluated Projects and Project Design 
 
 
A.  Evidence of Variability across Innovation Composite Criteria  
in the Selected Sample: Evaluated Projects 
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B.  Evidence of Variability across Composite Criteria in Project Design 
Figure 9. Evidence of variability across selected innovation 
indicators in project design
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APPENDIX VI 
 
 
List of Projects of the Total Population and the Selected Sample of Evaluated Projects 
 
A.  List of all Stand Alone Projects and Projects within the CPEs Evaluated and Rated by IEO 
Between 2002 and 2007 
Region1 Country Project Title Approval Date 
APR Bangladesh Netrakona Integrated Agricultural Production and Water Management Project 02-Dec-93 
WCA Chad Ouadis of Kanem Agricultural Development Project 20-Apr-94 
LAC Haiti Small-scale Irrigation Schemes Rehabilitation Project 26-Apr-89 
WCA Mauritania Oasis Development Project – Phase II 06-Sep-94 
NEN Morocco Livestock and Pasture Development Project in the Eastern Region 19-Apr-90 
ESA Namibia Northern Regions Livestock Development Project 06-Sep-94 
LAC Perú Management of Natural Resources in the Southern Highlands Project 14-Sep-95 
APR Philippines Rural Micro-Enterprise Finance Project 18-Apr-96 
ESA Tanzania Agricultural and Environmental Management Project 04-Dec-96 
NEN Yemen Tihama Environment Protection Project 07-Apr-93 
WCA Benin Income-Generating Activities Project 06-Dec-95 
LAC Brazil Community Development Project for the Rio Gaviao Region 07-Dec-95 
WCA Burkina Faso 
Special Programme for Soil and Water Conservation and 
Agroforestry in the Central Plateau 04-Dec-87 
LAC Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples’ Development Project 04-Dec-97 
ESA Eritrea Eastern Lowlands Wadi Development Project 05-Dec-94 
WCA Ghana Root and Tuber Improvement Programme 04-Dec-97 
WCA Guinea Smallholder Development Project in North Lower Guinea 14-Sep-95 
NEN Lebanon Smallholder Livestock Rehabilitation Project 15-Apr-92 
APR Nepal Hills Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project 07-Dec-89 
LAC Venezuela Support Project for Small Producers in the Semi-Arid Zones of Falcon and Lara States 04-Apr-91 
ESA Ethiopia Special Country Programme – Phase II 05-Dec-96 
WCA Gambia Rural Finance and Community Initiatives Project 02-Dec-98 
NEN Jordan Agricultural Resource Management Project – Phase II 06-Dec-95 
APR Lao Northern Sayabouri Rural Development Project 04-Dec-97 
LAC Paraguay Peasant Development Fund Credit Project – Eastern Region of Paraguay 07-Dec-95 
WCA Senegal Rural Micro-Enterprises Project 06-Dec-95 
NEN Tunisia Integrated Agricultural Development Project in the Governorate 
of Siliana 06-Dec-95 
                                                     
1
  APR = Asia and the Pacific; ESA = Eastern and Southern Africa; LAC = Latina America and the 
Caribbean; NEN = Near East and North Africa; WCA = Western and Central Africa Division. 
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A (continued).  List of all Stand Alone Projects and Projects within the CPEs Evaluated and  
        Rated by IEO Between 2002 and 2007 
Region1 Country Project Title Approval Date 
APR Viet Nam Agricultural Resources Conservation and Development Project in Quang Binh Province 04-Dec-96 
APR Viet Nam Ha Giang Development Project for Ethnic Minorities 04-Dec-97 
APR China Southwest Anhui Integrated Agricultural Project 11-Sep-97 
WCA Ghana Upper-East Region Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project 29-Apr-99 
WCA Ghana Upper West Agricultural Development Project 14-Sep-95 
WCA Guinea Fouta Djallon Local Development and Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme 04-Dec-96 
APR India North Eastern Region Community Resource Management Project for Upland Areas 29-Apr-97 
LAC Mexico Development Project of the Mayan Communities in the Yucatan Peninsula 07-Dec-95 
APR Mongolia Arhangai Rural Poverty Alleviation Project 17-Apr-96 
NEN Morocco Tafilalet and Dades Rural Development Project 20-Apr-94 
ESA Mozambique Niassa Agricultural Development Project 20-Apr-94 
ESA Uganda District Development Support Programme 10-Sep-98 
LAC Venezuela Economic Development of Rural Communities Project 11-Sep-96 
APR Bangladesh Employment Generation Project for Rural Poor 12-Apr-95 
APR Bangladesh Small-scale Water Resources Development Project 06-Dec-95 
APR Bangladesh Agricultural Diversification and Intensification Project 29-Apr-97 
APR Bangladesh Third Rural Infrastructure Development Project 04-Dec-97 
APR Bangladesh Aquaculture Development Project 23-Apr-98 
APR Bangladesh Smallholder Agricultural Improvement Project 29-Apr-99 
APR Bangladesh Snamganj Community-Based Resource Management Project 12-Sep-01 
APR Bangladesh Microfinance and Technical Support Project 10-Apr-03 
LAC Mexico Development Project for Marginal Rural Communities in the Ixtlera Region 03-Oct-90 
LAC Mexico Rural Development Project for the Indigenous Communities of the State of Puebla 15-Apr-92 
LAC Mexico Rural Development Project for Rubber-Producing Regions of Mexico 03-May-00 
LAC Mexico Strengthening Project for the National Micro-Watershed Programme 17-Dec-03 
ESA Rwanda Rwanda Returnees Rehabilitation Programme (PRRR) 11-Sep-97 
ESA Rwanda Byumka Agricultural Development Project - Phase II 01-Oct-90 
ESA Rwanda Intensified Land Use Management Project in the Buberuka Highlands (PGERB) 02-Dec-92 
ESA Rwanda Rural small and Micro-Enterprise Promotion Project 17-Apr-96 
ESA Rwanda Umutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Project (PDRCIU) 04-May-00 
ESA Rwanda Smallholder Cash and Export Crops Development Project 11-Dec-02 
LAC Colombia Rural Microenterprise Development Programme 11-Sep-96 
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A (continued).  List of all Stand Alone Projects and Projects within the CPEs Evaluated and 
        Rated by IEO Between 2002 and 2007 
Region1 Country Project Title Approval Date 
ESA Ethiopia Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project 02-Dec-93 
NEN Georgia Agricultural Development Project 30-Apr-97 
WCA Niger Special Country Programme Phase II 13-Sep-95 
LAC Perú Development of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project 04-Dec-97 
APR Philippines Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resource Management Project 06-Dec-95 
NEN Romania Apuseni Development Project 10-Sep-98 
ESA Tanzania Participatory Irrigation Development Programme 08-Sep-99 
LAC Brazil Low-income Family Support Project in the Semi-arid Region of Sergipe State 02-Dec-93 
LAC Brazil Sustainable Development Project for Agrarian Reform Settlements in the Semi-Arid North-East 03-Dec-98 
WCA Mali Income Diversification Programme in the Mali Sud Area 05-Dec-94 
WCA Mali Zone Lacustre Development Project - Phase II 17-Apr-96 
WCA Mali Sahelian Areas Development Fund Programme 02-Dec-98 
NEN Morocco Rural Development Project for Taourirt-Taforalt 04-Dec-96 
NEN Morocco Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province 07-Dec-00 
NEN Albania Mountain Areas Development Programme 09-Dec-99 
LAC Belize Community-Initiated Agriculture and Resource Management Project 23-Apr-98 
WCA Burkina Faso Community-Based Rural Development Project 04-May-00 
APR Pakistan Dir Area Support Project 11-Sep-96 
APR Philippines Western Mindanao Community Initiatives Project 23-Apr-98 
ESA Ethiopia Agricultural Research and Training Project 10-Sep-98 
ESA Ethiopia Rural Financial Intermediation Programme 06-Dec-01 
ESA Ethiopia Pastoral Community Development Project 11-Sep-03 
APR Pakistan Mansehra Village Support Project 03-Dec-92 
APR Pakistan Pat Feeder Command Area Development Project 19-Apr-94 
APR Pakistan Barani Village Development Project 03-Dec-98 
APR Pakistan North-West Frontier Province Barani Area Development Project 26-Apr-01 
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B.  List of Selected Sample of Stand Alone Projects and Projects within CPEs 
 
Region1 Country Project Title Approval Date 
Closing 
Date Sector 
Type of 
Eval. 
Eval. 
Date 
1 WCA Guinea 
Fouta Djallon Local 
Development and 
Agricultural 
Rehabilitation Progr. 
Dec-96 Dec-08 Rural development IE
*
 2005 
2 WCA Ghana 
Root and Tuber 
Improvement 
Programme 
Dec-97 Sep-05 Agricultural development IE 2004 
3 WCA Mali 
Sahelian Areas 
Development Fund 
Programme 
Dec-98 Sep-09 Rural development CPE 2007 
4 WCA Ghana 
Upper-East Region 
Land Conservation 
and Smallholder 
Rehabilitation Project 
Apr-99 Dec-06 Agricultural development IE 2006 
5 WCA Ghana 
Upper West 
Agricultural 
Development Project 
Sep-95 Dec-04 Agricultural development IE 2006 
6 WCA Burkina Faso 
Community-Based 
Rural Development 
Project 
May-00 Dec-07 Rural development IE 2008 
7 WCA Gambia 
Rural Finance and 
Community Initiatives 
Project 
Dec-98 Dec-06 
Credit and 
Financial 
Services 
IE 2005 
8 WCA Nigeria 
Roots and Tubers 
Expansion 
Programme 
Dec-99 Mar-10 
Research, 
Extension, 
Training 
CPE 2009 
9 ESA Ethiopia Special Country Programme, Phase II Dec-96 Dec-06 Irrigation IE 2009 
10 ESA Uganda District Development Support Programme Sep-98 Dec-06 
Rural 
development CE
**
 2005 
11 ESA Ethiopia Agricultural Research 
and Training Project Sep-98 Dec-07 
Research, 
Extension, 
Training 
CPE 2009 
12 ESA Tanzania 
Participatory 
Irrigation 
Development 
Programme 
Sep-99 Jun-07 Irrigation CE 2007 
13 ESA Rwanda 
Umutara Community 
Resource and 
Infrastructure 
Development Project  
May-00 Jun-11 Agricultural development CPE 2006 
14 APR India 
North Eastern Region 
Community Resource 
Management Project 
for Upland 
Apr-97 Mar-08 Agricultural development IE 2006 
15 APR China 
Southwest Anhui 
Integrated 
Agricultural Project 
Sep-97 Jun-04 Agricultural development CE 2006 
16 APR Vietnam 
Ha Giang 
Development Project 
for Ethnic Minorities 
Dec-97 Jul-04 Rural development IE 2004 
* Interim evaluation (IE). ** Completion evaluation (CE). 
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B (continued).  List of Selected Sample of Stand Alone Projects and Projects within CPEs 
 Region1 Country Project Title Approval Date 
Closing 
Date Sector 
Type of 
Eval. 
Eval. 
Date 
17 APR Bangladesh 
Small-scale Water 
Resources 
Development Sector 
Project  
Dec-95 Dec-02 Irrigation CPE 2006 
18 APR Philippines 
Western Mindanao 
Community 
Initiatives Project 
Apr-98 Dec-07 Rural development IE 2008 
19 APR Pakistan Barani Village Development Project Dec-98 Dec-07 
Agricultural 
development CPE 2008 
20 APR Bangladesh 
Agricultural 
Diversification and 
Intensification 
Project 
Apr-97 Dec-04 Agricultural development CPE 2006 
21 APR Mongolia 
Arhangai Rural 
Poverty Alleviation 
Project 
Apr-96 Jul-04 Livestock CE 2007 
22 LAC Colombia 
Rural 
Microenterprise 
Development 
Programme 
11-Sep-96 Jun-07 
Credit and 
Financial 
Services 
CE 2007 
23 LAC Perú 
Development of the 
Puno-Cusco Corridor 
Project 
Dec-97 Jun-08 
Research, 
Extension, 
Training 
IE 2007 
24 LAC Belize 
Community-Initiated 
Agriculture and 
Resource 
Management Project 
Apr-98 Jun-06 Agricultural development CE 2008 
25 LAC Brazil 
Sustainable 
Development Project 
for Agrarian Reform 
Settlements in the 
Semi-Arid North-
East 
Dec-98 Jun-09 
Credit and 
Financial 
Services 
CPE 2008 
26 NEN Morocco 
Rural Development 
Project for Taourirt-
Taforalt 
Dec-96 Jun-08 Agricultural development CPE 2008 
27 NEN Georgia Agricultural Development Project Apr-97 Dec-05 
Credit and 
Financial 
Services 
CE 2007 
28 NEN Romania Apuseni Development Project Sep-98 Jun-07 
Credit and 
Financial 
Services 
CE 2008 
29 NEN Albania 
Mountain Areas 
Development 
Programme 
Dec-99 Mar-08 Agricultural development CE 2008 
30 NEN Morocco 
Rural Development 
Project in the 
Mountain Zones of 
Al-Haouz Province 
Dec-00 Sep-08 Agricultural development CPE 2008 
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APPENDIX VII  
 
List of Recent Country Programme Documents Reviewed 
 
A.  Listing of COSOPs Assessed 
                                                     
1
  Although the final version of the Innovation Strategy was released in December 2007, preparatory 
activities and draft documents had already been written. It was therefore decided to include COSOPs that had 
been generated late in 2007 as part of the sample of post-Innovation Strategy COSOPs. 
 
 
B.  List of Projects Reviewed 
No Region Country Project Title Approval Date 
1 ESA Ethiopia Pastoral Community Development Project 11 Sep 03 
2 LAC Guatemala National Rural Development Programme – Phase I: the Western Region 11 Sep 03 
3 NEN Moldova Agricultural Revitalization Project 17 Dec 03 
4 WCA Gambia, The Participatory Integrated Watershed-Management Project 21 Apr 04 
5 ESA Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Improvement Programme 02 Dec 04 
6 APR Viet Nam Decentralized Programme for Rural Poverty Reduction in Ha Giang and Quang Binh Provinces 02 Dec 04 
7 LAC Guatemala National Rural Development Programme: Central and Eastern Regions 02 Dec 04 
Before Innovation Strategy After Innovation Strategy1 
Guinea 14 October 1999 Mali 6 November 2007 
Moldova August 2002 Mexico 6 November 2007 
Vietnam 12 March 2003 Yemen 13 November 2007 
Guatemala 19 March 2003 Jordan 20 November 2007 
Burundi 11 September 2003 Moldova  20 November 2007 
 Bolivia 12 December 2007 
 Cambodia 12 December 2007 
 Afghanistan 26 March 2008 
 Vietnam 11 September 2008 
  Brazil 11 September 2008 
 Burundi 11 September 2008 
 Ethiopia 18 November 2008 
 Indonesia 21 November 2008 
 Guatemala 25 November 2008 
 Morocco 28 November 2008 
 Guinea 16 December 2008 
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B (continued).  List of Projects Reviewed 
No Region Country Project Title Approval Date 
8 NEN Sudan Western Sudan Resources Management Programme 02 Dec 04 
9 WCA Mali Northern Regions Investment and Rural Development Programme 19 Apr 05 
10 LAC El Salvador Rural Development and Modernization Project for the Eastern Region 19 Apr 05 
11 APR China South Gansu Poverty-Reduction Programme 08 Sep 05 
12 NEN Moldova Rural Business Development Programme 13 Dec 05 
13 NEN Albania Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas 13 Dec 05 
14 ESA Madagascar Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions 20 Apr 06 
15 APR Viet Nam Programme for Improving Market Participation of the Poor in Ha Tinh and Tra Vinh Provinces 14 Sep 06 
16 WCA Gambia, The Rural Finance Project 14 Sep 06 
17 WCA Mali Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme 14 Dec 06 
18 LAC Haiti Small-scale Irrigation Development Project (PAPR-2) 14 Dec 06 
19 NEN Sudan Butana Integrated Rural Development Project 14 Dec 06 
20 ESA Ethiopia Participatory Small-scale Irrigation Development Programme 18 Apr 07 
21 NEN Syria North-eastern Region Rural Development Project 18 Apr 07 
22 NEN Morocco Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Errachidia Province 12 Sep 07 
23 LAC El Salvador Rural Development and Modernization Project for the Central 
and Paracentral Regions 12 Sep 07 
24 APR Viet Nam Developing Business with the Rural Poor Programme  13 Dec 07 
25 WCA Burkina Faso Small-Scale Irrigation and Water Management Project 13 Dec 07 
26 WCA Ghana Northern Rural Growth Programme 13 Dec 07 
27 WCA Nigeria Rural Microenterprise Development Programme  13 Dec 07 
28 ESA Angola Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project 13 Dec 07 
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B (continued).  List of Projects Reviewed 
No Region Country Project Title Approval Date 
29 ESA Madagascar Support Programme for Rural Microenterprise Poles and Regional Economies (PROSPERER) 13 Dec 07 
30 ESA Malawi Rural Livelihoods and Economic Enhancement Programme  13 Dec 07 
31 APR Bangladesh National Agricultural Technology Project  13 Dec 07 
32 APR China Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Rural Advancement Programme 13 Dec 07 
33 APR Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund Project – Phase II 13 Dec 07 
34 LAC Guyana Rural Enterprise and Auricular Development Project 13 Dec 07 
35 LAC Honduras Project for Enhancing the Rural Economic Competitiveness of Yoro 13 Dec 07 
36 LAC Peru Project for Strengthening Assets, Markets and Rural Development Policies in the Northern Highlands (Sierra Norte) 13 Dec 07 
37 NEN Azerbaijan Rural Development Project for the North West  13 Dec 07 
38 NEN Djibouti Programme for the Mobilization of Surface Water and Sustainable Land Management 13 Dec 07 
39 ESA Mauritius Marine and Agriculture Resources Support Programme 24 Apr 08 
40 APR India Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan Project 24 Apr 08 
41 APR Philippines Second Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resource Management Project 24 Apr 08 
42 LAC Panama Participative Development and Rural Modernization Project 24 Apr 08 
43 APR Indonesia IFAD Support to the National Programme for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas 11 Sep 08 
44 NEN Moldova Rural Financial Services and Marketing Programme 11 Sep 08 
45 WCA Cameroon Rural Microfinance Development Support Project 11 Sep 08 
46 WCA Congo Rural Development Project in Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments 11 Sep 08 
47 WCA Senegal Agricultural Value Chains Support Project 11 Sep 08 
48 ESA Madagascar Support to Farmers’ Professional Organizations and Agricultural Services Project 11 Sep 08 
49 ESA Mozambique Rural Markets Promotion Programme 11 Sep 08 
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B (continued).  List of Projects Reviewed 
No Region Country Project Title Approval Date 
50 ESA Rwanda Kirehe Community-based Watershed Management Project 11 Sep 08 
51 APR Kyrgyzstan Agricultural Investments and Services Project 11 Sep 08 
52 LAC Costa Rica National Rural and Entrepreneurial Development Programme 11 Sep 08 
53 NEN Albania Mountain to Markets Programme 11 Sep 08 
54 NEN Sudan Southern Sudan Livelihoods Development Project 11 Sep 08 
55 APR Viet Nam Pro-Poor Partnerships for Agroforestry Development Project 17 Dec 08 
56 LAC Guatemala Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Northern Region 17 Dec 08 
57 WCA Congo, D.R. Integrated Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme in Maniema Province 17 Dec 08 
58 WCA Ghana Rural and Agricultural Finance Programme 17 Dec 08 
59 WCA Niger 
Agricultural and Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
Initiative Project – Institutional Strengthening Component 
(ARRDI-ISC) 
17 Dec 08 
60 ESA Swaziland Rural Finance and Enterprise Development Programme 17 Dec 08 
61 ESA Tanzania Agricultural Sector Development Programme 17 Dec 08 
62 APR China Dabieshan Area Poverty Reduction Programme 17 Dec 08 
63 APR Laos Sustainable Natural Resource Management and Productivity Enhancement Project 17 Dec 08 
64 APR Philippines Rapid Food Production Enhancement Programme 17 Dec 08 
65 APR Tajikistan Khatlon Livelihoods Support Project 17 Dec 08 
66 LAC Belize Rural Finance Programme 17 Dec 08 
67 LAC Venezuela Orinoco Delta Warao Support Programme 17 Dec 08 
68 NEN Bosnia and Herzegovina Rural Livelihoods Development Project 17 Dec 08 
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APPENDIX IX 
 
Excerpts of the Report of the Chairperson of the Evaluation Committee1 on the Corporate-level 
Evaluation of IFAD’s Capacity to Promote and Scale Up Innovation 
 
1. The Committee found the corporate-level evaluation (CLE) of IFAD’s capacity to promote and 
scale up innovations a timely and useful document that raises critical issues related to the topic. The 
Committee also underlined its concurrence with the CLE’s recommendations, in particular with the 
need to treat scaling up as mission-critical. 
 
2. IFAD Management sees innovation as a key element in achieving results in rural poverty 
reduction. Management also found the report to be helpful and is integrating the recommendations 
made into its operational procedures and policies. 
 
3. Management broadly concurs with the CLE findings, and recognizes that there have been 
limited incentives for staff to innovate and subsequently to document and share knowledge about 
innovations. Management also agrees that scaling up is mission-critical for the institution as a whole, 
and it is also for this reason that a grant has been provided to the Brookings Institution to assist the 
Fund in finding critical pathways to scale up its innovation and impact. 
 
4. On establishing an innovation agenda, Management concurs with the CLE recommendation, 
although it flagged the need to maintain a two-pronged approach – working on “big bets” (e.g. private 
sector, value chain, and public-private partnership) while continuing to support small-scale 
innovations developed at the grass-roots level. 
 
5. Several Committee members discussed the need for added clarity on IFAD’s definition of 
innovation and scaling up. 
 
6. Committee members also felt that, in the future, it would be useful for IEO to share the draft 
approach papers for all CLEs with the Evaluation Committee for their comments before the 
evaluation begins.  
 
7. In addition, Committee members noted the importance for such CLEs to focus on gender issues 
and the role of women, as well as the field dimension and interaction with beneficiaries. In this 
regard, members underlined the fact that the CLE on gender could be considered as a new starting 
point. Furthermore, it was suggested that IFAD could make gender one of its "big bets”. 
 
8. On another issue, Committee members underlined the importance of carefully reflecting on the 
different partners to be mobilized throughout the innovation process, and underscored the importance 
of capturing and disseminating best practices generated through innovation in the field. 
 
9. In the course of the session’s deliberations, the importance of making available adequate time 
and resources, including dedicated training, for country programme managers to pilot innovations and 
their scaling up was considered essential. 
 
10. Committee members acknowledged IFAD’s comparative advantage in institutional innovations 
and suggested that IFAD continue to partner with other institutions to promote innovations in 
agricultural technology. 
                                                     
1
  Executive Board — Ninety-ninth Session, Rome, 21-22 April 2010, (EB 2010/99/R.5). 
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